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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This public health handbook, Cryptosporidium and Water, was developed by the Working
Group on Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis (WGWC) -- a multi-disciplinary group composed of
representatives from the national Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),  Food and Drug Administration (FDA), U. S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), state and local health departments, the drinking water
industry, and organizations representing the concerns of immunocompromised  persons.  The
handbook was developed to assist local health departments and water utilities in preparing
for and responding to reports of Cryptosporidium oocysts in tap water or in a community’s
source of drinking water (river, lake, well).  A new, federally mandated water monitoring
regulation goes into effect in 1997 that requires water utilities to test drinking water sources
once a month for Cryptosporidium.  Cryptosporidium will likely be found in the water
supplies of many communities; such findings may result in many unnecessary boil water
advisories if test results are not carefully interpreted.
The WGWC encourages health departments and water utilities to work as a team to develop
appropriate health risk assessment protocols and public responses to findings of
Cryptosporidium in drinking water supplies.  The common occurrence of Cryptosporidium in
sources of drinking water throughout the nation, and the lack of  reliable water testing meth-
ods for determining if a sufficient number of viable oocysts are present in water to cause an
outbreak, combine to make this a challenging task.  Because cryptosporidia are resistant to
the chlorine disinfectants commonly used in water treatment, the WGWC encourages water
utilities to optimize their filtration methods to reduce the risk of tap water contamination. It
should be recognized, however that Cryptosporidium oocysts may occasionally get through
even well operated filters. Although the handbook focuses primarily on Cryptosporidium in
drinking water and, to a lesser extent, recreational water, most of the principles outlined in
the handbook can be applied equally well to the prevention and investigation of other water-
borne pathogens.
The WGWC recommends the formation of a local Cryptosporidium Response Task Force
that includes, at a minimum, representatives from the health department, water regulatory
authority, and water utility.  Guidance is provided in the handbook for organizing such a task
force,  evaluating the water system’s vulnerability to Cryptosporidium (e.g., source water
protection and water treatment methods) before there is public concern about the risk of
waterborne cryptosporidiosis.  The handbook also provides guidelines on assessing and
developing health department capabilities for detecting a Cryptosporidium outbreak, and
developing a coordinated emergency response plan.   Also reviewed are some of the complex
issues that should be addressed before issuing or rescinding a boil water advisory.
If Cryptosporidium is detected in your drinking water, a significant portion of health depart-
ment and water utility staff time will be consumed by media and public inquiries.  The
WGWC encourages you to prepare for such inquiries well in advance of a crisis.  One effec-
tive approach is to develop a good working relationship with key media health/science
writers.  Let them know in advance that your community, like most communities in the
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United States, can expect to find Cryptosporidium occasionally in source water when manda-
tory Cryptosporidium testing is initiated.  The health department, water utility, and the public
will further benefit if the media are provided with a clear understanding of the many prob-
lems surrounding interpretation of water testing results for Cryptosporidium.  Making the
extra effort to work with the media before there is a crisis can reduce the chances of articles
being published or broadcast with inaccurate, misleading, or frightening information about
cryptosporidiosis and Cryptosporidium test results.  Practical tips for working with the media
as well as informational materials are provided in the handbook.
Guidance is also provided for initiating epidemiologic studies to determine if an outbreak is
occurring, for conducting a systematic investigation of the water supply to determine if
drinking water is a likely source of a suspected outbreak, as well as for assessing the size of
an outbreak, geographic distribution of ill persons, and specific risk factors for infection.  A
sample data collection form and epidemiologic questionnaire are provided to facilitate this
process.  Emergency telephone numbers are provided for state health departments, CDC, and
EPA, to contact for assistance in interpreting preliminary water quality data or investigating a
possible outbreak.
Within the various chapters you will find information on Cryptosporidium and
cryptosporidiosis that can be used for developing public education materials and preparing
news media releases.  This includes emergency water treatment guidelines such as boiling
water for 1 minute.  Informational materials for immunosuppressed persons (e.g., those with
AIDS) at risk of developing life-threatening cryptosporidiosis are also provided. For immuno-
suppressed persons who want to try to avoid all municipal tap water and commercial products
made with tap water, guidance is given for selecting an effective home-use water filter,
bottled water, soft drinks, and juices.  For the laboratorian, tables are provided that summa-
rize information about the types and sources of diagnostic Cryptosporidium tests for water
and stool, along with a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses.  An appendix includes
selected published articles, a listing of key words and phrases, and an index to make the
handbook user-friendly.
We hope you will find this handbook helpful.   We are interested in receiving comments or
questions and welcome suggestions for improving it.  Research on Cryptosporidium is
growing rapidly, and we anticipate that some sections of this handbook will need to be
updated.  Please let us know if you would like to receive updated materials by filling out and
mailing the postpaid postcard enclosed in the front pocket.  We welcome your input.
Dennis D.  Juranek
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
for the Working Group on Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis
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INTRODUCTION
Cryptosporidium is a protozoan parasite affecting the gastrointestinal tract of humans and
animals.  It is shed in the feces in the form of an “oocyst,” which has a hard shell to protect it
from the environment.
Infections may be asymptomatic or may cause watery diarrhea and abdominal cramps.  The
organism is transmitted by the fecal-oral route. Outbreaks have most commonly been associ-
ated with person-to person (day care center) and waterborne (drinking and recreational water)
modes of spread.  Foodborne and animal-(especially calves) to-person spread has also been
documented.
At this time, there is no specific drug therapy proven to be effective against Cryptosporidium,
but the immunocompetent person will usually recover from illness within 2 weeks.
Immunocompromised individuals, however, may be unable to clear the parasite and suffer
chronic and debilitating illness.
Waterborne Cryptosporidium outbreaks have occurred in both large and small communities,
with the largest outbreak occurring in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1993, affecting an estimated
403,000 people.  Such outbreaks have caused major disruption to residents, businesses, and
government.  Infection with the Cryptosporidium organism may also have contributed to the
premature deaths of immunosuppressed individuals in these outbreaks.
Because of this, the finding of Cryptosporidium oocysts in many drinking water sources
(rivers, lakes, and reservoirs), and occasionally even in treated water, has been a source of
considerable concern to drinking water and public health officials, as well as to the public
and the news media.
Ordinary water disinfection methods cannot kill Cryptosporidium oocysts, and even the best
filtration units may allow a few organisms to pass through in treated water.  However, the
health risks associated with the consumption of public drinking water supplies contaminated
with small numbers of oocysts is unknown.
A new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) collaborative project study, the Information
Collection Rule (ICR), will begin in 1997 and will require municipal water systems serving
over 100,000 people to test their source waters for Cryptosporidium. If the number of
cryptosporidia exceed a specified limit, water systems will be requirred to test their treated
water as well. The data obtained through this study will assist the EPA in the development of
water quality standards relating to Cryptosporidium.  Testing results will be available to the
public and news media and it is very likely that concern will result from reports of positive
findings.  Health officials will be looked upon to be knowledgeable and to provide guidance
in the event of a real or perceived health threat by this organism.  In smaller communities,
Cryptosporidium has also proven to be an important concern, and health officials in such
localities also need to be aware of any Cr ptosporidium testing, public or private.
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This handbook has been developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Working Group on Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis to guide health officials in formulating a
response to findings of Cryptosporidium in drinking water.  Working Group membership
represents a wide range of agencies and disciplines, including the CDC, EPA, Food and Drug
Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, drinking water industry, state and local
health officials, laboratory professionals, medical and environmental researchers, and com-
munity action groups.
In addition to assisting you in your response to real or perceived threats from waterborne
Cryptosporidium, it is our intention that this handbook will also prove useful to you in
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I. Coordination - Forming a Task Force
Need for a Task Force
In many localities, drinking water issues involve jurisdiction held jointly by several
different governmental agencies, as well as nongovernmental groups.  Therefore, it is highly
recommended that local task forces be formed, with participation by all related groups.
Before water testing yields a positive test for Cryptosporidium, these task forces should be
created to formulate sound and timely responses, as such a finding could cause great public
concern and scrutiny. Similar task forces should be established at the state or territorial level.
 Benefits of Forming a Task Force:
• All appropriate officials work together and are included in the decision-making process.
• Community groups with related interests can be included in the overall process.
• Standardized, coordinated response tactics are thought out and developed, thereby
avoiding unwarranted adverse economic and political impacts.
• A coordinated response and a unified public health message promote public trust.
• Relationships and response strategies developed can be used as a basis to manage other
waterborne disease threats.
Task Force Membership
The task force can be composed of an Executive Group
and an Advisory Group.
The Executive Group can include official agency
representatives and technical experts who are immedi-
ately responsible for drinking water safety and disease
outbreak investigations, as well as a person responsible
for public communications.  You may already have
similar individuals chosen to handle responses to
natural disasters.
We suggest the following:
• Health department representative (e.g., infectious disease epidemiologist, communicable
disease specialist, community or public health nurse or other health officer)
• Water regulatory representative (health department and/or environmental protection agency)
• Local or regional drinking water EPA representative
• Water utility representative (public or private water supplier agency)
• Public information officer or other designated spokesperson
Before water testing yields
a positive test for
Cryptosporidium,  joint
task forces should be
created to formulate sound
and timely responses to
such a finding.
1-2 Chapter 1- Coordination and Preparation
The Advisory Group might include one or more representatives from as many of the
following as is possible and appropriate, meeting with the Executive Group on a regular or
periodic basis:
• State or regional health agency representative
• Agricultural representative (if watershed issues are involved)
• Clinical laboratory representative
• Immunosuppressed persons’ group representative
• Local community group representative
• Local medical association representative
• Local hospital/HMO association representative
• Representative of local Red Cross chapter or other emergency aid agency
• Member(s) of association(s) representing affected industries (e.g., restaurants, hotels,
food and water industries)
• Representatives of local day care and nursing home businesses
• University/research expert
There are various ways in which the Executive Group and the Advisory Group could work
together, depending on what is appropriate for a particular situation and locale.  The
interaction could work as follows.
The Executive Group meets several times to get organized (i.e., go over bylaws, rules
and regulations; identify areas of responsibility; identify resources; identify and begin to
assess technology issues).  The Executive Group could also identify groups and/or individu-
als to invite to serve on the Advisory Group and identify potential projects for Advisory
Group participation (i.e., developing notification lists for immunosuppressed persons’ groups
or health care providers)  The Advisory Group will probably also come up with their own
ideas for projects and could split off into committees to work on these.
The Executive Group will most likely meet on a frequent and regular basis, and the Advisory
Group will meet with them on a regular, but less frequent basis.  Participation by certain
Advisory Group members on specific Executive Group projects might dictate their meeting
with the Executive Group regularly for a time.  During combined Executive and Advisory
Group meetings, the Executive Group would report to the Advisory Group on Executive
Group project progress, and request input on ideas and plans.
II. Preparation
Task force activities
Executive Group becomes familiar with the local water system’s sources of water, treatment
methodologies, monitoring tests, and the federal and state standards for drinking water
quality.
• Reviews current water treatment methodologies and capabilities with the water utility
representative.
• Assesses vulnerability of the local drinking water to contamination of source water and to
treatment failure. (See Chapter 4)
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• Determines what water testing results will necessitate follow-up and task force response.
• Discusses participation in the Partnership for Safe Water, a joint program developed by
the EPA, state water supply agencies, and the water industry to optimize water treatment
performance, utilizing existing facilities and staff.
Executive and Advisory Groups assess the status of local epidemiologic surveillance for
cryptosporidiosis and other diarrheal diseases, and make improvements if necessary.
• Encourage hospital and other clinical laboratories to screen stool samples for
Cryptosporidium.
• Educate local physicians about Cryptosporidium and encourage them to screen
diarrheal cases for Cryptosporidium.
• Institute mandatory reporting of cryptosporidiosis cases.
• Develop ongoing epidemiologic surveillance to detect outbreaks of diarrheal disease
as soon as possible. (See Chapter 2)
• Determine what epidemiologic findings will necessitate follow-up and response.
Executive and Advisory Groups develop an Action/Response Plan to follow in the event that
water utility and/or epidemiologic data indicate that drinking water may be a potential health
risk.  This plan should be sufficiently detailed to ensure notification of all involved groups
and agencies, as well as the media.  Section III provides assistance on how to develop such a
plan.
Executive Group identifies a governmental chain of command to be notified and gain ap-
proval from if a water-related emergency occurs.  A suggested form for facilitating this
process is provided in the appendix, as Figure A.  This chain of command may include:
• Immediate supervisors of Executive Group members (first level)
• Department and agency heads/commissioners
• Mayor, other municipal officials
• Governor, state officials
• Others, as appropriate for locale
• Other municipal or county officials
Executive and Advisory Groups determine who will be the spokesperson for communications
if a public announcement is needed. Scientific experts on the Executive or Advisory Groups
in the areas of health and water quality should also be selected to provide technical backup
for the main media spokesperson and to do interviews if necessary.  An agency public infor-
mation office or equivalent can be used to direct questions to appropriate experts.  These
experts should be aware of which types of questions they should not answer, but rather
should refer back to the information office.  Back-up spokespersons who have been equally
trained should be designated.
Executive and Advisory Groups develop and have available public education materials on
cryptosporidiosis. (See Chapter 6)
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Executive and Advisory Groups identify the major water users in your locale that would be
affected by a waterborne emergency and list, with fax, telephone numbers, and e-mail
addresses the contact persons to notify in the event of such an emergency.  A suggested form
to facilitate this process is provided in the appendix, as Figure B.  Some types of major users
are listed below.
• Hospitals, nursing homes, day care centers, residential care facilities






• Stadia and arenas
• Facilities using automatic ice-making equipment
Executive and Advisory Groups determine back-up or alternate sources of drinking water for
use in case of an emergency.
• Communicate with state or local emergency response management coordinators to
see if they have already developed emergency drinking water supply plans.
• Contact nearby military and national guard installations about their emergency water
treatment capabilities.
• Identify bottled water suppliers and determine their capabilities to serve as a substitute
water source in the event of an emergency.
• Encourage institutions (hospitals, schools, long-term care facilities) to have plans for
alternative water sources.
Prepare for public and media use educational materials on effective water filters and suitable
types of bottled waters. (See Chapter 6)
III. Cryptosporidium action/response plan
 The development of a comprehensive Cryptosporidium action/response plan will help to
organize, standardize, and streamline your response to a possible finding of Crypt sporidium,
as well as to ensure that all the proper groups, agencies, and the public are notified and kept
informed of events and decisions. An example of a sequential plan of action is outlined below
and in a flow chart on page 7.  The narrative describing this plan corresponds with the flow
chart.
1. Water supplier or health department detects cryptosporidiosis “trigger event.”
• A “trigger event” is any situation that may stimulate discussion of the need for a boil
water advisory.  This may include: violation of the total coliform rule or the surface
water treatment rule turbidity standard, a water filtration breakdown or other such water
treatment problem, an unusual number of customer complaints about water quality, a
laboratory finding of pathogens in finished water, significant interruption in key water
treatment or monitoring, or an increased reporting of diarrheal illness or cryptosporidiosis
cases to the local health department that indicates a possible drinking water source.
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2. Event reported by water supplier or health department to Executive Group for
further evaluation.
• Executive Group members immediately alert first level of governmental chain of
command (i.e., their immediate supervisors), that a trigger event has been reported.
3. Executive Group evaluates trigger event.
• Discusses the incident/findings reported and all relevant information.
• Determines if further information is needed to analyze event thoroughly.
4. Executive Group recommends a response.
• Reviews possible responses with appropriate members of Advisory Group.
• Selects appropriate action (See #6 below).
• Summarizes data in a clear and concise manner and explains why the plan of action
was chosen.
5. Executive Group sends concise summary to immediate supervisors for notification
and approval.
6. Executive Group carries out action/response plan - four possible responses:
A. Health risk no longer suspected
Event determined to be false alarm — no further action necessary.
B. Health risk indeterminate at current time
Continue heightened monitoring or surveillance for agreed-upon period and report
information back to Executive Group members for further evaluation. Executive
Group will terminate trigger event response if there are no significant further find-
ings, or recommend an increased level of action/response if findings warrant.  Some
groups may want to issue a Level I notice (described below) at this point.
C. Health risk suspected—notifications released. (This is only a presentation of
options—health risks are rarely defined clearly, and local realities should be the
deciding factor.)
Level I—health risk possible for immunocompromised persons
• Issue notice directed to immunocompromised persons that an increased level of
suspicion exists regarding the possible presence of parasites in the water supply.
Refer to Chapters 4 and 6 for specific educational information you can provide.
• Activate communications systems developed with Advisory Group members to
provide notification to immunosuppressed individuals.
• Do not issue general public precautions, because no risk for the general public is
suspected at this time.
• Increase epidemiologic surveillance; request that health care providers, staff at
clinical laboratories and hospitals, and pharmacists be on the alert for evidence of any
increase in diarrheal disease. Test for Cryptosporidium and other suspected pathogens
when appropriate.
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Level II—health risk possible for general population
• Strongly recommend water use precautions for
immunocompromised individuals; utilize
communications ystems developed with Advisory
Group to reach these populations with disease
prevention information.
• Advise the public that they may also wish to take
these precautions.
• Institute more active epidemiologic surveillance —
telephone physicians, pharmacists, clinical laboratories,
hospitals, and nursing homes to inquire about any
evidence of increase in diarrheal disease and/or
Cryptosporidium findings.
D. Health risk strongly suspected—issue boil␣water␣advisory
• Announce that all persons should boil water before consumption.
• Issue specialized informational materials for restaurants, hospitals, dental offices,
establishments that sell fountain drinks, etc. (See Chapter 5)
• Institute active surveillance of hospitals, clinical laboratories, physicians’ offices,
pharmacies, and nursing homes for any evidence of increase in diarrheal disease and
cryptosporidiosis. (See Chapters 2 and 4)
• Strongly recommend Cryptosporidium testing for all diarrheal illnesses— make
health department laboratory available for testing at no cost if possible.
• Set up temporary telephone “hotline” for the public, businesses, and health
professionals, if possible. (See Chapter 5)
• Issue media release regarding boil water advisory. (See Chapter 5)  Ensure that
materials for special audiences (see Chapter 5) are also given to the media for
distribution.
7. Executive Group re-evaluates situation frequently.
8. Executive Group makes decision to change status of action/response plan.
• Reviews recommended change with appropriate members of Advisory Group.
• Upgrades action/response to higher level.
• Downgrades warning or terminates boil water advisory.
• Summarizes data in a clear and concise manner and explains why changes in status
were made.
9. Executive Group sends summary to immediate supervisors for notification and
approval.
10. Executive Group notifies the public and media about any changes in
recommendations.
Become familiar with your local
water system’s sources of water,
treatment methodologies,
monitoring tests, and the
 federal and state standards
for drinking water quality.
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Flow Chart for Action/Response Plan
4. Exec. Group makes final decision on
recommended response
1. Water system or health department
detects trigger event
2. Event reported to Executive Group for
further evaluation
Exec. Group members advise their
immediate superiors of reported
trigger event
3. Exec. Group evaluates event
Review with appropriate Advisory Group
members
5. Exec. Group sends summary to
supervisiors for notification and approval
6. Exec. Group carries out action/response





continue to monitor and
investigate
D. Health risk strongly
suspected or ascertained–




7. Exec. Group re-evaluates situation
frequently
8. Exec. Group makes decision to change
status (upgrade or downgrade/terminate)
9. Exec. Group sends summary to immedi-
ate supervisors
10. Exec. Group notifies public and media
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IV. Preparing a News Media Response
If Cryptosporidium is found in your drinking water supply and/or you have an outbreak of
cryptosporidiosis in your community, your task force will need to work with the local media
to educate the public about cryptosporidiosis without causing undue concern.  The experience
of other communities in this regard has taught a number of important lessons.
Be Prepared:
The best time to prepare for managing the media and the public in a cryptosporidiosis out-
break or a finding of oocysts in your drinking water is before a crisis occurs.  Do not wait to
prepare your response until there is an outbreak.  In preplanning, you should take these steps,
working with the other agencies that will be involved.
• Set your goals and objectives.  Be very clear about what you want the outcome of your
interaction with the media to be—what message you want the media to convey to the
public.
• Identify your personnel resources.
• Identify a spokesperson(s) for managing the media, and plan how to restrict media
access.  You may wish to funnel all media inquiries through your office of public affairs,
or equivalent, to different spokespersons with expertise in different areas.  If you do this,
each spokesperson should be aware of which type of questions he or she should answer
and which types should be referred to the office of public affairs or to other
spokespersons.  Designate back-up spokespersons who have been equally trained.
• Bear in mind that, particularly in more competitive media markets, reporters will try to
find other sources besides your spokesperson(s) and media releases.  Reporters may seek
comments from advocacy groups representing the HIV-positive community or similar
stakeholders.  These stakeholders may have their own, different political agenda to
pursue with the media.  It is not realistic to expect the news media to reproduce your
institution's  comments or news release verbatim and without comment.
• Plan a joint information center.  At this one locale, public information officers and
spokespersons from the different agencies can work together to coordinate a response to
the media.  Any agency that would be involved in issuing a boil water advisory should be
represented in this center.  If technical questions specifically on the water in question are
deferred to the water utility, answers to these questions should be coordinated with the
overall message coming from your joint group.  Keep everyone involved in handling any
aspect of your crisis “in the loop.”
• Think about the questions you would face from the media in a “cryptosporidiosis event”
before called upon to answer them.  You may want to write up answers to sample
questions; writing such questions and answers will help you focus your responses before
you have to give them.  An example is provided in Chapter 5.  You might also wish to
prepare some “fill in the blank” responses for media questions that will occur in different
waterborne disease contexts.  These statements can be pre-approved, then used
immediately in the first moments of a crisis.
• Get to know the reporters and editorial boards who would be involved in coverage of
such an event.  If they are sophisticated regarding cryptosporidiosis and trust you, they
will be far more likely to report on cryptosporidiosis in a calm and accurate manner.  You
may want to keep a record of helpful and responsible reporters and how to contact them.
An example of how to do this is provided in the appendix, as Figure C.
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Have a Plan:
• Identify the target audiences you must reach in the event of a waterborne disease
outbreak.  Material for specific audiences and contingencies is included in Chapter 4.
• Write a set of key communication points with the cooperation of the other agencies that
all of your spokespersons will use.  Try to limit this to as few points as possible.
• “Exercise” your plan.  Like any other emergency plan, your media plan can benefit, and
be utilized better, if you practice it with mock emergencies.
• Build in an evaluation component.  Be ready, when your crisis has passed, to review how
you handled it and how you could improve your performance.
General Tips for Spokespersons:
• You should be well-informed, apolitical, good at working with the media and direct and
nontechnical in answering questions.  Spokesperson(s) must be accessible.  If the media
cannot reach you they will turn to someone else for answers to their questions.
• If appropriate and possible, have a prepared statement to read or to issue.
• Always reply truthfully, simply, and directly to the media but answer only the question
asked.  “Yes" or "no” answers may need qualification.  Unless you have a specific point
to make that a reporter did not bring up, limit your comments to direct answers.  Prepare
and practice for the most difficult questions you are likely to be asked.  You will need to
be able to respond quickly and with authority to any question the media might ask.  It
may help to note that Cryptosporidium is a pathogen that has been in water for many
years and is only now becoming better understood and detected.
• Be concise.  Establish your key message at the beginning of your interview or press
encounter.  Do not overload the media with excessive or overly complex information.
Simply state and reinforce one or two important points.
• Admit it when you don’t know the answer or don’t have conclusive data on the subject.
If you are asked hypothetical questions by the media, defer them, answering only fact-
based inquiries.  Do not try to hedge by using phrases such as “I think,” “maybe,” or
“probably not.”
• Be sure to present your data in context.  For instance, if oocysts are found in your
finished water at a level that is normal and consistent with national findings, be sure to
say it is consistent with national findings and therefore not a cause for alarm.  Only
advise boiling water when your Executive Group, in consultation with appropriate
Advisory Group members, has already decided to do so and informed political leaders of
this decision.
• Avoid overly downplaying the effect of cryptosporidiosis on people with healthy immune
systems.  While not life-threatening for the general public, cryptosporidiosis can still be a
very unpleasant experience and your credibility could be hurt if you are seen as
dismissing their concerns.
• For the media’s own use and/or for inclusion in their stories, provide the phone number
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Chapter 2 - Epidemiologic Surveillance
Dennis D. Juranek, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and 
1994 participants in a CDC/EPA sponsored workshop "Prevention and Control of 
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Local public health officials should consider developing one or more surveillance systems to
establish baseline data on the occurrence of cryptosporidiosis among residents of their com-
munity and, where possible, obtain sufficient epidemiologic data to identify potential sources
of infection. These baseline indices will be helpful in assessing whether oocysts that are
found in drinking water are associated with any increases in the number of Cryptosporidium
infections in the community. Such surveillance should be considered by all communities
whose water utility provides service to 100,000 persons and whose water supply is derived
from surface water. Communities with populations of 10,000-99,999 persons will not be
required by the ICR to monitor their source water for Cryptosporidium. Small communities
with unfiltered surface water or with water quality indices that suggest their filters are not
adequately removing oocysts should also consider conducting surveillance for
cryptosporidiosis.
No single surveillance strategy can be recommended or would be feasible for all locations;
therefore, communities should select a method that meets local needs and is most compatible
with existing disease surveillance systems or ongoing special studies. Neither increased
incidence of diarrhea nor Cryptosporidium infection in a community establishes water as the
cause of infection. Any increased occurrence of
either diarrhea or laboratory-confirmed
Cryptosporidium infection detected by surveil-
lance requires further epidemiologic investigation
to identify the source(s) of infection.  The follow-
ing six approaches to surveillance are presented
hierarchically by increasing order of the per-
ceived effort and cost.
Monitor sales of antidiarrheal
medications.
Local pharmacies often have computerized data
bases that contain the number of medications sold daily. The development of an information
exchange between local pharmacists and state or local public health officials is a cost-effec-
tive and timely way to detect increases in diarrheal illness in some communities. In addition,
these data bases can provide historical data that can serve as an indicator of baseline sales
rates for antidiarrheal medication.
Surveillance should be considered
by all communities whose water
utility provides service to at least
100,000 persons, and whose
water supply is derived from
surface water.
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Monitor logs maintained by Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) and hospitals for complaints of diarrheal illness.
HMOs and hospitals often have computerized systems for logging telephone calls regarding
patient illnesses. Information entered promptly into a computerized data base can effectively
monitor both complaints of diarrhea and severity of gastrointestinal disease in a community.
These data are particularly useful if your local medical-care facility records zip code numbers
for persons who are ill, because waterborne illness associated with inadequate water treat-
ment affects persons residing throughout the water distribution area.
Monitor incidence of diarrhea in nursing homes.
During outbreak investigations, data from nursing homes have implicated drinking water as
the source of community infection. Diarrheal illness rates in residents of nursing homes that
use municipal drinking water can be compared with illness rates in residents of other nursing
homes in the same community that use a different water source (e.g., well water). Because
nursing staff usually record the frequency and characteristics of bowel movements for each
resident, such data also can be used for other surveillance purposes. Substantial efforts by
your local or state health department might be needed to review and extract the relevant data
from patient records, which could differ in format by nursing home. If this measure is em-
ployed, health departments also should establish a baseline for the population comprising
nursing home residents, which usually experiences more gastrointestinal problems than the
general population.
Monitor laboratory data for Cryptosporidium.
Most laboratories do not look for Cryptosporidium in stool specimens submitted for routine
parasitologic examination. To obtain this information, health-care providers usually must
request specifically that stool specimens be examined for Cryptosporidium. Because health-
care providers who treat patients who have AIDS are more likely to suspect cryptosporidiosis
as a diagnosis in such patients who have diarrhea, they are more likely than other health-care
providers to request specific testing for Cryptosporidium. Thus, current laboratory-based
surveillance for cryptosporidiosis would more likely detect an increased number of
Cryptosporidium infections in patients who have AIDS than in immunocompetent patients in
the general population.
To determine more accurately the occurrence of Cryptosporidium infection in the general
population, health-care providers should be aware of the public health importance of obtain-
ing data on the occurrence of cryptosporidiosis. Further, they should be encouraged to submit
stool specimens for Cryptosporidium testing in persons who have symptoms compatible with
the disease. However, the cost of the additional laboratory testing for cryptosporidiosis in
immunocompetent patients may present an obstacle, especially because specific therapy will
not necessarily be implemented as a result of a confirmed diagnosis. Some HMOs and labo-
ratories might be able to provide computerized reports of all Cryptosporidium diagnoses. You
must also be aware that substantial delays can occur between the completion of the test and
the entry of data into a computer.
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Monitor tap water in selected cities.
Intensive surveillance in a sample of six to 10 cities known to have Cryptosporidium oocysts
in their finished water can provide a method for assessing how often a temporally related
increase in diarrheal illness or C yptosporidium diagnosis occurs during the first week or first
2 weeks after oocysts are found in drinking water. Health departments and public officials in
other cities can use information derived from analysis of the data generated at these sites as a
basis for local decision making and for educating the public about the health risks associated
with similar levels of oocyst contamination of their water supplies. Health officials in cities
participating in this intensive surveillance would need to implement thorough surveillance
techniques for recording diarrheal illness and laboratory-confirmed Cryptosporidium diag-
noses, and they should monitor finished water for Cryptosporidium oocysts more frequently
than required by the ICR. In addition to identifying small outbreaks, these studies could be
used to compare the effectiveness of different surveillance methods (including those de-
scribed previously) and to identify cases of cryptosporidiosis for possible inclusion in epide-
miologic studies that could further define the risks for waterborne cryptosporidiosis.
Make immediate epidemiologic assistance available.
Rapid initiation of epidemiologic investigations might be necessary when disease surveil-
lance or water quality data indicate that the public might be at increased risk for
cryptosporidiosis. Although some states and cities could implement such investigations
independently, many could not and would need technical and financial assistance. These
investigations should emphasize a) assessment of the morbidity and mortality in various
immunocompromised populations, b) appropriate and rapid environmental testing for
Cryptosporidium oocysts, c) rapid identification and evaluation of potential sources of water
contamination (e.g., sewage), and d) a thorough engineering assessment of the water utility’s
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Laboratorians should educate
those using their services as to
what is and is not included in
routine culture and fecal parasite
examinations in their laboratory.
Physicians may incorrectly
assume certain enteric pathogens
are routinely tested for.
CHAPTER 3
CLINICAL LABORATORY TESTING
Laboratories can play a critical and preemptive role as a community’s first line of surveillance
in detecting waterborne outbreaks when they are aware of increased numbers of stool speci-
mens, and suspect or identify Cryptosporidium as the cause of illness. In addition, strong
working relationships between clinical laboratories and state or local public health laborato-
ries or agencies can facilitate a meaningful and rapid response related to potential outbreaks.
Clinical and public health laboratories potentially play a key role in adding to the limited
knowledge of the endemicity and ultimately the natural history of Cryptosporidium.  This
chapter addresses the early detection of waterborne outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis and some
strategies that could be used to a)  determine endemic levels of Cryptosporidium infections
unrelated to outbreaks, b)  detect Cryptosporidium outbreaks by causes other than potable
waterborne sources (e.g., food, surface or recreational waters, pets or farm animals, or sexual
activity), or c)  determine outbreak or endemic
levels of other infectious diseases.
External Planning
Potential planning options are suggested below.
These steps may or may not apply to all of the
wide variety, size, type, and function of  laborato-
ries (e.g., state public health, local public health,
reference, community hospital, and medical
center clinical laboratories).  However, each
laboratory should determine its own appropriate
public health response plan and coordinate it with
other agencies before a crisis.
External Planning Before A Waterborne Disease Outbreak
Know the name and phone numbers of appropriate officials to call if you suspect a
community-wide situation might be developing.
For example a) your state or local public health agency or laboratory;
b) state or local water utility or regulatory agency; and
c) other local clinical microbiology laboratories.
Discuss and plan follow-up steps with appropriate agency(s) when test results suggest a
potential outbreak.
Local public health agencies and/or water utilities with knowledge of at-risk water quality
conditions should alert laboratories of the potential for waterborne pathogens in stool
specimens.
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Internal Planning
The goal of  an internal planning process is to prevent a delay in the detection of an increase
in the number of stool specimens, which can signal an outbreak.  Internal planning allows
prompt detection of a potential outbreak and implementation of community-wide prevention
strategies.
The tasks of assessing increases of diarrheal stool specimens and added testing are not
without additional costs.  These recommendations should be considered in view of individual
budgetary limitations; therefore several options are offered.
Clinical laboratories should have plans in place to alert either state or local public health
agencies when increases in the number of  diarrheal stool specimens (or all stool specimens
when stool consistency is unknown) occur from outpatient, emergency room, or short-term
inpatient populations.
Assessment of an Increase
Laboratories are encouraged to monitor the number of diarrheal stool specimens (or total
stool specimens) submitted and to note any increases over their established baseline.  If the
number of  specimens exceeds a predesignated threshold number, the laboratory should
consider the possibility of an outbreak such as waterborne cryptosporidiosis.  Other
nonroutine causes of illness should be considered if other increases in laboratory specimens
suggest it.
Suggestions for Assessments
Establish a baseline of the number of stool specimens submitted per day or week:  for
example, the daily or weekly average for the previous month or year, or a rolling 3-month
weekly average, or the prior week’s total.  Compare the number of current cases with the
chosen baseline threshold.
When possible, have your LIS activate a “flag” when baseline thresholds are exceeded.
If resources do not allow for routine quantitative monitoring:  call your public health
authority when a noticeable increase in stools with no apparent explanation occurs,
especially diarrheal stools.  Several such calls from laboratories could suggest a
meaningful pattern.
If a laboratory is unable to test or confirm a positive Cryptosporidium finding, then that
laboratory should have plans in place with another facility such as a state or local public
health or reference laboratory to do such testing.
When a noticeable increase of enteric pathogen-negative diarrheal specimens occurs, your
clinical microbiologists should suggest to physicians that testing for Cryptosporidium and
other enteric pathogens may be appropriate.
Notify public health authorities when any increase in findings of Cryptosporidium or other
enteric pathogens are confirmed, following the guidelines of your public health response
plan (see Chapter 1).
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Testing
Complete, accurate, and relevant laboratory testing depends on compliance with recom-
mended guidelines.  Specimen collection and transport protocol must be followed that in-
cludes placing appropriate information on test requisitions and specimen containers.  In
addition, communication between the laboratory and clinician should include specimen
rejection criteria and test result limitations.  Only when proper specimen submission is
ensured can a thorough understanding and interpretation of the test result be guaranteed.
Collection Containers, Requisitions, and Report Formats
A description of the physical nature of a stool specimen (formed, soft, watery, and other
factors such as blood or mucus) should be noted, especially for stool in collection vials
(stored in transport media or with stool preservatives).  Once the stool is mixed with the
collection vial contents, the original consistency of the specimen cannot be determined.
The laboratory request form or the specimen container must therefore be marked accordingly.
Laboratorians should educate those using their services as to what is and is not included in
routine culture and fecal parasite examinations in their laboratory.  Physicians may incor-
rectly assume certain enteric pathogens, such as Cryptosporidium or Escherichia coli
0157:H7,  are routinely tested for in enteric examinations.  Such organisms may be listed as
separate requests on the form if they are not part of the routine workup.
Another way to clarify results for clinicians is to report which enteric pathogens were not
detected rather than stating that no enteric pathogens were detected.  For example:
• “No Salmonella, Shigella,  or Campylobacter detected. Other pathogens require specific
requests.”
• “No ova or parasites detected.  Some parasites that occasionally cause diarrheal illness,
such as Cryptosporidium, require a request for a specific test.”
• “To discuss further appropriate testing of this specimen, please consult ‘Laboratory/
Microbiology Director.’”
Test Options
Before testing a stool specimen for the presence of Cryptosporidium, the proper collection
and transport of stool samples in fixatives such as 5 to 10% buffered Formalin or Sodium
Acetate-Formalin (SAF) are essential to obtain a reliable test result.  Polyvinyl-Alcohol
(PVA)-preserved specimens are not appropriate for the modified acid-fast staining procedure.
Several alternatives exist for examining stool specimens or their concentrates for
Cryptosporidium.  These options vary in their sensitivity, specificity, and cost.  While an
experienced microbiologist  may be able to detect  heavy concentrations of oocysts in a wet
mount, generally additional testing will be needed to confirm the identification or detect low
numbers of organisms.  Additional tests  may include a modified acid-fast or fluorescent
antibody stain, or an Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) test.  If testing for the
presence of Cryptosporidium is not available, then contact a state or local public health
laboratory for assistance.
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Methods (See Tables)
Collection
• Follow collection recommendations and precautions on routine parasitologic examination
of stools. For immunodiagnostic assay kits, follow manufacturer’s instructions (refer to
references on following pages).
Transport
• If immediate examination is not possible, use one of several preservatives such as 5 to
10% buffered Formalin, Merthiolate-Iodine-Formalin (MIF), or SAF.
• Refrigerate unpreserved specimens to delay deterioration. Do not freeze specimens.
Processing
• Unconcentrated, fresh specimens can be examined by wet mount preparations.
• Concentration by the Formalin ethyl acetate method is preferable.  Optimal centrifugation
time and speed, 10 minutes at 500 X,  are critical for concentrating Cryptosporidium
oocysts.
• PVA-preserved specimens are not acceptable for modified acid-fast staining for detection
of Cryptosporidium.
Testing
• High concentrations of oocysts can be detected in unconcentrated wet mounts. However,
direct wet mounts are insufficient for detecting oocysts in low concentrations;  results
should be confirmed by a modified acid-fast or antibody-specific test.
• The auramine-rhodamine nonspecific fluorescent stain can be used as a screening test but
is usually not as sensitive as other methods.  Results should be confirmed by a modified
acid-fast or antibody-specific test.
• For modified acid-fast methods use any of several acceptable variations. (Note:
Trichrome-stained smears are not recommended for detection of Cryptosporidium.)
• Commercial immunodiagnostic methods are available that vary in cost, sensitivity, and
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Table  B
Advantages and Disadvantages
 of EIA and FA Kits
Compared with Traditional Methods
The following parameters need to be reviewed before selecting a test kit.
EIA Diagnostic Kits
Advantages Disadvantages
Preserved or fresh stools.
ual interpretation.
Note:
1) Comments on the advantages and disadvantages for each test product are extracted from the literature.
2) The selection of a particular method is the responsibility of an individual laboratory. These selections are
based on a number of factors, including cost, anticipated workload, ease of kit use, number of trained staff,
single vs. batch testing, physician clients, patient base, size of laboratory, availability of equipment, compatibil-
ity of method with laboratory work flow, and training needs.
3) External controls in addition to kit controls offer an extra measure of quality control.
4) Use of trade names and commercial sources is for identification only and does not imply endorsement by
the Public Health Service, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control






Easy to test large numbers of specimens.
Can be automated.
Increased sensitivity.
Not recommended as replacement for O & P
examination.
Dilution step may be required.
Wash step is critical to avoid false positives.
May be difficult to interpret visually.
Higher cost.
Short examination time.
Recommended stool concentration yields more
accurate results.
Some reagents detect Giardia cysts and
Cryptosporidium oocysts at the same time.
Can batch test.
Fluorescence is bright; slides very easy to read
under low magnification
Can be read quickly.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATING WATER TEST RESULTS
I. Drinking Water Sources, Treatment, and Testing
Drinking water is obtained from one of two types of sources:
Ground water, or water from underneath the surface of the earth, which is pumped up and out
for use (e.g., well water) or flows naturally to the surface (e.g., spring water).
Surface water, or water from above ground sources, such as rivers, lakes and reservoirs.
Untreated surface water is more likely than ground water to contain Cryptosporidium and
other pathogenic microorganisms because of the possibility of direct contamination with
animal feces, treated and untreated human sewage, or fecal run-off from adjacent land after
heavy rain or snow melt. Ground water is less likely to be contaminated with Cryptosporidium
because water carrying this size pathogen must usually seep through layers of soil and sand
which in essence “filters” out the organism before the water reaches the well.  The few
ground water-associated outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis that have occurred have been attrib-
uted to wells that were either poorly located, constructed, or damaged.  An example of a
poorly located well is one that may be contaminated by a nearby sewage or septic system.  A
poorly constructed well or a well with ruptured casings or pipes may also become contaminated.
Water Treatment
Chemical Disinfection
Chemical disinfection is the most common way to make water safe to consume.  Chemical
disinfection kills many of the harmful microorganisms that might be in raw, or untreated,
water.  Chlorine is the disinfectant most commonly used by water utilities to treat drinking
water; other disinfectants used include chloramine, chlorine dioxide, and ozone.  Unfortu-
nately, chlorine-based formulations commonly used by the water treatment industry are not
effective against Cryptosporidium.  Additional research is needed to determine the optimal
dose of ozone and resolve other technical and practical issues that may limit its routine use.
Filtration
The conventional filtration process used by most surface water treatment plants usually
includes several steps: coagulation-flocculation, sedimentation, and filtration.  During the
first step in the process, a chemical (coagulant) is added to the water that causes small sus-
pended particles to stick together (flocculation) to form larger particles that either settle to the
bottom (sedimentation) or are more easily removed by a water treatment filter that princi-
pally relies on fine sand.  The coagulation-flocculation step is critical for successful removal
of chlorine-resistant protozoa (1-20 microns in size) which could easily slip through the 50-
70 micron spaces between grains of sand in a water treatment filter.  Poor mixing of coagu-
lants with water and failing to add the appropriate amounts of coagulants are common causes
for inadequate filtration.  Because the dose of coagulant needed may frequently vary with
changes in raw water pH, temperature, or turbidity, successful filtration relies strongly on the
training and experience of the filter operator.
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Conventional water filtration should trap nearly all protozoan parasites, including Giardia
and Cryptosporidium, if the water is properly processed with adequate equipment and opti-
mal procedures (coagulation-flocculation) are conducted by well-trained operators.  How-
ever, a small number of Cryptosporidium oocysts may occasionally get through the treatment
process to the finished drinking water.  The health risk associated with drinking filtered or
unfiltered water containing small numbers of Cryptosporidium oocysts is unknown.  Oocysts
found in drinking water may not be infectious if they are dead, damaged by the treatment
process, or of a species of Cryptosporidium not infectious to humans.  Large numbers of
oocysts, or high turbidity or "cloudiness," in finished water indicates inadequate filtration,
filter failure, or a filter malfunction that may lead to an outbreak.
Drinking Water Testing
Coliform Bacteria Tests
Coliform bacteria are common in the environment and are generally not harmful.  The pres-
ence of these bacteria in drinking water, however, generally is the result of a problem with
water treatment or distribution pipes, and indicates that the water may be contaminated with
organisms that can cause disease. A total coliform test measures the presence or number of
living aerobic coliform bacteria in a water sample.
If the total coliform test on a sample of drinking water is positive (1 or more coliforms per
100 ml of water), either a fecal coliform test or an Escherichia coli test must be performed to
determine if any coliform bacteria found are of fecal origin.  Water utilities usually collect
additional water samples for this purpose within 24 hours of notification of a positive total
coliform test.  If a fecal coliform or  E.  coli test is positive, this is a strong indication that the
water in question may be contaminated with fecal material.  The E. coli test is more specific
for bacteria of fecal origin than the fecal coliform test.  A positive fecal coliform test is
possible without recent fecal contamination.  When tests for fecal bacteria are positive,
follow-up investigations of the water treatment plant and water distribution system are
usually initiated and issuance of a boil water advisory may be considered.
Turbidity Tests
Turbidity tests measure the level of suspended particles or “cloudiness” in water.  Turbidity is
measured  in nephelometric turbidity units, or NTUs.  High turbidity in finished water can be
an indicator of possible water contamination, inadequate filtration,  or other water system
problems.  A single spike exceeding 5 NTUs violates current EPA standards for drinking
water.  Ninety-five percent of all monthly post-filtration readings must be less than or equal
to 0.5 NTUs to meet EPA standards for the most commonly used type of water filter.  Recent
research, however, indicates that Cryptosporidium is most reliably removed when water
turbidity is consistently maintained at 0.1 NTU or lower.  The American Water Works Asso-




Environmental sampling methods for detecting and quantifying Cryptosporidium oocysts
were adapted from those for Giardia cysts.  The methods were originally developed to assist
in the investigation of suspected waterborne outbreaks.  They were subsequently applied to
studies seeking to determine the occurrence and distribution of protozoa in water and to
assess drinking water treatment effectiveness.  Since Giardia and Cryptosporidium do not
reproduce outside the host, the number of organisms per unit volume of water decreases with
distance from the point of contamination.  Methods for detecting Cryptosporidium in envi-
ronmental water samples usually involve a procedure for concentrating the organisms from
large-volume water samples.  These methods are designed for detecting Giardia cysts as
well. Sample volumes generally recommended are 100 liters for source water and 1000 liters
or more for finished water.
The usual procedure for collecting oocysts from a sample of water is filtration through
nominal 1 micron porosity yarn-wound polypropylene filter cartridges.  These are widely
used because they are effective with high or low turbidity waters containing a variety of
suspended material, and they are relatively inexpensive.  Other types of filter cartridges used
for concentrating cysts and oocysts are fiberglass-resin cartridge tubes and membrane filters.
Next, filters are eluted in a laboratory with detergent solutions and the recovered particulates
are concentrated by centrifugation.  Water samples may contain a variety of viable and
nonviable organisms, as well as inorganic materials.  Detection methods therefore include a
purification step to separate the target Giardia cysts and Cryptosporidium oocysts from the
rest of the particulates.  This has usually been accomplished by flotation on density gradients
consisting of sucrose, Percoll (an organically coated colloidal silica compound), Percoll-
sucrose mixtures, or various salt solutions.
The method most widely used in the United States for examining purified material for protozoa
is an antibody-based immunofluorescence assay.  After staining the purified material with
fluorescence antibody reagents, the sample is examined by microscope with an ultraviolet
light source.  Tentative identification of oocysts is based on the fluorescence reaction, size,
and shape of any oocyst-like object.  Positive identification requires observing one or more
sporozoites within the oocysts by visible light microscopy (phase-contrast or differential
interference microscopy).
Antibody-based microscopic methods have several limitations, including the lack of informa-
tion on the infectivity or viability of cysts or oocysts; the lack of indication of the host species
of origin of the organisms; the chance of false identification of algal or other protozoal
species as Cryptosporidium or Giardia; poor recovery efficiency; poor precision; the time-
consuming nature of the process; and the need for an experienced and skilled microscopist.
These limitations notwithstanding, existing methods have been useful in outbreak investiga-
tions, in identifying possible sources of contamination and in controlled experiments for
determining the effectiveness of different treatment processes in removing protozoa. The
Milwaukee cryptosporidiosis outbreak in 1993, together with EPA regulatory activities, have
stimulated interest and research on better and more cost-effective methods.
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Almost all of the following methods address Giardia as well as Cryptosporidium.  Complete
methods, assays, and processing techniques, and viability determinations are presented in the
following series of tables.  Table A summarizes methods characteristics.  Since most of the
methods use assays that are antibody-based, relevant information on available antibodies is
presented in Table B.
More detailed information may be found in: Jakubowski W, Boutros S, Faber W, Fayer R,
Ghiorse W, LeChevallier M, Rose J, Schaub S, Singh A, Stewart M. Environmental Methods
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II. Issuing and Rescinding a Boil Water Advisory
Introduction
Issuing a boil water advisory (BWA) for the protection of public health from waterborne
pathogens has serious implications for a community and must be done only after careful
consideration.
Decisions must frequently be made within relatively short periods of time and with either
incomplete or inconclusive information.  Therefore, as stated in Chapter 1, the most effective
way for a community to make decisions is to establish a local task force well in advance of
any potential crisis to discuss issues that are critical to BWA decision making.  The task force
should consist of representatives from public health and regulatory agencies and the water
utility.
The task force has two principal goals:  to bring together these representatives to establish
local water quality standards, and to establish a review process to be activated when a ques-
tion about the safety of local drinking water arises.  Issues for discussion might include the
legal authority for issuance of a BWA, identification of regulatory concerns, critical water
processing guidelines, source water factors (ground or surface), and public health implications.
By discussing these issues well in advance, the task force can prepare itself to make sound
professional judgements in the most informed and expeditious manner.
Boil Water Advisory Guidelines
The following guidelines are divided into three components:
1.)  Factors that trigger a meeting of the task force to review data relevant to a BWA;
2.) Factors to be considered in issuing a BWA;
3.) Factors to be considered in rescinding a BWA.
 Although the working group that developed this document and most water industry profes-
sionals encourage water utilities that filter water to maintain a finished water turbidity level
of 0.1 NTU,  these guidelines do not set specific turbidity levels, pathogen concentrations, or
particle counts that would trigger the issuance of a BWA because of the following current
limitations:
• The health risk associated with the consumption of drinking water contaminated with
small numbers of Cryptosporidium oocysts is unknown.
• For Cryptosporidium and other emerging pathogens, the analytical methods for detection
in water samples are developmental and may lack the sensitivity and specificity that
would permit basing decisions about issuing BWAs on test results alone.  Negative
results, using currently available tests, do not necessarily indicate the absence of
organisms, but only that none were detected in the sample analyzed.  Positive results do
not necessarily provide an accurate assessment of the number of organisms present nor of
their infectivity or viability.  Hence, a numerical standard for the number of organisms
that should be of concern has not been developed.
• Some measurements, such as turbidity levels or particle counts are site-specific.
• The complex interplay of factors to be considered in making BWA decisions makes it
difficult to set criteria on a national level that would be appropriate to all communities.
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Factors That Trigger a Meeting of the Boil Water Advisory Task Force
•     Evidence of disease in a community in which drinking water is suspected as the source of
      infection.
• Failure or significant interruption in key water treatment process(es)  (e.g., increases in
turbidity levels, increased particle counts, mechanical or equipment failure, persistent
monitoring deficiencies).
• Positive test results for pathogens (e.g., Cryptosporidium, Giardia, Shigella) in water.
• An acute violation of the total coliform rule (TCR) or a violation of the surface water
treatment rule (SWTR) turbidity standard.
• A persistent nonacute violation of the TCR.
• Any event (e.g., water main break, cross connection) that compromises the distribution
system, coupled with an indication of a health hazard.
• A natural disaster that may adversely affect water quality (e.g., flood, hurricane,
earthquake).
Issuing a Boil Water Advisory: Factors to Consider
Source water quality
• Vulnerability of the source water to contamination. The following may contaminate
source water: recreational use, sewage or sanitary discharges, or livestock operations in
the watershed area. Other site-specific factors, circumstances, and criteria should also be
considered.
• Previous monitoring results for pathogens.  Data from past monitoring or studies may
be helpful in interpreting current test results.
• Major changes to source water quality.  Source water quality can be altered by sewage
or manure spills, destratification of a reservoir, recent heavy or persistent rainfall, floods,
wind, water temperature changes, droughts, chemical changes, or related circumstances.
These events may increase the risk of pathogen occurrence and concentration, or decrease
the ability of the plant to treat the water effectively.
Treatment effectiveness
• Plant optimization for pathogen removal.  A treatment plant should have a plan for
treatment improvement such as that offered by EPA, water utilities, and states under the
Partnership for Safe Water program.  Evaluation of plant performance by a third party
may also be beneficial.
• Treatment failure or interruption .   Failure or interruption of key treatment processes
can occur even if a system is optimal.  Maintenance of all levels of a multiple barrier
system (i.e., coagulation, flocculation, sedimentation, filtration, disinfection, or other
individual water treatment processes) is critical to the effective removal of pathogens.
• Finished water quality.  Finished water quality measurements that should be reviewed
include turbidity levels,  particle counts, disinfection (dosage, residual, and contact time),
and the presence of pathogens or indicators at the treatment plant or in the distribution
system.  National water quality standards may not be adequate to prevent transmission of
waterborne Cryptosporidium. Site-specific standards may need to be more stringent than
current EPA regulations.
When evaluating positive test results for pathogens, consider:
• The experience of the laboratory with environmental samples.
• The appropriateness of sample collection and test methods for water.
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• The inherent limitations in the test methods.  For Cryptosporidium, negative results do
not necessarily indicate the absence of organisms and positive results do not necessarily
provide an accurate assessment of the number of organisms present, nor of their
infectivity or viability.
• The time between collection of the sample and the availability of results.  For example, a
BWA may not necessarily be advisable if a positive test result was associated with a
sample that was collected a month ago vs. a few days ago.
Distribution System Integrity
An assessment of the distribution system includes evaluating any disruption to the system
such as:
• low pressure or main breaks
• cross connections
• recent construction that might interrupt pipe flow
• stagnant water
• disinfectant residual
• an inadequate flushing program
• age and condition of the system.
This information may be contained in recent sanitary surveys.
Epidemiologic evidence
Epidemiologic evidence that associates gastrointestinal illness with drinking water in any
segment of the population should also be taken into account. Epidemiologic data suggesting
waterborne disease should be acted upon even if disease-confirming water quality data are
not readily available.
Rescinding a Boil Water Advisory: Factors to Consider
Source water quality
Source water quality indicators have returned to acceptable levels.
Treatment effectiveness
Treatment deficiency has been corrected.
Finished water quality
Finished water quality indicators have returned to acceptable levels and are within regulatory
limits. Successive pathogen monitoring shows acceptable results. Sufficient finished water
displacement has occurred in the distribution system to eliminate water that was or might
have been contaminated.  If the BWA was issued because a pathogen was detected and that
pathogen is no longer being detected, then the inadequacies of the pathogen detection
methods must be considered before rescinding a BWA.
Epidemiologic evidence
Epidemiologic evidence may be valuable. However, epidemiologic data is often not readily
available for BWA decision-making.
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Additional resources for this decision making are available.  Local health and drinking water
officials are encouraged to seek advice from their state epidemiologist (see Appendix, Figure F),
and their state agency responsible for implementation of the Safe Drinking Water Act.  On the
federal level, 24-hour assistance is available through the EPA Environmental Response Team
at (908) 321-6660 and CDC at (770) 488-7760 (during business hours) and (404) 639-2888
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I. Epidemiology (checklist for investigating a possible
outbreak)
1. Is an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis occurring?
An outbreak can generally be defined as a sudden increase in the incidence of disease in a
defined area over a specific period of time.  However, even if the number of reported cases of
cryptosporidiosis exceeds the expected number, this excess may not necessarily indicate an
outbreak.  Reporting may increase because of changes in the local reporting procedures,
changes in the case definition, increased interest because of local or national awareness,
improvements in diagnostic procedures, or changes in laboratory standards or personnel.
Similarly, a new physician or infection control nurse seeing referred cases may more consis-
tently report them, when in fact there has been no change in the prevalence of disease.
A general increase in the rate of diarrheal illness in a community does not necessarily mean
that a single type of  organism or mode of transmission is the cause.  One quick way to
determine if a specific organism is the predominant cause of diarrhea is to collect stool
samples from 10-20 ill people and a similar number from controls (people without diarrhea)
and have them tested for a variety of organisms (bacteria, viruses, parasites) by a reliable
laboratory.  If one organism is commonly found in the stool of ill persons and rarely found in
stools from controls, it is likely that this organism is the cause of the outbreak.   The finding
of two or more different organisms could indicate a) sporadic cases of  different diseases are
occurring in the same area at the same time; b) multiple outbreaks with different modes of
transmission are occurring; or c) a single outbreak is occurring in which multiple organisms
are being transmitted in the same way, e.g., sewage-contaminated water may transmit a
number of pathogens simultaneously.
An approach for rapidly determining if there is an increase in cases of cryptosporidiosis or
diarrhea is outlined below:
• Review data available from ongoing surveillance systems for diarrheal illness or
cryptosporidiosis. (See Chapter 2 for information on conducting surveillance)
• Set up a system for recording basic information about people who call the health
department or water utility to report laboratory-confirmed infection and clinical illness
consistent with cryptosporidiosis.  Use a standardized questionnaire or data collection
form such as the ones in Figures D and E in the appendix to capture comparable
information from all callers.  Information collected should include the name and phone
number of persons reporting illness, demographic and clinical characteristics of ill
persons, suspected source of infection, and name or initials of the person who recorded
information on the form. A quick analysis of data collected on these forms may suggest
avenues of investigation.  For example, if most cases involve toddler-age children a day
5-2 Chapter 5- Outbreak Management
care source may be likely.  Illness in predominantly older children may indicate a
recreational water exposure, or eating at a particular function or food establishment.
Instances of disease with no age, sex, or geographic clustering suggest that drinking
water or a widely distributed food product may be worthy of more intensive
investigation.  Data from these forms may also provide a reasonable estimate of the time
period when exposure may have occurred.
• Review laboratory practices and laboratory records.  Ensure that the cryptosporidiosis
diagnosis is correct and that an increase in diagnoses truly represents an outbreak.  An
apparent outbreak may, in fact, be an artifact of reporting or a laboratory error. The
following should be addressed when an increase in the number of cryptosporidiosis
diagnoses is being reported by a laboratory:
• Send a representative sample of specimens reported as positive to an outside
reference laboratory (e.g., state health department) for verification.
• Compare the current weekly or monthly number of cases with a) the number of cases
diagnosed in the previous week or month and b)  with the number of cases in the
same week or month of the previous year.
• Determine if there has there been a change in the total number of stools submitted for
Cryptosporidium testing that might artificially increase the number of cases.  A
sudden change in the number of tests requested by physicians may cause an increase
in the number of cases detected, but this increase may not signal an outbreak.
• Determine whether there has there been a change in the proportion of stools that test
positive for Cryptosporidium.  An increase in the percentage of stools testing positive
(number of stools positive divided by number of stools submitted for
Cryptosporidium testing) is a more reliable index of a true increase in the occurrence
of cases than the total number of stools positive.
• Determine whether there has been a change in the method(s) used for detection
of Cryptosporidium or in laboratory personnel that might have caused a greater
number of tests to be done or to be read as positive.
• Determine whether other nearby laboratories have seen similar increases.
• Determine whether the laboratory reporting most of the cases recently began
providing services to a new client, e.g., an AIDS clinic, a day care center, or a large
HMO that might explain a sudden increase in the number of specimens
testing positive for Cryptosporidium.
• Establish a case definition for survey purposes.  A case definition is a standard set of
criteria for deciding whether an individual should be classified as having a disease. The
common elements of a cryptosporidiosis case definition include:
• laboratory-confirmed infection
• three or more watery stools per day lasting for 3 or more days in the 2 weeks (or other
time period of interest) before the date that the questionnaire is administered.
• Survey health care facilities for evidence of increased numbers of patients with diarrhea
or laboratory-confirmed cryptosporidiosis.  The survey should be designed to ascertain
the number of cases diagnosed within a defined time period (usually several weeks to a
month around the time that the outbreak is thought to have occurred).  Any impressions
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of an increase in the number of cases (case definition to be established by the
investigator) identified during this period should be further assessed by comparing the
current number of cases with a) the number of cases identified the preceding month and
b)  the number of cases identified for the corresponding time period in the previous year
at these facilities.  An increase in cases compared with the previous week or month and
compared with the same week or month in the previous year supports the hypothesis that
an outbreak may be occurring.  Bear in mind, however,  that what appears to be an
outbreak may be merely the finding or reporting of cases that were not reported
previously, but are now being detected or reported as a result of media attention,
improved surveillance, or other change in methods for case ascertainment.  Sources of
information include surveys of hospital and clinic emergency departments and of
physicians offices, records of pharmacy sales of anti-diarrheal medications, records of
patients with diarrhea at nursing homes (on and off the suspected water supply), and
records of school absenteeism.
• Analyze epidemiologic data from all sources including self-reported cases, health care
facilities’ surveys, questionnaire data from specific epidemiologic surveys, and  water and
environmental data.  The list of activities below is intended to provide a starting point for
data analysis.  In some outbreaks the preliminary analysis may be adequate to make
recommendations; in many other outbreaks preliminary analysis will serve to identify
areas that will require more sophisticated statistical analysis or further epidemiologic
study to be able to resolve important questions.
Note:  If at any time throughout the entire investigative or analytical process, an ongoing,
potentially hazardous source of illness (e.g., food, water) is discovered, recommendations for
the community should be decided upon and immediately publicized (see Chapters 1 and 4).
Regulatory actions may also need to be taken.
• Determine whether the outbreak is ongoing.  Review line listing and epidemiologic
questionnaire data for dates of onset of illness for the most recent cases.   The
incubation period for cryptosporidiosis is estimated to range from 2 to 10 days.
Therefore, if persons are reporting onset of illness in the past 1 to 2 weeks,
transmission may still be occurring.
• Chart an epidemic curve.  Is it consistent with a common source outbreak, i.e., does it
have a steep upward slope with a sharp peak?  Does the curve appropriately reflect
the effects of a control program, e.g., if a boil water advisory  was issued, was there a
sharp decline in cases following the advisory?
• Plot cases by location of residence on a map to determine if they are clustered in one
area or randomly distributed.  Is the distribution of cases consistent with the
hypothesized mode of transmission?
• Summarize the age, sex, and ethnic distribution of cases.
• Determine whether drinking tap water is the major risk factor.  Were persons with
illness more likely to drink tap water without applying  home water treatment than
were persons who are not ill?  Did drinking alternative water, e.g., bottled water,
home-filtered water, private well water, or municipal water from another source
protect against infection?
• Evaluate other risk factors such as attendance at a day care center, recent travel to a
developing country, contaminated food, animal exposures, etc.
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2.  Is water a likely source of infection?
If  age, sex, and geographic distribution of cases indicates that only people using a specific
water supply are affected, collect additional water data.  The objectives are to determine
rapidly if drinking water is the probable source of infection and to decide if a boil water
advisory should be issued.
• Obtain water quality and treatment data for the community affected by the suspected
outbreak. (Chapter 1 discusses how to form a task force to assess the local drinking water
supply and treatment before a possible outbreak.  Information may already have been
collected by the task force for the first three items outlined below.)
• Identify source(s) and type(s) of water (e.g., surface, spring, well).
• Determine type(s) of treatment (e.g., filtration type, if any; disinfection type, if any).
• Determine the number of water supplies serving the community and the parts of the
community that each serves.   Are cases clustered in one water service area ?
• Review recent water quality data (e.g., coliform counts, turbidity levels, disinfectant
residuals).  Graph the peak turbidity levels recorded each day before and during the
suspected outbreak period.  Were there any recent changes in the water treatment
protocol, temporary malfunctions, or treatment failures shortly before cases began to
be reported?  Have there been chronic water filtration problems, e.g. frequent turbidity
spikes in the 0.3 - 1.0 NTU range that may have allowed Cryptosporidium to pass
through without violating filtration standards?
• Determine whether there were there any recent repairs to the treatment plant or
distribution system.  If so, does the distribution of cases correspond to the site of
repair?
• Determine whether system pressure recently fell to less than 5 psi.
• Determine whether there was vandalism and/or unauthorized access to facilities.
• Determine whether there have been any recent changes in the watershed (e.g.,
drought, flood, land use, sewage overflow) that may have increased the chances for
Cryptosporidium contamination of source water.
• Discuss water quality and treatment data with the local water treatment plant engineer
or the state water-treatment engineer, and/or the EPA engineer that may be assisting in
the investigation.  This will minimize the risk of misinterpreting data.
• If the outbreak appears to be caused by drinking water:
• Consider issuing a boil water advisory if there is evidence that a hazard still exists.
• Consider sampling raw and finished (treated) water for Cryptosporidium. This should
be done as early in the outbreak as possible in order to increase chances of detecting
the organism.
• Consider sampling filter backwash material for Cryptosporidium.
• Consider locating water for Cryptosporidium testing that likely was drawn during the
probable period when people were exposed, e.g., stored water such as recently filled
swimming pools or water beds, water in dead-end mains, or commercial ice.
• Contact health departments and water utilities in other communities that could be
affected by the same water source, i.e., if a river is the source of drinking water,
contactcommunities upstream and downstream to alert them to a possible problem
and ask for information about any recent increases in Cryptosporidium diagnoses or
diarrhea.
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• If recreational water is suspected, sample lake, river, or pool water for C yptosporidium.
If  pool water is tested, skim off the thin layer of material resting on top of the filter bed
and/or gather the filter backwash material for examination for Cryptosporidium.
3. What to do if data indicate an outbreak is occurring.
A thorough epidemiologic investigation is often desired to better define the size, geographic
extent, and cause of an outbreak as well as to identify the specific activities (exposure risk
factors) that lead to infection.
Note:  If at any time an outbreak appears to be occurring, it should be reported to your state
department of health which can provide both technical and field assistance.  Experienced
state staff can often improve the study design, provide guidance on interim control strategies,
and facilitate more rapid completion of the investigation.  Emergency numbers for state
personnel are listed in the appendix of this handbook. Ideally an interagency task force will
already have been established (see Chapter 1) and a coordinated response plan agreed upon.
Task force members should be kept fully apprised of all actions taken when an outbreak
appears to be occurring.
• Plan the investigation.  Random digit telephone surveys and case-control studies are two
types of study design commonly used in outbreak investigations in which drinking water
is suspected.  Random digit dialing surveys are useful for determining when the outbreak
began, the magnitude of the outbreak, geographic distribution of cases, and the
demographic profile and symptoms of people reporting illness.  Telephone surveys are
also useful in determining the impact of control measures (e.g., boil water advisories).
Case-control studies are used primarily to identify the type(s) of exposure (e.g., water,
food, animals, day care, etc) that result in infection. The major objective of  the study is
to find out what people with Cryptosporidium (cases) did to acquire infection that people
without the infection (controls) did not do.  Case-control studies require that methods be
developed to identify cases (e.g., patients who have laboratory-confirmed
cryptosporidiosis), and controls (uninfected persons) who are representative of the
population from which the cases are drawn.  Exposures to infection that are more
common among cases than among controls are then identified using an epidemiologic
questionnaire. The questionnaire must be developed to ensure critical evaluation of ll
likely sources of infection.
• Identify a suitable study population(s).
Investigations can be community-wide or restricted to smaller groups. Early in an
investigation, quick studies of small groups such as people in residential care
institutions may be helpful.  For example, comparing attack rates (number of ill
persons divided by total number of persons exposed) for individuals in nursing homes
in the same community but with different water supplies can be useful in rapidly
assessing the role of drinking water. A high rate of infection in residents of nursing
homes using a suspected water source vs. a low rate of infection in a similar facility
on another water supply is strong evidence for waterborne transmission because
individuals in such institutions have few other exposures to Cryptosporidium. For
larger case-control studies, consult your state health department for assistance in
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determining an appropriate sample size and number of controls to use per case.
• Identify suitable controls.
This can often be the most important and difficult part of an epidemiologic
investigation.  Even the experienced epidemiologist will benefit from consultation with
another epidemiologist.
• Design a questionnaire.
      Design a standardized questionnaire to use in gathering information on reported or
known cases.  If a case-control study is planned, develop a similar questionnaire for
controls.  A sample questionnaire for case-patients is provided in the appendix as Figure
E.  The sample questionnaire is intended only as a guide; it will require modification to fit
the particular circumstances surrounding the outbreak investigated. Below is a brief
checklist of important variables to consider when developing a questionnaire:
• Demographic information:
Age, sex, ethnicity, home, work, and school addresses. (If the entire address is not
available, obtain the zip code to use as a minimum indication of where people live.)
• Clinical:
Onset date of illness
Duration of illness










Sources of drinking water at home, work, and school
Consumption of unpurified lake or river water (e.g., while camping)
Exclusive or partial use of purified water
Consumption of water or reconstituted drinks in restaurants, stores, or social
settings
Amount of water consumed daily before becoming ill
Food
Dining out
Consumption of unpasteurized beverages or other products
Children
Number in diapers
Number who attend day care
Number in diapers who attend day care
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Other people








• Collect the data
• Random digit dialing survey
Select a sample of names from a residential telephone directory.  Depending on the
number of people to be sampled, select every 10th, 20th, 30th or other number of
persons listed.  Seek the telephone company’s guidance on how to call residential
listings only.  Use a computer program to randomly select telephone numbers to call.
• Case-control study
Administer your questionnaire to all or a representative sample of persons with illness.
For example, if there are a large number of cases, you might want to sample 10-30%
of them. Contact your state health department for assistance in determining an
appropriate sample size and number of controls per case.
• Other groups to consider studying:
Consider investigating persons who had time-limited exposures to the water in question
(e.g., flight attendants, business travelers, out-of-town attendees at sporting events,
weddings, etc). Studies of these groups are useful for determining when the problem
began and how long exposure continued.  These studies also provide useful information
about the incubation period and dose (minimum amount of water consumed that results in
infection).
• Draw conclusions and make recommendations. After analysis of epidemiologic and
environmental data, conclusions should be summarized in an outbreak report.  Special
attention should be given to discussing the most likely cause(s) of the outbreak and
development of recommendations that would prevent future outbreaks.
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II. News Release Information
This is a sample of information to include in a news release to be used if there is a
cryptosporidiosis outbreak in your community, or if Cryptosporidium is found in your
community’s water.
Extra precautions for people with weakened immune systems:
In persons with weakened immune systems, cryptosporidiosis can be chronic and life-threat-
ening.  Persons with weakened immune systems may wish to take these extra precautions to
protect themselves against cryptosporidiosis.
• Drink only water that has been purified by boiling for 1 minute or by distilling.
• Trust only water filters with any of the following information on the label to remove
Cryptosporidium: reverse osmosis; absolute pore size of 1 micron or smaller; tested and
certified by NSF Standard 53 for cyst removal; tested and certified by NSF Standard 53
for cyst reduction.  Bottled water treated by reverse osmosis or with any of these filters,
and distilled water, will also be free of Cryptosporidium.  Canned or bottled carbonated
(bubbly) drinks will also be free of Cryptosporidium.
• Wash, with purified water, and/or cook all food.
• Do not swim in lakes, rivers, streams, public pools, or water parks and do not use
jacuzzis.
• Avoid any sexual practice that might involve contact with stool.
• Avoid touching young farm animals.
• Avoid touching the stool of animals.
Sources of infection
• Cryptosporidiosis is the disease caused by the parasite Cryptosporidium parvum.
Cryptosporidium infection can be caused by swallowing only a small amount of
cryptosporidia.  Cryptosporidium infection can be contracted by:
• eating contaminated food or drinking contaminated water;
• touching the stool of infected persons or animals, then not washing your hands well
before touching your mouth;
• touching anything contaminated with stool, then not washing your hands well before
touching your mouth.
• Cryptosporidiosis can be prevented by always washing hands thoroughly, after any
contact with animals or soil, after changing diapers, and before eating.
Symptoms
• Symptoms of cryptosporidiosis, the disease caused by Cryptosporidium, include diarrhea,
stomach cramps, fatigue, nausea, vomiting, or a slight fever.
• Symptoms usually start 2 to 10 days after swallowing Cryptosporidium.
• In a healthy person with a normal immune system, symptoms normally will last for 2
weeks or less, although individuals may recover, then get sick again.  Some people with
cryptosporidiosis may not get sick, but they can still pass the disease to others.
• After infection, an individual can pass cryptosporidia in their stool for up to 2 months,
and may give the disease to other people.
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• Persons with severely weakened immune systems may have cryptosporidiosis for a
longer time and should talk with their health care providers to learn how to avoid
infection.  The CDC AIDS Hotline, 1-800-342-2437, provides more information on
cryptosporidiosis.
Information for infected persons
• Persons infected with Cryptosporidium should:
• wash their hands regularly, especially before preparing food and after using the toilet;
• avoid any sexual contact, especially sexual contact involving exposure to feces;
• avoid swimming in public bathing areas (swimming pools, lakes, water parks, etc.)
while they have diarrhea and for several weeks after it clears up.
• Diarrhea can cause dehydration.  Individuals with diarrhea should contact their health
care provider, who may prescribe an oral rehydration mix.
• Some drugs, such as paromomycin, may reduce the symptoms of cryptosporidiosis, but
no drug now known can cure it. Therefore, prevention of infection is the key.
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III. Sample FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions)
Anticipate questions you might be asked by the media and the public during a
cryptosporidiosis outbreak and how to answer them.  Here are some examples.
Q. What is Cryptosporidium and how is it transmitted?
A. Cryptosporidium is a microscopic parasite that is found in the feces of infected humans or
animals.  Humans are infected when they ingest contaminated water or food, or touch
contaminated objects, then touch their mouth before washing their hands well.
Cryptosporidiosis, the disease caused by Cryptosporidium, is one of the most common
causes of diarrhea among persons with AIDS in the U.S.
Q. What are the symptoms?
A. Symptoms of Cryptosporidium infection in persons with normal immune systems include
diarrhea that lasts 1 to 2 weeks, often accompanied by abdominal cramps, fatigue,
nausea, vomiting, and low-grade fever.  People usually develop symptoms 2 to 10 days
after ingesting the parasite.
In persons with weakened immune systems, cryptosporidiosis can be chronic and life-
threatening.
Q. Who is at risk for severe cryptosporidiosis?
A. People at risk for severe cryptosporidiosis include people with AIDS, people who have
cancer, or organ or bone marrow transplant patients who are taking drugs that suppress
the immune system, and people who are born with genetically weakened immune
systems.
Q.  Why is Cryptosporidium a problem in drinking water?
A. Cryptosporidium is a problem because most water from lakes, rivers, and streams,
contains some of the microscopic parasite.  Most communities get their drinking water
from these “surface” sources, rather than from underground sources such as wells.
Cryptosporidium is highly resistant to chlorine and other disinfectants, which are used to
kill bacteria and viruses in drinking water.  In addition, Cryptosporidium is so small that
it is not easily removed from water by the type of filters used in conventional municipal
water treatment.
Over half of the tested public water supplies that use surface water have been found to
have small amounts of Cryptosporidium in the water sent to homes and businesses.
Q. How can I tell if there is Cryptosporidium in my drinking water?
A. You cannot tell without expensive, special tests.  These tests are not very good for home
use, and are not always reliable.
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Q. Is there a cure for Cryptosporidium infection?
A. No.  Some drugs, such as paromomycin (PAR-o-mo-my-sin), may reduce the symptoms
of cryptosporidiosis, but no drug now known can cure it.  Diarrhea can cause
dehydration.  Persons with diarrhea should contact their health care provider who may
recommend an oral rehydration therapy mix.
Q. Should I take extra protective measures?
A. It depends on your health and your drinking water.  If you have AIDS,  if you have cancer
or if you have had an organ or bone marrow transplant and are taking drugs that weaken
your immune system, or if you were born with a genetically weakened immune system,
you may want to take extra measures.  You should talk to your health care provider
regarding the level of your risk and on how to reduce it.
If you have a healthy immune system, you are at less risk for cryptosporidiosis, but you
may want to consider the quality of your drinking water.  Unfortunately, assessing the
risk of Cryptosporidium infection from your drinking water is not easy.  Tests for
Cryptosporidium in public water supplies are not easy to interpret.  A positive test does
not necessarily mean there is a risk, and a negative test does not necessarily mean there is
no risk.  If your drinking water comes from a surface source (lake, stream, or river) that
is unfiltered, or one that is located downstream from a sewage treatment facility or runoff
from farming, your water may be at increased risk of containing Cryptosporidium.
Q. What can immunosuppressed persons do to avoid infection with Cryptosporidium?
A. Avoid sexual practices that may result in exposure to feces.
Avoid drinking water directly from lakes, rivers, ponds, or streams.
Avoid swimming in lakes, rivers, streams, ponds, public swimming pools, or recreational
water parks.
Avoid working with diaper-aged children.
Avoid contact with feces of all animals, particularly young farm animals such as calves.
Always wash hands thoroughly:
• after any contact with animals;
• after any contact with soil (e.g., gardening);
• after changing diapers;
• before eating, or preparing food.
Consume only water that has been purified by boiling for 1 minute, or by treatment with
certain filters.  The CDC AIDS Hotline (1-800-342-2437) has information on filters that
remove Cryptosporidium from water.
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IV. Protocols for Special Audiences and Contingencies
The following pages contain information for various specialized audiences and contingencies
for use if a boil water advisory is issued.  You may wish to release this information to the
appropriate persons individually (i.e., not as a news release).  You may also want to set up
telephone hotline numbers to handle questions specific to these audiences.  These pages are
designed, in a camera-ready format, for individual release, by fax or similar methods, to the
appropriate persons at the institutions indicated.
Experience has shown that hotlines operate most effectively with a single number (answered
automatically or personally) with one consistent message.  Callers can be directed to further
basic information via audio, fax, Internet, or other means.  Callers can also be directed to
medical, sanitation, water, or other appropriate personnel.  In this way, callers with general
questions can be managed at a general level and callers with specific technical questions can
be efficiently directed to appropriate personnel.  Also, the following protocols can be distrib-
uted more appropriately and efficiently on demand if callers are grouped in this manner.
Experience has shown that hotlines are especially useful for addressing the needs of commer-
cial establishments and the public.
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Hospitals and Clinics
During a boil water advisory
• Patients and employees should not consume water that has not been disinfected, ice or
drinks made with water that has not been disinfected, or raw foods rinsed with water that
has not been disinfected.
• Disinfect water of Cryptosporidium by
• boiling at a rolling boil for 1 minute
• distilling
• filtering through a reverse osmosis filter, an “absolute 1 micron” filter or a filter
certified to remove Cryptosporidium under  NSF International Standard #53 for either
“cyst removal” or “cyst reduction.”  Ultraviolet light treatment of water is not
effective against Cryptosporidium, at normally used levels.
• All employees with diarrheal illness should be regulated by standard rules of exclusion
from work.
• Disinfect dishes via dishwashing machines that have a dry cycle or a final rinse that
exceeds 113°F for 20 minutes or 122°F for 5 minutes or 162°F for 1 minute.
• Use only disinfected water to treat skin wounds.
Upon rescinding a boil water advisory
• Re-start and flush any water-using fixture or piece of equipment in accordance with the
manufacturer’s specifications.  This may vary from fixture to fixture. Consult your
facilities engineer and/or the manufacturer when re-starting the equipment.
• Managers of large buildings with water-holding reservoirs should consult with their
facility engineer and health department about draining the reservoir.
• Run cold water faucets for 1 minute before using the water.
• Run drinking fountains for 1 minute before using the water.
• Backwash pool filters and change media or water.
• Run water softeners through a regeneration cycle.
• Drain and refill hot water heaters set below 113°F.
• Resume usual bathing practices and care for patients with breaks in the skin.
Renal Dialysis Units
During a boil water advisory
• Patients and employees should not consume water that has not been disinfected, ice or
drinks made with water that has not been disinfected, or raw foods rinsed with water that
has not been disinfected.
• Disinfect water of Cryptosporidium by
• boiling at a rolling boil for 1 minute
• distilling
• filtering through a reverse osmosis filter, an “absolute 1 micron” filter, or a filter
certified to remove Cryptosporidium under  NSF International Standard #53 for either
“cyst removal” or “cyst reduction.”  Ultraviolet light treatment of water is not
effective against Cryptosporidium, at normally used levels.
• All employees with diarrheal illness should be regulated by standard rules of exclusion
from work.
• Disinfect dishes via dishwashing machines that have a dry cycle or a final rinse that
exceeds 113° F for 20 minutes or 122° F for 5 minutes or 162° F for 1 minute.
• Use only disinfected water to treat skin wounds.
• Monitor patients closely for signs and symptoms of gastrointestinal illness.
If  your water system is treating water chemically beyond normal levels advise dialysis
units to
• Sample water for chemical analysis to ensure compliance with AAMI standards.
• Conduct chlorine/chloramine tests to ensure compliance with AAMI standards.
• Monitor water system gauges once per shift.
Upon rescinding a boil water advisory
• Re-start and flush any water-using fixture or piece of equipment in accordance with the
manufacturer’s specifications.  This may vary from fixture to fixture.  Consult your
facilities engineer and/or the manufacturer when re-starting the equipment.
• Managers of large buildings with water-holding reservoirs should consult with their
facility engineer and health department about draining the reservoir.
• Run cold water faucets for 1 minute before using the water.
• Run drinking fountains for 1 minute before using the water.
• Backwash pool filters and change media or water.
• Run water softeners through a regeneration cycle.
• Drain and refill hot water heaters set below 113°F.
• Resume usual bathing practices and care for patients with breaks in the skin.
Nursing Homes
During a boil water advisory
• Residents and employees should not consume water that has not been disinfected, ice or
drinks made with water that has not been disinfected, or raw foods rinsed with water that
has not been disinfected.
• Disinfect water of Cryptosporidium by
• boiling at a rolling boil for 1 minute
• distilling
• filtering through a reverse osmosis filter, an “absolute one micron” filter, or a filter
certified to remove Cryptosporidium under  NSF International Standard #53 for either
“cyst removal” or “cyst reduction.”  Ultraviolet light treatment of water is not
effective against Cryptosporidium, at normally used levels.
• All employees with diarrheal illness should be regulated by standard rules of exclusion
from work.
• Disinfect dishes by washing in dishwashing machines that have a dry cycle or a final
rinse that exceeds 113°F for 20 minutes or 122° F for 5 minutes or 162° F for 1 minute.
Upon rescinding a boil water advisory
• Re-start and flush any water-using fixture or piece of equipment in accordance with the
manufacturer’s specifications.  This may vary from fixture to fixture.  Consult your
facilities engineer and/or the manufacturer when re-starting the equipment.
• Managers of large buildings with water-holding reservoirs should consult with their
facility engineer and health department about draining the reservoir.
• Run cold water faucets for 1 minute before using the water.
• Run drinking fountains for 1 minute before using the water.
• Backwash pool filters and change media or water.
• Run water softeners through a regeneration cycle.
• Drain and refill hot water heaters set below 113°  F.
• Resume usual bathing practices and care for residents with breaks in the skin.
Day-care Facilities
During a boil water advisory
• Children and employees should not consume water that has not been disinfected, ice or
drinks made with water that has not been disinfected, or raw foods rinsed with water that
has not been disinfected.
• Disinfect water of Cryptosporidium by
• boiling at a rolling boil for 1 minute
• distilling
• filtering through a reverse osmosis filter, an “absolute one micron” filter, or a filter
certified to remove Cryptosporidium under  NSF International Standard #53 for either
“cyst removal” or “cyst reduction.”  Ultraviolet light treatment of water is not
effective against Cryptosporidium, at normally used levels.
• All employees with diarrheal illness should be regulated by standard rules of exclusion
from work.
• Disinfect dishes by washing in dishwashing machines that have a dry cycle or a final
rinse that exceeds 113°F for 20 minutes or 122° F for 5 minutes or 162° F for 1 minute.
Upon rescinding a boil water advisory
• Re-start and flush any water-using fixture or piece of equipment in accordance with the
manufacturer’s specifications.  This may vary from fixture to fixture.  Consult your
facilities engineer and/or the manufacturer when re-starting the equipment.
• Managers of large buildings with water-holding reservoirs should consult with their
facility engineer and health department about draining the reservoir.
• Run cold water faucets for 1 minute before using the water.
• Run drinking fountains for 1 minute before using the water.
• Backwash pool filters and change media or water.
• Run water softeners through a regeneration cycle.
• Drain and refill hot water heaters set below 113°F.
Prevention and Control of Cryptosporidiosis in Day-care Facilities
Effective measures include
• frequent hand washing, by both staff and children;
• clear separation of diapering and food-handling areas and responsibilities;
• the use of overclothes or diapers capable of retaining liquid feces;
• disinfection of diaper areas and toys;
• excluding children with diarrhea;
• use of disposable gloves when changing diapers;
• use of disposable paper to cover diaper-changing areas;
• separation of diaper-changing areas from children’s play areas.
No disinfectant is guaranteed to be completely effective against Cryp osporidium. How-
ever, hydrogen peroxide (3%) is usually effective.  Ammonia can also be used but it has a
strong odor and, if accidentally mixed with bleach or other chlorine-containing solutions,
produces hazardous chlorine gas.
In the event of an outbreak, to reduce the level of potentially infectious Cryptosporidium,
clean and disinfect toys, table tops, and high chairs more frequently than usual (at least
twice daily).  Dishwasher-safe toys may be washed in a commercial dishwasher that has a
dry cycle or a final rinse that exceeds 113°F for 20 minutes or 122° F for 5 minutes or
162° F for 1 minute. Cloth toys may be washed and heat-dried in a clothes dryer for 30
minutes.
If there is an increase of diarrhea, parents should be informed of the symptoms of
cryptosporidiosis, how it is transmitted, the risk of severe illness in immunocompromised
persons, and necessary control measures.
Dental Offices
During a boil water advisory
• Reschedule appointments for immunocompromised patients, such as HIV-positive
individuals, chemotherapy and transplant patients, and congenitally
immunocompromised individuals.
• Warn your patients before treatment that they are at greater risk for cryptosporidiosis if
they are immunocompromised, and that they may wish to reschedule their treatment after
the boil water advisory is lifted.  Explain to all patients the current situation regarding
water and indicate what procedures your office is following to protect their health.
• Patients and employees should not consume water that has not been disinfected, or ice or
drinks made from water that has not been disinfected.
• Disinfect water of Cryptosporidium by
• boiling at a rolling boil for 1 minute
• distilling
• filtering through a reverse osmosis filter, an “absolute one micron” filter or a filter
certified to remove Cryptosporidium under  NSF International Standard #53 for either
“cyst removal” or “cyst reduction.”  Ultraviolet light treatment of water is not
effective against Cryptosporidium, at normally used levels.
• All employees with diarrheal illness should be regulated by standard rules of exclusion
from work.
• Turn off the water supply to high-speed handpieces.  Using disinfected water, flow water
out of a bulb syringe when using high-speed handpieces.
Upon rescinding a boil water advisory
• Re-start and flush any water-using fixture or piece of equipment in accordance with the
manufacturer’s specifications.  This may vary from fixture to fixture.  Consult your
facilities engineer and/or the manufacturer when re-starting the equipment.
• Managers of large buildings with water-holding reservoirs should consult with their
facility engineer and health department about draining the reservoir.
• Run cold water faucets for 1 minute before using the water.
• Run drinking fountains for 1 minute before using the water.
Commercial Establishments (Restaurants, Hotels, Convenience Stores)
During a boil water advisory
• Do not serve or consume water that has not been disinfected, ice or drinks made with
water that has not been disinfected, or raw foods rinsed with water that has not been
disinfected.
• Disinfect water of Cryptosporidium by
• boiling at a rolling boil for 1 minute
• distilling
• filtering through a reverse osmosis filter, an “absolute one micron” filter, or a filter
certified to remove Cryptosporidium under NSF International Standard #53 for either
“cyst removal” or “cyst reduction.”  Ultraviolet light treatment of water is not
effective against Cryptosporidium, at normally used levels.
• Disinfect dishes by washing in dishwashing machines that have a dry cycle or a final
rinse that exceeds 113°F for 20 minutes or 122° F for 5 minutes or 162° F for 1 minute.
Upon rescinding a boil water advisory
• Re-start and flush any water-using fixture or piece of equipment in accordance with the
manufacturer’s specifications.  This may vary from fixture to fixture.  Consult your
facilities engineer and/or the manufacturer when re-starting the equipment.
• Managers of large buildings with water-holding reservoirs should consult with their
facility engineer and health department about draining the reservoir.
• Run cold water faucets for 1 minute before using the water.
• Run drinking fountains for 1 minute before using the water.
• Backwash pool filters and change media or water.
• Run water softeners through a regeneration cycle.
• Drain and refill hot water heaters set below 113°F.
Commercial Ice Maker Users
Upon rescinding a boil water advisory
A.  Flush the water line to the machine inlet:
1.  Close the valve on the water line behind the machine and disconnect the water line
from the machine inlet.
2.  Open the valve, run 5 gallons of water through the valve, and dispose of the water.
3.  Close the valve.
4.  Reconnect the water line to the machine inlet.
5.  Open the valve.
B.  Flush the water lines in the machine:
1.  Turn on the machine.
2.  Make ice for 1 hour and dispose of the ice.
C.  Clean and disinfect all parts and surfaces that come in contact with water and ice,
following the manufacturer’s instructions.
Public Users of Public Water Supplies
During a boil water advisory
• Do not consume water that has not been disinfected, ice or drinks made from water that
has not been disinfected, or raw foods rinsed with water that has not been disinfected.
• Disinfect water of Cryptosporidium by
• boiling at a rolling boil for 1 minute
• distilling
• filtering through a “reverse osmosis” filter, an “absolute one micron” filter, or a filter
certified to remove Cryptosporidium under NSF International Standard #53 for either
“cyst removal” or “cyst reduction.”  Ultraviolet light treatment of water is not
effective against Cryptosporidium, at normally used levels.
• Disinfect dishes by washing in dishwashing machines that have a dry cycle or a final
rinse that exceeds 113°F for 20 minutes or 122° F for 5 minutes or 162° F for 1 minute.
Upon rescinding a boil water advisory
• Flush household pipes/faucets: run all cold water faucets for 3 minutes each.
• Flush home automatic ice makers: make three batches of ice cubes and discard all three
batches.
• Run water softeners through a regeneration cycle.
• Flush drinking fountains: run continuously for 1 minute.
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The following camera-ready fact sheets can be duplicated or faxed as is. The
information for persons with HIV and AIDS is also available in pamphlet form from
the CDC National AIDS Hotline at 1-800-342-2437. 
PREVENTING CRYPTOSPORIDIOSIS: A GUIDE FOR PERSONS
WITH HIV AND AIDS
What is cryptosporidiosis?
Cryptosporidiosis (krip-toe-spo-rid-e-o-sis), often called “crypto,”  is a disease caused by a
one-celled parasite, Cryptosporidium parvum, also known as “crypto.”  Crypto, which cannot
be seen without a very powerful microscope, is so small that over 10,000 of them would fit
on the period at the end of this sentence.
What are the symptoms of crypto ?
Although sometimes persons infected with crypto do not get sick, when they do get sick they
can have watery diarrhea, stomach cramps, an upset stomach, or a slight fever.  In some
cases, persons infected with crypto can have severe diarrhea and lose weight.  The first
symptoms of crypto may appear 2 to 10 days after a person becomes infected.
How does crypto affect you if your immune system is severely
weakened ?
In people with AIDS and in others whose immune system is weakened, crypto can be serious,
long-lasting and sometimes fatal.  If your CD4+ cell count is below 200, crypto is more
likely to cause diarrhea and other symptoms for a long time.  If your CD4+ count is above
200, your illness may not last more than  1 to 3 weeks or slightly longer.  However, you
could still carry the infection, which means that the crypto parasites are living in your intes-
tines, but are not causing illness.  As a carrier of crypto, you could infect other people. If your
CD4+ count later drops below 200, your symptoms may reappear.
How is crypto spread?
You can get crypto by putting anything in your mouth that has touched the “stool,” (bowel
movement) of a person or animal with crypto.  You can also get crypto by touching your
mouth before washing your hands after touching the stool of infected persons, or touching
the stool of infected animals, or touching soil or objects contaminated with stool.  Drinking
contaminated water or eating contaminated food can also give you crypto.  Cryptosporidiosis
is not spread by contact with blood.
Can crypto be treated ?
Yes, but no drug has been found yet to cure it.  Some drugs, such as paromomycin, may
reduce the symptoms of crypto and new drugs are being tested.  If you think you have crypto,
or if you just have diarrhea, talk with your health care provider about testing and treatment.
Diarrhea can cause dehydration.  You should drink plenty of fluids to prevent dehydration.
Oral rehydration powders and sportsade drinks can also help prevent dehydration.
How can I protect myself from crypto?
You can reduce your risk of getting crypto.  The more steps you take, the less likely you are
to get crypto.  These actions will also help protect you against other diseases.
1.  Wash your hands.
Washing your hands often with soap and water is probably the single most important step
you can take to prevent crypto and other illnesses.  Always wash your hands before eating
and preparing food.  Wash your hands well after touching children in diapers; after
touching clothing, bedding, toilets, or bed pans soiled by someone who has diarrhea; after
gardening; any time you touch pets or other animals; and after touching anything that
might have had contact with even the smallest amounts of human or animal stool,
including dirt in your garden and other places.  Even if you wear gloves when you do
these activities you should still wash well when you finish.   Children should be
supervised by adults to make sure they wash their hands well.
2. Practice safer sex.
Infected people may have crypto on their skin in the anal and genital areas, including the
thighs and buttocks.  However, since you cannot tell if someone has crypto, you may
want to take these precautions with any sex partner:
“Rimming” (kissing or licking the anus) is so likely to spread infection that you should
avoid it, even if you and your partner wash well before.
Always wash your hands well after touching your partner’s anus or rectal area.
3. Avoid touching farm animals.
If you touch a farm animal, particularly a calf, lamb, or other young animal, or visit a
farm where animals are raised, wash your hands well with soap and water before
preparing food or putting anything in your mouth.  Do not touch the stool of any animal.
After you visit a farm or other area with animals, have someone who is not HIV infected
clean your shoes, or wear disposable gloves if you clean them yourself.  Wash your hands
after taking off the gloves.
4. Avoid touching the stool of pets.
Most pets are safe to own.  However, someone who is not HIV infected should clean their
litter boxes or cages, and dispose of the stool.  If you must clean up after a pet, use
disposable gloves.  Wash your hands afterwards.  The risk of getting crypto is greatest
from pets that are less than 6 months old, animals that have diarrhea, and stray animals.
Older animals can also have crypto, but they are less likely to have it than younger
animals.  If you get a puppy or kitten that is less than 6 months old, have the animal
tested for crypto before bringing it home.  If any pet gets diarrhea, have it tested for
crypto.
5. Be careful when swimming in lakes, rivers, or pools, and when using hot tubs.
When swimming in lakes, rivers, or pools, and when using hot tubs, avoid swallowing
water.  Several outbreaks of crypto have been traced to swallowing contaminated water
while swimming.  Crypto is not killed by the amount of chlorine normally used in
swimming pools and water parks.  Crypto also can remain alive in salt water for several
days, so swimming in polluted ocean water may also be unsafe.
6.  Wash and/or cook your food.
Fresh vegetables and fruits may be contaminated with crypto.  Therefore, wash well all
vegetables or fruit you will eat uncooked.  If you take extra steps to make your water safe
(see next page for ways to do so), use this safe water to wash your fruits and vegetables.
When you can, peel fruit that you will eat raw, after washing it.  Do not eat or drink
unpasteurized milk or dairy products.  Cooking kills crypto.  Therefore, cooked food and
heat-processed foods are probably safe if, after cooking or processing, they are not
handled by someone infected with crypto, or exposed to possibly contaminated water.
7. Drink safe water.
Do not drink water directly from lakes, rivers, streams, or springs.  Because you cannot
be sure if your tap water contains crypto, you may wish to avoid drinking tap water,
including water or ice from a refrigerator ice-maker, which are made with tap water.
Because public water quality and treatment vary throughout the United States, always
check with the local health department and water utility to see if they have issued any
special notices about the use of tap water by HIV-infected persons.  You may also wish to
take some additional measures:  boiling your water, filtering your water with certain
home filters, or drinking certain types of bottled water.  Processed, carbonated (bubbly)
drinks in cans or bottles are probably safe, but drinks made at a fountain might not be
because they are made with tap water.  If you choose to take these extra measures, use
them all the time, not just at home.  If the public health department advises boiling the
water, do not drink tap water unless you  boil it.  You could also use one of the bottled
waters described below.
Boiling water:  Boiling is the best extra measure to ensure that your water is free
of crypto and other germs.  Heating water at a rolling boil for 1 minute kills crypto,
according to CDC and EPA scientists.  After the boiled water cools, put it in a
clean bottle or pitcher with a lid and store it in the refrigerator.  Use the water for
drinking, cooking, or making ice.  Water bottles and ice trays should be cleaned with
soap and water before use.  Do not touch the inside of them after cleaning.  If you
can, clean water bottles and ice trays yourself.
Filtering tap water: Not all available home water filters remove crypto.  All filters
that have the words “reverse osmosis” on the label protect against crypto.  Some other
types also work, but not all filters that are supposed to remove objects 1 micron
 or larger from water are the same.  Look for the words “ab olute 1 micron.”
Some  “1 micron” and most  “nominal  1 micron” filters will not work against crypto.
Also look for the words “Standard 53” and the words “cyst reduction” or “cyst
removal” for an NSF-tested filter that works against crypto.
To find out  if a particular filter removes crypto, contact NSF International
(3475 Plymouth Road, P.O. Box 130140, Ann Arbor, MI 48113-0140, tel: 1-800-673-
8010, fax: 1-313-769-0109), an independent testing group.  Ask NSF for a list of
“Standard 53 Cyst Filters.”  Check  the model number on the filter you intend to buy
to make sure it is exactly the same as the number on the NSF list.  Look for the NSF
trademark on filters, but be aware that NSF tests filters for many different things.
Because NSF testing is expensive, many filters that may work against crypto have not
been tested. Reverse osmosis filters work against crypto whether they have been
tested by NSF or not.  Many other filters not tested by NSF also work if they have an
absolute pore size of 1 micron or smaller.
If you choose to buy a filter, look for this information on the label:
Filters designed to remove crypto
 (any of the four messages below on a package label indicate that
the filter should be able to remove crypto)
Reverse osmosis (with or without NSF testing)
Absolute pore size of 1 micron or smaller
(with or without NSF testing)
Tested and certified by NSF Standard 53 for
cyst removal
Tested and certified by NSF Standard 53 for
cyst reduction
Filters labeled only with these words
may not be designed to remove crypto






EPA approved - Caution: EPA does not approve
or test filters.
EPA registered - Caution: EPA does not register






Filters collect germs from your water, so someone who is not HIV infected should change the
filter cartridges for you; if you do it yourself, wear gloves and wash your hands afterwards.
Filters may not remove crypto as well as boiling does because even good brands of filters
may sometimes have manufacturing flaws that allow small numbers of crypto to get past the
filter. Also, poor filter maintenance or failure to replace filter cartridges as recommended
by the manufacturer can cause your filter to fail.
Bottled water: If you drink bottled water, read the label and look for this information:
Water labeled as follows was processed
by method effective against crypto
Reverse osmosis treated
Distilled
Filtered through an absolute 1 micron or
smaller filter
“1 micron absolute”
Water labeled as follows may not have been















Bottled water labels reading  “well water,”  “artesian well water,”  “spring water,” or “min-
eral water” do not guarantee that the water does not contain crypto.  However, water that
comes from protected well or protected spring water sources is less likely to contain crypto
than bottled water or tap water from less protected sources, such as rivers and lakes.
Home distillers: You can remove crypto and other germs from your water with a home
distiller.  If you use one, you need to carefully store your water as recommended for
storing boiled water.
 Other drinks: Soft drinks and other beverages may or may not contain crypto.  You need
to know how they were prepared to know if they might contain crypto.
If you drink prepared drinks, look for drinks prepared to remove crypto:
Crypto killed or removed in preparation
Canned or bottled soda, seltzer, and fruit drinks
Steaming hot (175° F or hotter)
tea or coffee
Pasteurized drinks
Crypto may not be killed or removed
in preparation
Fountain drinks
Fruit drinks you mix with tap water from
frozen concentrate
Iced tea or coffee
Information on Prepared Drinks
Juices made from fresh fruit can also be contaminated with crypto.  Several people
became ill after drinking apple cider made from apples contaminated with crypto.  You
may wish to avoid unpasteurized juices or fresh juices if you do not know how they were
prepared.
Take extra care when traveling.
If you travel to developing nations, you may be at a greater risk for crypto because of poorer
water treatment and food sanitation.   Warnings about food, drinks, and swimming are even
more important when visiting developing countries.  Avoid foods and drinks, in particular
raw fruits and vegetables, tap water, or ice made from tap water, unpasteurized milk or dairy
products, and items purchased from street vendors.  These items may be contaminated with
crypto.  Steaming-hot foods, fruits you peel yourself, bottled and canned processed drinks,
and hot coffee or tea are probably safe. Talk with your health care provider about other
guidelines for travel abroad.
For more information on crypto, call the CDC National AIDS Hotline at
1-800-342-AIDS.
This material was prepared by the inter-agency Working Group on Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis, which
includes representatives from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection
Agency, Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Association of People With
AIDS, AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power, and representatives of state and local health departments and water
utilities.
PREVENTING CRYPTOSPORIDIOSIS: A GUIDE FOR THE
PUBLIC
What is Cryptosporidium?
Cryptosporidium  (pronounced krip-toe-spo-rid-ee-um) is a parasite that can live in the
intestines of humans, farm animals, wild animals, and household pets. Although there are
several species of Cryptosporidium, only one species, Cryptosporidium parvum, is known to
cause infection in humans. The parasite, which is too small to be seen without a microscope,
is protected by an outer shell called an oocyst (oh-oh-cist).  This protective shell allows it to
survive outside the body for long periods of time. When a person or animal swallows
Cryptosporidium oocysts, the parasite comes out of its shell and can cause infection.  More
Cryptosporidium oocysts are then produced and passed in the feces (bowel movements) of
the infected person or animal.
Where is Cryptosporidium Found ?
Animal droppings and human feces are the most common sources of Cryptosporidium.
Therefore, soil, drinking water, recreational water, food, hands, and other surfaces contami-
nated by such wastes can contain Cryptosporidium as well.
How Can Cryptosporidium Affect My Health ?
If you swallow Cryptosporidium oocysts, 2 to 10 days later you may get a disease called
cryptosporidiosis.  Symptoms may include diarrhea, which could be watery, stomach cramps,
upset stomach, and a slight fever.
If you are healthy and have a normal immune system, your symptoms usually will last for 2
weeks or less, although during that time your condition may improve and then worsen.
People who recover from their initial illness may continue to pass Cryptosporidium in their
feces for up to two months.  During this 2-month period they may spread the disease to
others.  Although some people who swallow Cryptosporidium will not get sick, they can still
pass the organism in their feces.
If you have a severely weakened immune system, you may have cryptosporidiosis for a
longer period of time, and it could lead to serious or life-threatening illness.  You should talk
with your health care provider to learn how to avoid cryptosporidiosis.  Examples of people
with weakened immune systems include those with HIV/AIDS, cancer and transplant pa-
tients taking certain immunosuppressive drugs, and people with inherited diseases that effect
the immune system.
How Would I Know if I Have Cryptosporidiosis ?
The only way to tell if you have cryptosporidiosis is to have your feces analyzed in a labora-
tory.  Because most people recover from the infection without visiting a doctor, they may
never know if Cryptosporidium was the cause of their illness.
Is There a Treatment for Cryptosporidiosis ?
Presently, there is no drug that can cure cryptosporidiosis.  Most people with a healthy
immune system will recover on their own.  Young children and persons with a weakened
immune system may need special treatment from a doctor to replace fluids lost during the
illness. If you have diarrhea, you should drink plenty of fluids and may also wish to take
over-the-counter anti-diarrheal medication.
How is Cryptosporidiosis Spread ?
You can become infected by swallowing Cryptosporidium.  Even a small amount may cause
infection.  Some sources of the disease are:
Feces
• People infected with  Cryptosporidium can pass the infection to others through soiled
diapers, clothing, bedding, or other items. You should always wash your hands after
touching items that may be contaminated.
• Infected persons may have small amounts of feces containing Cryptosporidium on their
skin throughout the genital area, including the thighs and buttocks.  Sex that may involve
contact with feces, including oral and anal sex, can lead to infection with
Cryptosporidium.
• The feces of animals, especially animals less than 6 months old or animals with diarrhea,
can contain Cryptosporidium.  You should always wash your hands after touching
animals, cleaning up their feces, cleaning their cages or stalls, or visiting barns or other
areas where these animals live.
Food
• Food that is grown in or has fallen upon soil contaminated with feces.
• Unpasteurized milk and dairy products that may have been contaminated with feces.
• Food contaminated by being handled by someone who is infected and does not wash their
hands carefully, or food that is washed with Cryptosporidium-contaminated water.
Water
• Water in lakes, rivers, streams, ocean bays, swimming pools, hot tubs, jacuzzis, and
recreational water parks can be contaminated with Cryptosporidium. When swimming,  if
you drink this water or accidentally swallow it, you may get cryptosporidiosis.  Neither
the chlorine used to disinfect swimming pools nor the types of filters used in most
swimming pools can be depended upon to kill or remove Cryptosporidium.
• Contaminated drinking water or ice may be a source of Cryptosporidium infection.
Unlike most germs, Cryptosporidium is not completely removed or killed by treatment
methods most commonly used to disinfect drinking water.
How Can I Protect Myself ?
1.  Always Wash Your Hands Thoroughly with Soap and Hot Water.
• Any time you may have touched human or animal feces.  Always wash your hands after
using the bathroom, changing diapers, having sex, or handling animals.  You can also
become infected by touching objects that are contaminated with feces such as faucet
handles, diaper changing tables, or bed pans.
• After working in soil. Soil can become contaminated when an animal with
cryptosporidiosis leaves its droppings there.
• Before eating.
2.  Avoid Sexual Activity that May Involve Contact with Feces.
3.  Avoid Contaminated Food.
• Food that will be eaten uncooked should be washed with purified (boiled or filtered)
water before serving.
• Do not drink or eat unpasteurized milk, dairy products, or juices and ciders.
4.  Know the Source of Your Water.
• Do not drink or swallow water directly from rivers, lakes, streams, the ocean, swimming
pools, hot tubs, or jacuzzis.
• If you travel to a less developed region, you may want to avoid drinking water that has
not been boiled or filtered to remove Cryptosporidium.
5.  Extra Precautions for People with Severely Weakened Immune Systems.
If you have a severely weakened immune system, consult your health care provider for
additional guidance.  You can also call the CDC AIDS Hotline toll-free at 1-800-342-2437
and ask for more information on cryptosporidiosis, or use the WWW site www.cdc.gov/
ncidod/diseases/crypto/crypto.htm.
Should I Have My Water at Home Tested for Cryptosporidium ?
Home tests for Cryptosporidium are generally not recommended because they are expensive
and  impractical.  This is especially true if you are served by a municipal water system that is
already providing this service.  The test requires a large amount of water (about 100-400
gallons)  and many hours of analysis by a specially trained microbiologist.   For more infor-
mation on Cryptosporidium testing in your local water system, contact your  water provider
or the state agency that sets rules for water systems.   If you have a private drinking water
source, routine maintenance should include annual testing for bacterial contamination. This
may provide an indication of possible contamination.
What Should I do if My Water Utility Reports Cryptosporidium in My
Drinking Water ?
Current water treatment practices may not remove all Cryptosporidium from drinking water.
Drinking water systems that routinely test for Cryptosporidium are likely to find it occasion-
ally.  If Cryptosporidium is found in your drinking water, public health and water supply
officials will look at many measures of water quality and alert the public about any additional
precautions that might be necessary.  If you are advised to boil your water, don’t drink tap
water or eat uncooked products prepared with tap water such as food or ice, unless you boil
the water for 1 full minute, or filter the water first.
What About Boiling, Home Filters, and Bottled Water ?
Boiling your drinking water for 1 minute is the best way to get rid of Cryptosporidium.
When boiling is not possible, there are many different types of home water filters and bottled
water that you can use,  although not all of them can protect you against cryptosporidiosis.
If you are interested in a specific brand of filter and want to find out if it removes
Cryptosporidium you can contact NSF International,  3475 Plymouth Road, P.O. Box
130140, Ann Arbor, MI 48113-0140, 1-800-673-8010, or by fax at 1-313-769-0109.  NSF
International is an independent testing group that some filter manufacturers use to certify
their products. In addition, any process that uses reverse osmosis or a filter with a pore size
of 1 micron absolute or smaller should remove Cryptosporidium. Remember that all filters
must be properly maintained as recommended by the manufacturer.
If you choose to buy a filter, look for the following information on the label:
Filters Designed to Remove Cryptosporidium
(any of the four messages below on a package label
indicate that the filter should be able to remove Cryptosporidium)
Reverse osmosis (with or without NSF testing)
Absolute pore size of 1 micron or smaller
(with or without NSF testing)
Tested and certified by NSF Standard 53 for cyst removal
Tested and certified by NSF Standard 53 for cyst reduction
All types of bottled water are not equally safe.  Bottled water labels that say “well water,”
“artesian well water,” “spring water,” or “mineral water,” don t guarantee water free of
Cryptosporidium. If you want to buy bottled water with a low risk of Cryptosporidium, read
the label and look for the following information:




Filtered through an absolute 1 micron or
smaller filter
1 micron absolute
Filters designed to remove crypto
 (any of the four messages below on a package label  indicate
that the filter should be able to remove crypto)
Reverse osmosis  (with or without NSF testing)
Absolute pore size of 1 micron or smaller
(with or without NSF testing)
Tested and certified by NSF Standard 53 for cyst
removal
Tested and certified by NSF Standard 53 for cyst
reduction
Filters labeled only with these words
may not be designed to remove crypto






EPA approved - Caution: EPA does not
approve or test filters.
EPA registered - Caution: EPA does not






PREVENTING CRYPTOSPORIDIOSIS: A GUIDE TO WATER
FILTERS AND BOTTLED WATER
Filtering tap water:  Not all available home water filters remove crypto.  All filters that have
the words “reverse osmosis” on the label protect against crypto.  Some other types also work,
but not all filters that remove objects 1 micron or larger from water are the same.  Look for
the words “absolute 1 micron.”  Some  “1 micron” and most  “nominal 1 micron” filters will
not work against crypto.  To find out  if a particular filter removes crypto, contact NSF
International (3475 Plymouth Road, P.O. Box 130140, Ann Arbor, MI 48113-0140, 1-800-
673-8010, 1-313-769-0109 [fax]), an independent testing group.  Ask NSF for a list of
“Standard 53 Cyst Filters.”  Check  the model number on the filter you intend to buy to make
sure it is exactly the same as the number on the NSF list.   Look for the NSF trademark on
filters, but be aware that NSF tests filters for many different things.  Also look for the words
“Standard 53” and the words “cyst reduction” or “cyst removal” for an NSF-tested filter that
works against crypto.  Because NSF testing is expensive, many filters that may work against
crypto have not been tested.   Reverse osmosis filters work against crypto whether they have
been tested by NSF or not.   Many other filters not tested by NSF also work if they have an
absolute pore size of 1 micron or smaller.
If you choose to buy a filter, look for this information on the label:
Water labeled as follows was processed
by method effective against crypto
Reverse osmosis treated
Distilled
Filtered through an absolute 1 micron or
smaller filter
“1 micron absolute”
Water labeled as follows may not have been















Filters collect germs from water, so someone who is not HIV infected should change the
filter cartridges; anyone changing cartridges should wear gloves and wash their hands after-
wards.  Filters may not remove crypto as well as boiling does because even good brands of
filters may sometimes have manufacturing flaws  that allow small numbers of crypto to get
past the filter.  Also, poor filter maintenance or failure to replace filter cartridges as recom-
mended by the manufacturer can cause a filter to fail.
If you drink bottled water, read the label and look for this information:
Bottled water labels reading  “well water,”  “artesian well water,”  “spring water,” or “min-
eral water”do not guarantee that the water does not contain crypto.  However,  water that
comes from protected well or protected spring water sources is less likely to contain crypto
than bottled water or tap water from less protected sources, such as rivers and lakes.
Home distillers: You can remove crypto and other germs from your water with a home
distiller.  If you use one you need to carefully store your water as recommended for storing
purified water.
Other drinks : Soft drinks and other beverages may or may not contain crypto.  You need to
know how they were prepared to know if they might contain crypto.
If you consume prepared beverages, look for drinks from which crypto has been re-
moved:
Crypto killed or removed in preparation Crypto may not be killed or removed
in preparation
Canned or bottled soda, seltzer, and fruit drinks Fountain drinks
Steaming hot (175° F. or hotter) tea or coffee Fruit drinks you mix with tap water
from frozen concentrate
Pasteurized drinks  Iced tea or coffee
Juices made from fresh fruit can also be contaminated with crypto.  Several people became ill
after drinking apple cider made from apples contaminated with crypto.  You may wish to
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Waterborne cryptosporidiosis associated with recreational water exposure is an emerging
public health problem.  Cryptosporidium oocysts are resistant to disinfection by chlorine at
levels generally used in swimming pools, and recreational water filtration units that use sand
filter media are not effective in removing oocysts.  Furthermore, few recreational water
facilities enforce measures that might reduce the potential for contamination. The low infec-
tive dose of this organism and the intermittent nature of diarrhea experienced by many
persons with cryptosporidiosis adds to the difficulty of preventing swimming-associated
cryptosporidiosis.
The first reported U.S. outbreak of cryptosporidiosis associated with recreational water
exposure occurred in 1988 in Los Angeles County, Calif.  Forty-four (73% of the total)
persons from five separate swimming groups reported diarrhea after using the same swim-
ming pool in July and August.  Unlike most outbreaks subsequently reported, a fecal accident
was noted the week before onset of illness.
Since then, nine additional recreational waterborne outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis have been
reported in the United States; these have occurred in California, Kansas, Idaho, Oregon,
Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Georgia.  Attack rates among pool users have ranged from 15 to
100%; typically, the highest attack rates are reported among children.  The number of ill
persons per outbreak has ranged from 26 to more than 2,000.  Although some outbreaks have
occurred in the presence of inadequate chlorination or malfunctioning filter systems, no such
irregularities have been identified in other outbreaks.
Outbreaks have occurred in a variety of recreational water settings, including a lake at a state
park in New Jersey, a large recreational water park in Georgia, a wave pool in Oregon, a
water slide in Idaho, and community or hotel pools in Wisconsin and Kansas. The occurrence
of recreational waterborne cryptosporidiosis appears to be increasing, and these outbreaks are
most certainly underrecognized and underreported.  Outbreaks in Wisconsin and Oregon
followed large drinking water-associated outbreaks in nearby cities, suggesting that increased
awareness and enhanced surveillance may have played a role in the detection and investiga-
tion of these outbreaks.
As noted previously in this handbook, Cryptosporidium oocysts are resistant to disinfection
by chlorine at levels generally used in swimming pools.  Because Cryptosporidium oocysts
are only 4-6 microns, most recreational water filtration units that use sand filter media are not
effective in removing them.   In a typical case of diarrhea, one bowel movement can contain
enough oocysts to contaminate 100 million gallons of water, to the extent that swallowing  a
single mouthful of this water can cause illness. Because persons infected with
Cryptosporidium will excrete oocysts for several weeks after they have stopped having
diarrhea, contamination of recreational water is possible long after symptoms are no longer
present.
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Few recreational water facilities enforce measures that might reduce risk of exposure, such as
showering before entering the pool, excluding persons with diarrhea or incontinence, or
restricting diaper-age children to certain pools.  Children in diapers and those being toilet
trained are more apt to have fecal accidents.  This, coupled with younger children’s tendency
to swallow pool water, increases their chance of becoming ill. In addition, younger children
are more likely to suffer from dehydration as a result of diarrhea.  Restricting access to
certain pools can reduce the risk of spreading contamination to an entire recreational facility.
Data on effective prevention strategies are extremely
limited.  Behavioral changes will require education of
swimmers and facility management alike.  Improved pool
filtration, and separate filtration and/or circulation sys-
tems for adult and children’s pools may reduce risk, but
such changes can be costly, and the degree to which they
reduce risk is unknown.  Development and enforcement
of clear and effective policies regarding fecal accidents in
recreational water facilities is needed, but the effective-
ness of stringent policies is unclear.  For example, one
recommendation might be to treat all observed fecal
accidents as potentially involving Cryptosporidium, in
which case all swimmers should immediately leave the
pools and the water should be effectively treated for Cryptosporidium.  Unfortunately, fecal
accidents are often not reported and can be difficult to detect when stools are watery.
In light of these uncertainties, much work is needed to educate the public and the recreational
water industry, and to evaluate potential intervention strategies.  In the meantime, immuno-
suppressed persons should be counseled regarding the potential risk of Crypt sporidium
infection associated with recreational water.
Cryptosporidium oocysts are
resistant to disinfection by
chlorine at levels generally
used in swimming pools, and
recreational water filtration units
that use sand filter media are not
effective in removing oocysts.
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Cryptosporidiosis: Sources of Infection and Guidelines for
Prevention*
by Dennis D. Juranek
Division of Parasitic Diseases,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Atlanta, Georgia
Cryptosporidium parvum is an important emerging pathogen in the United States and a cause of severe, life-threatening
disease in patients with AIDS. No safe and effective form of specific treatment for cryptosporidiosis has been identified
to date. The parasite is transmitted by ingestion of oocysts excreted in the feces of infected humans or animals. The
infection can therefore be transmitted from person-to-person, through ingestion of contaminated water (drinking water
and water used for recreational purposes) or food, from animal to person, or by contact with fecally contaminated
environmental surfaces.
Outbreaks associated with all of these modes of transmission have been documented. Patients with human immunodefi-
ciency virus infection should be made more aware of the many ways that Cryptosporidium species are transmitted, and
they should be given guidance on how to reduce their risk of exposure. This article summarizes existing data on the
various modes of transmission. It includes an in-depth look at waterborne transmission because as more research data are
made available to the public, physicians will increasingly be asked by patients about the importance of this source of
infection compared with other sources of infection.
Cryptosporidium parvum has been recognized as a
human pathogen since 1976. From 1976 to 1982 the
disease was rarely reported and primarily occurred in
immunocompromised persons. In 1982, the number of
reported cases began to increase dramatically as part of
the AIDS epidemic. Initially the increase was limited to
immunocompromised persons; however, with the aid of
newly developed laboratory diagnostic techniques,
outbreaks in immunocompetent persons began to be
recognized. In immunocompetent persons,
cryptosporidiosis is manifested as an acute, self-limiting
diarrheal illness lasting 7 to 14 days and it is often
accompanied by nausea, abdominal cramps, and low-
grade fever.  In patients with AIDS, cryptosporidiosis is
generally chronic and more severe than in immunocom-
petent persons; the voluminous watery diarrhea is often
debilitating and may be accompanied by severe abdomi-
nal cramps, weight loss, anorexia, malaise, and low-
grade fever [1].
No safe and effective form of treatment for
Cryptosporidiosis has been identified to date. On the
basis of initial human treatmenttrials, several drugs have
been reported to decrease the frequency or volume of
stool production in some patients.  However, to date,
none of these initially “promising” drugs have lived up
to expectations when subjected to larger, controlled
studies or to widespread use by physicians in clinical
practice.
Incidence of Cryptosporidiosis
Cryptosporidiosis is among the most common causes of
diarrhea in patients with AIDS in the United States.
About 2.2% of all patients whose cases of AIDS are
reported to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) have cryptosporidiosis as their AIDS-defining
illness; 3.5% of children whose cases of AIDS are
reported to the CDC have cryptosporidiosis. Hospital-
based studies indicate that Cryptosporidiosis is diag-
nosed in 10%-20%
of patients with AIDS who have diarrhea [2-6]. Because
diarrhea occurs in about half of all patients with AIDS
each year [2, 7], it is estimated that the annual rate of
cryptosporidial infection among all patients with AIDS
may approach 5%-10%.
Cryptosporidiosis can occur at any time in the course of
HIV infection.  However, severe and persistent disease
correlates well with CD4 counts of less than 180 cells/
mm3.  In one study, only 5 (13%) of 39 patients infected
*This article originally appeared in Clinical Infectious
Diseases 1995;21(Suppl 1)S57-61.
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with C. parvum and with CD4 counts of less than 180
cells/mm3 had self-limiting disease, whereas all 8
patients with CD4 counts of greater than 180 cells/mm3
had infections that cleared and did not relapse during a
follow-up period of 1-24 months [8].
Source of Infection and Risk Factors
Cryptosporidium species are transmitted by ingestion of
oocysts excreted in the feces of infected humans or
animals. Cryptosporidial infection can therefore be
transmitted from person-to-person, through ingestion of
fecally contaminated water or food, from animal to
person, or by contact with fecally contaminated environ-
mental surfaces.
Transmission via Water and Food
Six well-documented outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis
attributed to drinking water have been recognized in the
United States, including an outbreak in Milwaukee in
1993 that affected over 400,000 persons [9-15]. The
source of drinking water used by utilities in these
outbreaks included surface water (lakes, rivers, streams),
well water, and spring water. Several outbreaks have also
been associated with swimming pools and amusement
park wave pools or water slides [12, 16-19].
There is considerable circumstantial evidence that low
level (nonepidemic) transmission of Cryptosporidium
species through drinking water may be occurring
throughout the United States. Recent studies indicate that
Cryptosporidium oocysts are present in 65% - 97% of
surface waters (rivers, lakes etc.) tested throughout the
country [20-23].  Because Cryptosporidium species are
highly resistant to chemical disinfectants used in the
treatment of drinking water, physical removal of the
parasite from contaminated water by filtration is an
important component of the water treatment process.
However, a filtration system, especially one that is not
well maintained and operated, may not afford absolute
protection. All waterborne outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis
detected to date have occurred in communities where
water utilities met state and federal standards for
acceptable quality of drinking water, and in all three of
the outbreaks that involved surface water supplies, a
filtration system had been used. Data from the outbreaks
suggest that compliance of utility companies with state
and federal standards for water treatment may not be
adequate to protect citizens from waterborne
cryptosporidiosis.  Moreover, recent surveys for the
occurrence of Cryptosporidium oocysts in fully treated
(disinfected and filtered) municipal water demonstrate
that small numbers of oocysts were able to breach filters
and were present in tap water in 27%-54% of communi-
ties evaluated [23, 24].
Twenty-three million Americans reside in communities
that do not filter municipal drinking water that comes
from surface sources [25]. These communities include
some of America’s largest cities, which have substantial
numbers of patients with HIV infection or AIDS, (e.g.
New York, Boston, Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco).
Small numbers of Cryptosporidium oocysts have also
been intermittently found in the drinking water in these
cities.
However, none of the cities with filtered water or with
unfiltered drinking water where small numbers of
oocysts have been detected have had a recognizable
outbreak of cryptosporidiosis. While low level transmis-
sion could be occurring as a result of such low concen-
trations of oocysts, there are no data to date that docu-
ment such an event.  The absence of a treatment barrier
for Cryptosporidium species in communities that do not
use a filtration system could result in significant transmis-
sion if the source of the drinking water were to become
heavily contaminated with this organism.
The health risk (especially for immunocompromised
persons) associated with consumption of (filtered or
unfiltered) public drinking water contaminated with
small numbers of C. parvum oocysts is unknown.
Although researchers are able to recover small numbers
of oocysts from treated drinking water, current laboratory
methods do not enable them to determine if these oocysts
are viable or infectious. Moreover, it is not known if the
number of oocysts present in drinking water constitutes a
sufficient dose to cause illness in humans, whether
immunosuppressed persons are more susceptible to
lower doses of oocysts than are immunocompetent
persons, or if there are strains of  C. parvum that vary in
infectious dose and virulence.  Dose response data are
currently available for only one isolate of  C. parvum that
was evaluated in healthy volunteers. In this study the
50% infectious dose (ID50) was estimated to be 132
oocysts. [26, 26a].
Food contaminated with feces from infected persons or
animals has always been considered to be a theoretical
risk factor for cryptosporidiosis. A recent outbreak of
cryptosporidiosis in children who drank fresh-pressed
apple cider contaminated by animal feces at a county fair
in Maine provides the first documentation of this mode
of transmission [27]. Although oocysts do not survive
cooking, infected food handlers may unwittingly transmit
the infection by fecal contamination of beverages, green
salads, or other foods that are not cooked or heated after
handling.
Animal-to-Person Transmission
C. parvum is capable of infecting all species of mammals
including humans [28, 29]. In animals, cryptosporidiosis
almost exclusively occurs in newborns.  There are no
data on the national prevalence of cryptosporidial
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infection in puppies or kittens in the United States, but in
a study in Atlanta, 10% of puppies examined at an
animal shelter were found infected and shedding oocysts
[30]. To date there have been no confirmed instances of
C. parvum transmission from infected household pets.
Two suspicious episodes have been reported in which an
infected cat was found in the house of an immunodefi-
cient person with cryptosporidiosis; in neither instance
could the direction of spread be clearly elucidated [31,
32].
Other species of Cryptosporidium that infect birds (C.
meleagridis and C. baileyi), rodents (C. muris), reptiles
(C. serpentis), and fish (C. nasorum) are not generally
considered to be infectious for humans [33]. To date,
only one case of human infection with any of these
species has been reported [34]; this case
occurred in an HIV-infected patient from whom a
parasite resembling C. baileyi was isolated, but who did
not have a pet bird or other specific exposures to birds.
In strong contrast to the weak epidemiological data
implicating household pets as sources of
cryptosporidiosis in humans, the evidence for C. parvum
transmission from calves to humans is unequivocal [35-
40]. It is estimated that 50% of dairy calves shed oocysts
and that the parasite is present on more than 90% of
dairy farms [41-43]. While relatively few patients with
AIDS are directly exposed to calves or to premises where
calves are raised, the high prevalence of infected calves,
especially on dairy farms, raises additional questions
about the prudence of drinking unpasteurized milk.
Person-to-Person Transmission
Person-to-person spread of C. parvum is believed to be
one of the most common modes of transmission.
Children still wearing diapers who attend day care
centers are at especially high risk for this form of
transmission either through intimate play or because of
careless diaper changing practices. Infections acquired
by children in the day care setting are often transmitted
to care-givers at the facility and to older children and
adults who come in contact with the infected child at
home [44].  Any sexual practice that brings a person into
oral contact with the feces of an infected person is also
considered a high-risk for exposure to Cryptosporidium
species. It is not known how many patients with HIV
infection or AIDS acquire cryptosporidiosis by this route
of transmission. For patients with HIV infection or AIDS
who follow “safer sex” practices, including avoidance of
feces, this mode of transmission should be minimal.
Several other types of high-risk exposures include direct
contact with feces while caring for an infected person (e.
g. bathing, changing soiled bedding, or emptying a bed
pan) at home or in a medical facility. Nosocomial
infections involving both medical care staff and patients
have been reported [45- 50].  Hospital staff should
observe proper precautions for preventing fecally
transmitted disease while caring for patients with
cryptosporidiosis.
Prevention of Exposure
The proportion of cases of cryptosporidiosis in HIV-
infected persons that can be attributed to each mode of
transmission is unknown. Identification of the most
common route(s) of transmission and a better under-
standing of the specific risk factors for exposure that lead
to infection would greatly facilitate development of a
more targeted prevention strategy.  Until such data
become available, doing what one can to avoid each of
the commonly recognized modes of transmission should
reduce the risk of infection. As with many other opportu-
nistic infections for which effective treatment is not
available, prevention of infection is the most effective
approach to disease control.
It is clear that HIV-infected persons should not drink
water directly from lakes or rivers. This includes
accidental ingestion of lake or river water while swim-
ming or engaging in other types of recreational water
activity.  The amount of chlorine and types of filters used
in public swimming pools are not adequate to prevent
transmission from swimmers infected with
Cryptosporidium species who can shed oocysts for
weeks after symptoms resolve.  Patients should be
advised that these activities may expose them to
Cryptosporidium species, especially if the pool is used
by young children who might accidentally defecate in the
pool.
Because HIV-infected patients who have a
cryptosporidial infection can reinfect themselves and
infect others, they should not use swimming pools that
will be used by others.  Swimming pools can be disin-
fected by using high concentrations of chlorine for long
periods (e.g. 3 mg/l water for 53 hours or 8 mg/l for 20
hours).  While several municipal waterborne outbreaks of
cryptosporidiosis have occurred in the U.S., the magni-
tude of risk for acquiring cryptosporidiosis by drinking
municipally treated water in the non-outbreak setting is
presently unknown.  The risk is likely to vary from city
to city depending on the quality of the city’s source of
water and the quality of water treatment provided.
Current risk data are not adequate to recommend that all
immunocompromised persons in the U.S. boil or avoid
drinking tap water.  However, persons with severely
weakened immune systems should be advised that the
risk is not zero. Until the health risk associated with
small numbers of oocysts commonly found in drinking
water is more clearly defined, HIV-infected persons who
want to take independent precautions to reduce the risk
of waterborne cryptosporidiosis can do so by boiling for
1 minute all water intended for drinking [51, 51a].
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As an alternative to boiling water, certain types of
individual or household filters or a high-quality bottled
water may provide nearly the same level of protection.
While several portable and household filters are capable
of removing Cryptosporidium oocysts from drinking
water, bacterial overgrowth on these filters may pose an
additional health risk [52]. Therefore, patients should be
advised to carefully follow the manufacturer’s instruc-
tions for the use and replacement of filters.  In addition,
since Cryptosporidium oocysts are likely to concentrate
on the outside of a filter cartridge that has been in use,
patients should have someone else change dirty car-
tridges or they should use gloves if they do it themselves.
When selecting an effective filter one must pay careful
attention to label information in order to avoid purchas-
ing one of numerous filters on the market that are not
effective against Cryptosporidium species. Only
microstraining filters that can remove particles 0.1 to 1
micron in size should be considered.  Filters in this
category that provide the greatest assurance of removal
of Cryptosporidium species include those that filter water
by reverse osmosis, those that have “absolute” 1 micron
filters, and those that meet NSF standard #53 for “cyst
removal.”  The “nominal” 1 micron filter rating is not
standardized and many filters in this category may not be
capable of removing greater than 99% of oocysts. Filters
that only employ ultra-violet light, activated carbon, or
pentiodide impregnated resins are not effective against
Cryptosporidium species.  It should not be assumed that
all filters advertised as effective against Giardia species
are effective against Cryptosporidium species.
Many, but not all, brands of bottled water may provide a
reasonable alternative to tap water. Patients should be
advised that the origin, the microbial quality, and
microbial treatment of water before it is bottled vary
considerably among companies and even among brands
of water produced by the same company.  Information on
the labels of water bottles has not been standardized and
often does not provide the consumer with the type of
information needed to identify the product with the
lowest risk for cryptosporidiosis.  As with filters,
individuals who want to use bottled water as an alterna-
tive to tap water must research and pick their supplier
very carefully.  In general, bottled water derived from
springs or wells is safer than water obtained from rivers
and lakes.  Bottled water that originates from well-
protected underground sources (a well or a spring), that
are not subject to intermittent contamination from
surface water, and that have been consistently shown to
be free of coliform bacteria will not contain oocysts.
Since there is no industry labeling standard that reflects
this information, patients may have to question vendors
directly to obtain information about these points.
Just as in the case of municipal water supplies, the
absence of coliform bacteria in the final bottled water
product does not provide assurance that the water came
from an uncontaminated source or that it has been treated
adequately to remove Cryptosporidium species. Treat-
ment of water prior to bottling by distillation or reverse
osmosis filtration, regardless of the source (well, spring,
river, lake), ensures the remove of oocysts if they are
present. In addition, water that has been passaged
through an “absolute” 1 micron or smaller filter, or
through a filter labeled as meeting NSF standard #53 for
“cyst removal” prior to bottling will provide nearly the
same level of protection. Bottlers using “nominal” 1
micron filters as the only treatment barrier for
Cryptosporidium species may not be capable of remov-
ing >99% of oocysts. Companies that use the word
“micro-filtration” on the label may or may not be using
filters that are effective against Cryptosporidium species.
Although ozonation of water has also been shown to kill
Cryptosporidium oocysts, the appropriate amounts of
ozone needed to disinfect water at various temperatures
and pHs have not been clearly defined. Bottlers are
currently restricted to no more than 0.4 mg of ozone per
liter in the final product.  This may or may not be an
adequate amount to kill Cryptosporidium species,
depending on the contact time and other water condi-
tions.  In general, the amount of ozone needed to kill
Cryptosporidium species is hundreds of times greater
than that needed to kill bacterial contaminants [33].
Treatment of municipal tap water with charcoal to
remove the chlorine taste or with short-term exposure to
ultra-violet light before bottling offers no additional
protection against Cryptosporidium species.
The risk of cryptosporidiosis associated with pet owner-
ship is probably small, but it is reasonable to suggest that
HIV-infected persons avoid contact with feces of
animals. In situations where it is not possible to avoid
such contact, e.g., cleaning a cat litter box or removing
feces from shoes or other items that may have become
contaminated, patients should be instructed to wear
disposable gloves. The risk from household pets (dogs
and cats) is greatest from exposure to animals younger
than 6 months of age and to any animal with diarrhea.
Physicians should inform patients that pet ownership
may entail a small risk for cryptosporidial infection and
should discuss how these risks can be further minimized;
it should not be recommended that patients destroy or
give away healthy pets with whom they have a strong
emotional attachment. Immunosuppressed patients
contemplating the acquisition of a new pet should avoid
bringing any animal with diarrhea into their household,
should avoid purchasing a dog or cat younger than 6
months of age, and should not adopt stray animals found
roaming the neighborhood. HIV-infected patients who
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want to assume the small risk of acquiring a puppy or
kitten younger than 6 months of age should be advised to
specifically request that their veterinarian examine the
animal’s stool for Cryptosporidium species before the
patient has contact with the animal.
Research Priorities
More rapid and sensitive serological and molecular
diagnostic techniques for the detection of cryptosporidia
in humans and in environmental sources are needed to
facilitate epidemiologic studies of cryptosporidiosis.
High priority studies include: 1) an assessment of the
proportion of cryptosporidial infections attributable to
the low numbers of oocysts frequently found in munici-
pal drinking water and 2) the relative risk of acquiring
cryptosporidiosis from drinking water versus contact
with animals, unsafe sexual practices, and non-sexual
household or hospital contacts. Data from such studies
would serve to focus the immunocompromised patient’s
attention on avoidance of the exposures that would put
them at greatest risk. Studies are needed to define the
asymptomatic carrier rate for Cryptosporidium species in
HIV-infected patients who recover from a clinical
episode of cryptosporidiosis and who have CD4 cell
counts of greater than 200/mm3. There is also a need to
know if such carriers are likely to develop severe
cryptosporidiosis when their CD4 count drops below 200
cells/mm3. Improved laboratory methods are needed to
facilitate screening of potential therapeutic agents for
infections due to Cryptosporidium species.  Finally, state
and national reporting systems for cases of
cryptosporidial infection are needed to better quantify the
public health impact of this disease and to identify
outbreaks.
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The American Water System has conducted extensive monitoring of its operations since 1988.  Analysis of 347 surface
water samples collected between 1988 and 1993 showed that the prevalence rate of  Gi rdia and Cryptosporidium was
53.9 percent and 60.2 percent, respectively.  But because the parasite assay does not indicate viability or virulence, these
results do not necessarily indicate that these water systems were at risk from waterborne pathogens.  To supplement
coagulation and filtration, the average system will have to apply sufficient disinfection to reduce viable Giardia levels by
3.1 log
10
.  An analysis of existing disinfection practices shows that most systems are already applying disinfectant at a
level sufficient to reduce Giardia levels.  However, the proposed Disinfectants/Disinfection By-product (D/DBP) Rule
may hamper the ability of water utilities to apply sufficient disinfection under current operating conditions.  Careful
integration of the D/DBP and the Enhanced Surface Water Treatment rule is encouraged.
The analogy of the water purveyor as a juggler of
sometimes conflicting federal and state regulations has
never been more true.  The challenge is to keep all of the
regulated parameters successfully flying through the air
while new regulations are constantly being added.  What
makes this prestidigation even more impressive is that
pending regulations, which will have enormous impact,
are constantly changing shape during the performance.
In the middle of this magic show the ring master at-
tempts to interpret the meaning of the performance and
its impact on the audience.  This article will try to play
the role of the ring master in attempting to discuss the
application and interpretation of Giardia and
Cryptosporidium monitoring results but the reader
should be aware that this description is based on the
proposed regulations, and the final program may be
subject to change.
The Information Collection Requirements (ICR) will be
an administrative order that will require utilities to
monitor and provide the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) with information that will
assist the agency in establishing new regulations (1).
Systems will have to provide a variety of technical,
chemical, and operational data.  For microbiological
testing, systems serving populations between 10,000 and
100,000 people will be required to monitor for Giardia,
Cryptosporidium, andtotal and fecal coliforms (or
Escherichia coli) in raw water samples.  Large systems
(those serving >100,000 people) will additionally
monitor for coliphage and Clostridium spp. in raw water
and be required to examine filtered water if raw water
values exceed 1/L.
Through the process of regulatory negotiations the
USEPA has developed a two-tiered Disinfectants/
Disinfection By-Product (D/DBP) Rule (2).  Stage 1
regulations  will specify maximum contaminant levels
(MCLs) and MCL Goals (MCLG) for DBPs; maximum
residual disinfectant levels (MRDLs) and MDRL Goals
(MRDLG) for disinfectants; best available technology
for achieving compliance with the MCLs; a treatment
technique for DBP precursor removal; analytical and
monitoring requirements, and reporting and record-
keeping requirements.  Under stage 1, the MCL for five
haloacetic acids and total trihalomethanes will be 60 and
80 g/L, respectively.  Stage 2 requirements will be
developed using data generated under the ICR (1).
In addition, the D/DBP Rule will specify that all public
water systems using chlorine disinfection and conven-
tional treatment must operate with enhanced coagulation
for removal of DBP precursors if the total organic carbon
(TOC) concentration prior to the first application of
continuous disinfection exceeds 2.0 mg/L.  Enhanced
coagulation is defined as achieving a specified percent
removal of TOC between the raw water and the point
prior to continuous disinfection.  The specified removals
are based upon source water alkalinity and TOC concen-
trations.  Credit for chlorine disinfection will not be
given until the appropriate TOC removal levels have
been achieved.
With the development of the D/DBP Rule, USEPA
recognized the possibility that in an effort to reduce DBP
levels, utilities could inadvertently increase the risk from
microbial agents.  Utilizing the DBP regulatory analysis
model (DBPRAM), USEPA was able to examine the
health and economic implications of various approaches
to DBP regulation.  In a direct comparison of microbial
risk from Giardia infection with cancer risk for several
DBP control scenarios, the predicted increases in Giardia
infection were orders of magnitude higher than decreases
in cancer rates.  To ensure that implementation of the D/
DBP Rule did not increase microbial risk, USEPA
considered it necessary to review the adequacy of the
existing Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR).  This
revised rule, which may also include regulation of
Cryptosporidium, is called the Enhanced SWTR
(ESWTR) (3).*This article originally appeared in Journal of the American Water
Works Association, 1995; 87(9): 54-68.
Copyright © 1995, American Water Works Association.
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USEPA intends to use the microbial data generated by
the ICR to help formulate the final draft of the ESWTR
and it is very likely that the final rule will be subject to
many modifications.  The four principal treatment
options outlined in the draft ESWTR are summarized in
Table 1.
AWS began Giardia, Cryptosporidium testing in 1984
The American Water System (AWS) first began to test
for Giardia in 1984 at several locations of its Pennsylva-
nia operations.  Analysts were trained by Dr. Charles
Hibler of Colorado State University to perform the zinc
sulfate/Lugol’s iodine test.  Nearly 60 percent of 49 river
samples and 36 percent of 79 reservoir samples were
positive for Giardia cysts.  In 1987 the commercial
availability of monoclonal antibodies to Giardia and
Cryptosporidium allowed the development of an immun-
ofluorescence method for simultaneous detection of cysts
and oocysts in water (4).  Comparison of the immunof-
luorescence antibody (IFA) method with the zinc sulfate
(light microscopy) technique showed that the IFA
method detected approximately 12 times more Giardia
cysts in water than did the zinc sulfate technique (5).
IFA also allowed for the simultaneous detection of
Cryptosporidium oocysts.
With the development  of the IFA method, a survey was
conducted to determine the level of Giardia and
Cryptosporidium in surface water supplies.  A total of 66
surface water treatment plants in
14 states and 1 Canadian
province were examined (6).
The results showed that cysts
and oocysts were widely
distributed in the aquatic
environment.  Giardia were
detected in 81 percent of the
raw water samples, and
Cryptosporidium were found in
87 percent.  Either Giardia,
Cryptosporidium, or both, were
detected in 98 percent of the
raw water samples.  Significant
correlations were found between
Giardia and Cryptosporidium
densities and raw water quality
parameters such as turbidity,
and total and fecal coliform
levels.  Higher cyst and oocyst
densities were associated with
source waters receiving indus-
trial or sewage effluents.  The
geometric mean for Giardia in
raw water was 2.8 cysts/L
(range=0.04-66 cysts/L),
whereas the geometric mean for
Cryptosporidium was 2.7 oocysts/L (range=0.07-484
oocysts/L).  Application of a model predicting the 10-4
annual risk of Giardia infection to these raw water data
indicated that the average treatment plant would have to
provide 5.0 log
10
 removal, inactivation or both.
Examination of filtered drinking water showed that
Giardia were detected in 17 percent of the 83 water
samples (7).  Cryptosporidium oocysts were observed in
27 percent of the drinking water samples.  Overall, cysts
or oocysts were found in 39 percent of the treated
effluent samples.  Despite the frequent detection of
parasites in drinking water, microscopic observations of
the cysts and oocysts suggested that nearly all the
organisms were nonviable and there were no reported
outbreaks of water-related illness in any of the systems
examined.
Compliance with the filtration criteria outlined by the
Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR)  did not ensure
that treated water was free of cysts or oocysts.  The
average plant effluent turbidity for sites that were
parasite positive was 0.19 ntu.  Seventy-eight percent of
the sites that were positive for Giardia and
Cryptosporidium met the 0.5-ntu turbidity requirement of
the SWTR.  No correlation could be found between a
particular treatment process, coagulation scheme, or
operational practice and the occurrence of cysts or
oocysts in filtered effluents.  Plants with high source
water parasite levels had a high probability of detection
Table 1
Summary of the Proposed Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule
Parameter Action
Definitions:
  Groundwater under the direct
influence of surface water Includes Cryptosporidium
MCLG
Cryptosporidium MCLG = 0
Criteria to Avoid Filtration :
Watershed control program for Tightens requirements to avoid filtration
Giardia, Cryptosporidium and viruses.
Analytical & Monitoring
Sanitary Survey All public water systems
Frequency: 3-5 years
Conducted by State, agent, or system
Treatment Requirements
Treatment based on Giardia 3-6 log treatment requirement based on
raw water levels
Treatment based on 3-6 log treatment requirement based on
Cryptosporidium raw water levels
Minimum treatment Specifies minimum treatment of 2-log
removal of Cryptosporidium in addition
to existing SWTR requirements for
Giardia and viruses.
No change Does not modify existing SWTR levels
for removal-inactivation
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with the enhanced treatment levels.  This analysis also
permits evaluation of issues related to interpretation of
data collected by the ICR.
Samples collected from 72 plants
Samples were collected from 72 surface water treatment
plants located in 15 states and 2 Canadian provinces.
Sixty-seven surface water locations were examined. Raw
water samples were typically collected from pressurized
taps at the intake to the treatment process.  Samples were
filtered through 10-in. (25.4 cm) wound polypropylene
cartridge filters having a nominal porosity of 1 m (Cat.
#U1A10U, Memtek Corp., Timonium, MD).  Flow rates
averaged 0.99 gpm (gallons per minute) and ranged from
0.04 to 4.1 gpm.  The total volume collected averaged
132 gal (499 L) and ranged from 22.9 (86.6 L) to 898 gal
(3,394 L).
Separate sampling systems were used to collect plant
effluent water.  Chlorine residuals were neutralized prior
to filtration through injection of a sodium thiosulfate
solution using an in-line injector (Dema Engineering Co.,
St. Louis, MO).  Flow rates averaged 0.99 gpm and
ranged from 0.13 to 2.45 gpm.  The total volume
collected averaged 1,022 gal (3,863 L) and ranged from
100 (378 L) to 2,080 gal (7,862 L).
After collection, the filter along with the filter housing
water was placed in a bag (Whirl-Pac, Nasco, Fort
Atkison, WI) containing 10 mL of 37 percent formalin.
Filters were double-bagged and shipped to the laboratory
via overnight delivery.  After delivery, the samples were
stored at 2-5oC and usually processed within 24 to 72
hours.
IFA used to detect pathogens
The procedure for detection of Giardia and
Cryptosporidium in water samples has been described
(4,8).  This method is essentially the same as the Ameri-
can Society for Testing and Materials procedure P229,
(10) with minor modifications.  For example, a single
step centrifugation procedure was used to concentrate the
filter extract because it has been shown that
Cryptosporidium can be lost through repeated centrifuga-
tion (11).  Neither Evan’s blue nor bovine serum albumin
was used because the authors’ experience shows that
these procedures did not enhance cyst or oocyst detec-
tion.
The recovery efficiency of the procedure was evaluated
by spiking 40 gal (151 L) samples with known concen-
trations of cysts and oocysts. To simulate raw water
samples, filter concentrates were added to tap water to
achieve a 150 NTU solution.
of cysts or oocysts in treated effluents.  Examination of
disinfection practices showed that nearly all systems
applied more than the minimum 0.5 log
10
 disinfection
level specified by the SWTR.  More than 75 percent of
the systems applied sufficient disinfection to reduce the
annual risk of Giardia infection to <10-4.
Detailed analysis of five systems showed variation in the
performance of individual filters within a treatment plant
for Giardia and Cryptosporidium removal (8,9).  Al-
though the turbidity of the combined filter effluent was
low (<0.5 NTU), variation in particle counts between
individual filters could exceed 1,000 fold.  Significant
correlations were shown between the removal of turbid-
ity or particle counts and the reduction in cyst and oocyst
levels (9).  Particle counts >5 m were shown to be a
sensitive indicator of filter performance.  Small changes
in effluent turbidity could be associated with dramatic
increases in particle count levels.  Although higher cyst
and oocyst levels were associated with the filter ripening
period, organisms were also observed in the filter
effluents of “mid-run” samples.
Database allows evaluation of regs, issues
The current study was conducted to develop a database
of Giardia and Cryptosporidium results to determine
treatment plant performance goals, aid in long-term
planning for treatment modifications, and help in
determining the impact of future regulations.  The project
analyzed cyst and oocyst levels from raw and plant
effluent water for 72 surface water treatment plants.
Analysis using risk assessment techniques developed for
Giardia and Cryptosporidium permitted a theoretical
evaluation of the health impact of the data.
Because this database is the most comprehensive
collection of results for Giardia and Cryptosporidium
available to the water industry, it was of interest to
evaluate the pending regulations and determine the
feasibility of balancing the reduced DBP requirements
Table  2




Nuclei, median bodies, axoneme 24
Nuclei, median bodies 12
Nuclei, axoneme 12
Median bodies, axoneme 2
*Two or more observed internal structures is considered characteristic
of Giardia cysts.
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Densities of cysts and oocysts were reported as the
number per liter for surface water and number per 100 L
for plant effluent water.  When parasites were not
detected, the parasite level was reported as less than the
detection limit.  Unless stated differently, total cyst and
oocyst counts are given, and values are not adjusted to
reflect recovery efficiencies.
Data were combined with a previous data set
The data from the two-year biannual monitoring (from
March 1991 to January 1993) was combined with a
previous dataset (October 1988 to June 1990) collected
from most of the same systems (6,7).  Therefore, five or
more analyses were performed on both raw and plant
effluent samples for most systems (94 percent).
Physical and operational data were collected
Data characteristic of each site collected from each plant
included source type, level of watershed protection, total
and fecal coliform counts, heterotrophic plate counts, and
turbidity levels for the day of sampling as well as the
average level for the previous month.  Physical factors
included temperature, pH, ammonia, nitrate, phosphate,
and total dissolved solids (TDS).  Operational data
included peak turbidity level, treatment characterization,
type of filter media, average filter run time, surface
wash, filter-to-waste capability, coagulant type and
dosage, polymer type and dosage, pre- and postoxidant
levels, and contact times.
Estimates of the level of Giardia disinfection were
obtained by determining the average pH (7.5), tempera-
ture (15oC) and free chlorine residual (1.4 mg/L) for the
data set analyzed.  Previously published tables (12)
indicate 1.0 log
10
 Giardia inactivation will require 31
mg.min/L under these conditions.  No Giardia disinfec-
tion credit was given for treatment with chloramines.
Because most systems had not performed tracer studies
at the time data were collected, theoretical detention
times were adjusted (by a factor of 0.6 for sedimentation
basins, and 0.1 for clearwells) to account for short
circuiting.  The adjusted detention times were divided by
31 to estimate the level of log-fold Giardia reduction by
free chlorine disinfection.  This level of inactivation will
change seasonally and under different operating condi-
tions, but for the purposes of this study it provided an
estimate of treatment efficacy.
To calculate the level of treatment needed to achieve a
theoretical 10-4 annual risk goal, the logarithmic differ-
ence between source water data collected from this study
was compared to previously published risk assessment
values for Giardia and Cryptosporidium (13,14).  The
theoretical 10-4 annual risk level is 7 x 10-6 cysts/L for
Giardia and 3x10-5 oocysts/L for Cryptosporidium, and
include an assumption of 2 L per person per day con-
sumption of drinking water.  For these calculations, the
authors followed USEPA’s procedure of assuming that
the method recovery efficiency equaled the level of
source water cyst and oocyst viability so that these two
variables cancelled each other in the risk calculations.
Although there are no data to support this assumption,
the authors believe that the calculation results in a
conservative measure of risk (e.g. that recovery efficien-
cies are higher than protozoa viability).
Recovery efficiencies evaluated
During the past five years a large set of recovery
efficiency data has been accumulated for the IFA test.
Although minor details of the methodology have
changed (e.g., a stomacher homogenizer is used instead
of hand washing the filters), however, these alterations
did not substantially change recovery efficiencies. For
tap water samples (turbidity <1 NTU), the geometric
mean for recovery of Giardia cysts was 42.4 percent
(range=18.2 - 118.3 percent; =58) and the geometric
mean for recovery of Cryptosporidium oocysts was 23.6
percent (range=8.7 - 74.7 percent; n=57). More than 90
percent of the variation in Cryptosporidium recovery
efficiencies were within a factor of 2 from the mean,
whereas 89 percent of the variation in Giardia recovery
efficiencies were within a factor of 2 from the mean.  It
is possible that if the identical method had been used for
all the recovery experiments the variation may have been
less, but other studies have concluded that there are still
unidentified sources of variation within the procedure
(11).  Although there has been considerable concern
related to the reproducibility of monitoring results from
various laboratories (15), this study shows that values
from one lab can vary by logarithmic factor of 0.31.
This variation does not unduly affect the interpretation of
treatment goals for surface water plants.
To simulate raw water samples, sample concentrates
were added to tap water to achieve a 150 ntu solution.
The geometric mean for recovery of Giardia cysts from
the high turbidity solution was 50.1 percent (range=36.7
- 75.3 percent; n=5) and the geometric mean for recovery
of Cryptosporidium oocysts was 40.9 percent
(range=34.5 - 59.3 percent; =6).  These values are not
statistically different from the low turbidity experiments
and may illustrate the beneficial impacts of turbidity on
sample concentration (11).
When parasites were not detected, the parasite level was
reported as less than the detection limit.  The geometric
mean of the detection limit was 0.99 organisms/L
(range=0.004 - 42 cysts/L) for raw water, and 1.79
organisms/100 L (range=0.02 - 52 organisms/100 L) for
plant effluent water.  The relatively high detection limit
is probably due to the nature of the Midwestern waters
examined and the fact that emphasis was not placed on
achieving absolutely the highest sensitivity possible (e.g.
multiple membranes were not processed for samples with
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• The original study counted organisms that were not
Giardia or Cryptosporidium.
• The current study was less efficient in detecting
Giardia and Cryptosporidium.
• Occurrence levels fluctuate as a result of unknown
causes.  The  “true” level of occurrence is the
average of the two studies.
• Giardia and Cryptosporidium levels in raw water
have declined over the past four years.
The first possibility—that the previous study detected
organisms other than Giardia and Cryptosporidium—can
be discounted because the characteristics of the organ-
isms (the number of internal structures observed in cysts
and oocysts) were similar between the two studies.  In
the previous study, 12.8 percent of the cysts contained
two or more structures, compared with 14.6 percent in
this study.  Oocysts with sporozoite comprised 32
percent of 242 isolates in the previous study compared
with 54 percent in this study.
The second possibility is also dismissed because neither
the methodology nor the recovery efficiencies have
changed substantially.  The recovery efficiency in the
first study for Cryptosporidium was 25.3 percent (n=16)
compared to 23.6 percent (=57) for this study.  Al-
though Giardia recoveries in the first study averaged
68.6 percent (n=16), some of the values were unrealisti-
cally high (i.e., >100%).  When these high values were
eliminated from the recovery calculation from the first
study, the value averaged 44.4 percent, which is similar
to the 42.4 recovery (n=58) reported for this study.
When the data from this study (n=262) are combined
with the previous investigation (6,7) (n=85), the occur-
rence of Giardia and Cryptosporidium in 347 samples
was 53.9 percent and 60.2 percent, respectively.  These
values are consistent with the findings of other investiga-
tors (16-21).  Ongerth (16) reported detecting Giardia
cysts in 43 percent of 222 samples collected from 17
sampling stations on three Pacific Northwest rivers.
Rose et al (21) recovered Cryptosporidium oocysts in
51.4 percent of 111 surface water samples collected in 13
states.
Poulton et al (17) reported that Cryptosporidium levels
have declined in three of four watersheds monitored by
the Thames Water Company in the United Kingdom.
Levels decreased over a three year period (1989-1991)
with the geometric mean for oocyst levels declining an
average 78 percent.  Peak levels in oocyst occurrence
declined 10- to 20-fold.  One watershed, however,
showed a 73 percent increase in the geometric mean for
oocysts, and a four fold increase in peak concentrations.
Combined data from this and the previous study also
showed a decline in the occurrence of Giardia and
Cryptosporidium from 1989 to 1992 (Table 3).  When the
high limits of detection).  Despite this approach, cysts or
oocysts were detected in a majority of samples.  How-
ever, the proposed ICR would require water utilities to
sample filtered drinking water whenever the limit of
detection for source water samples exceeds 1 organism/
L.  More than 90 percent of the systems examined would
have exceeded this level at one time or another.  The
impact of this low threshold level would be to nearly
double the testing requirements for large systems and to
stress limited laboratory capabilities. Additionally, the
presence of high levels of cysts or oocysts in the raw
water did not automatically indicate that the organisms
would be found in filtered supplies.  A total of 9.4
percent of the plant effluent samples were positive for
cysts or oocysts when the raw water detection levels
were _1 organism/L compared to an 8.8 percent positive
plant effluent rate for raw waters with detection levels >1
organism/L.
Raw water results compiled
Giardia cysts were detected in 118 (45.0 percent) of the
262 raw water samples collected between March 1991
and  January 1993.  The geometric mean of (detectable)
Giardia was 2.0 cysts/L with levels ranging from 0.02 to
43.8 cysts/L.  Microscopic examination of 343 cysts
detected in the raw water samples showed that 50 (14.6
percent) of the organisms had two or more observable
internal structures (e.g., axoneme, median bodies,
nuclei).  Frequently, when the cysts were observed to
contain internal structures, all three characteristic
structures (axoneme, median bodies and nuclei) were
present (Table 2).  Giardia cysts averaged 8.6 m in width
(range 6.6 - 11.9 m) and 12.3 m in length (range 8.6 -
16.5 pm).
Cryptosporidium were detected in 135 (51.5 percent) of
the 262 raw water samples collected between March
1991 and  January 1993.  The geometric mean of
(detectable) Cryptosporidium was 2.4 oocysts/L with
levels ranging from 0.065 to 65.1 oocysts/L.  Micro-
scopic examination of 364 oocysts detected in the raw
water samples showed that 124 (34.2 percent) of the
organisms had no observable internal structures (e.g.
sporozoite or residuum).  Nearly 54 percent (183
oocysts) of the isolates contained observable sporozoite
(40 additional isolates were labeled “full,” but sporozoite
could not be distinguished).  A total of 183 samples (69.8
percent) was positive for either Giardia (47),
Cryptosporidium (65), or both (71).
The occurrence of Giardia and Cryptosporidium for
surface water in this study was lower than the rates
previous reported for the same sites (6).  Earlier the
authors reported that Giardia cysts were found in 81
percent of the samples tested, and Cryptosporidium in 87
percent.  This discrepancy suggests four possible
explanations:
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occasions, while 86.6 percent of the
sites were multiple-positive for
Cryptosporidium.  Only one site (a
protected watershed in Connecticut)
was consistently negative for both
Giardia and Cryptosporidium (n=5).
It is highly likely, therefore, that if a
utility performs a sufficient number
of samples, Giardia,
Cryptosporidium or both will
eventually be detected.
The large number of systems with
multiple-positive samples shows that
the results of the initial survey (6)
could be duplicated in subsequent
tests.  Tabulation of sites that were positive on only one
occasion (n=18 for either Giardia or Cryptosporidium )
showed that six sites were uniquely positive in the first
study (1988-90) while 12 sites were uniquely positive in
the second study (1991-93).  Therefore, when the data
were weighted for the number of samples processed,
there was no tendency to find more sites positive for
cysts or oocysts in either study.
Table 4 shows that the majority of sites were positive for
Giardia cysts 40-60 percent of the time (e.g., two to three
times based on five analyses).  Most sites were positive
for Cryptosporidium oocysts 60-80 percent of the time.
This range of parasite occurrence is consistent with the
results of other investigators (19-23).  Ongerth and
Stibbs (23) found Cryptosporidium oocysts in all of the
samples from the six rivers (four in the state of Washing-
ton, two in California) they examined.  The occurrence
of Giardia ranged from 20 to 80 percent, and
Cryptosporidium ranged from 70 to 100 percent, in three
watersheds examined by LeChevallier et al. (9).  Varia-
tions in parasite occurrence were noted during an
extensive survey of three watersheds in the United
Kingdom where Cryptosporidium oocysts were infre-
quently detected in two of the rivers (1 to 7 percent); in
the third river system oocysts were observed in an
average of 52 percent of the samples (24).  When
Cryptosporidium oocysts were detected, the range of
oocyst levels in the rivers was similar and the arithmetic
average of positive results was actually higher in the
watersheds with infrequent detection.
Variation in raw water levels important
From a water supply perspective,  the variation in source
water pathogen levels is important.  For example, a water
purveyor drawing from a watershed with a low fre-
quency of cyst or oocyst detection might become
complacent because of the infrequent detection of
waterborne protozoa.  However, during episodes of peak
cyst or oocyst densities, these systems may need to
provide roughly the same amount of treatment as
1991-92 data are tabulated by quarters a generalized
trend towards lower frequencies of detection is shown
throughout this time period.  Although it is unclear
whether this trend is due to the sampling frequency or
some methodological difference, it is possible that there
are cyclic variations in environmental cyst and oocyst
concentrations.  Such multiyear variations are well
known for many pathogens (e.g., Vibrio cholerae,
influenza, etc.) (18).  This cyclic phenomena should be
considered in the development and interpretation of
sampling programs such as that proposed in the ICR.  It
is possible that intense sampling over a short time span
may result in an inaccurate estimation of cyst or oocyst
occurrence.  Rather, systems should strive to develop a
database of cyst and oocyst occurrence over a prolonged
period of time.
Analysis of the data according to the raw water sites
provides another means to evaluate the accuracy and
reliability of the results.  This analysis showed that for
the 67 raw water sites (serving 72 treatment plants)
examined, only five were consistently negative for
Giardia, and only two were negative for
Cryptosporidium.  All negative sites were examined
between four and six times.  Nearly 79 percent of the
sites (53 of 67) were positive for Giardia on multiple
Table 3
Frequency of Occurrence for Giardia and Cryptosporidium—1988 - 1992*
Giardia Cryptosporidium
Year Number of Number Percent Number Percent
Samples Positive Positive Positive Positive
1989 47 38 80.9 42 89.4
1990 38 31 81.6 32 84.2
1991 110 56 50.9 69 62.7
1992 133 55 41.4 60 45.1
*1989 and 1990 data from LeChevallier et al (6).
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1 - 21 10.6 6.1
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41 - 60 27.3 27.3
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Table 4
Frequency Distribution of Giardia and







watersheds with a higher frequency occurrence of
parasites.  Because a single peak event can overwhelm
treatment barriers and result in waterborne illness,
treatment plants should be designed and operated in a
manner that can handle such events and ensure a consis-
tently low level of microbial risk.
USEPA has proposed (1) four possible approaches for
analyzing data collected through the ICR: (1) use the
arithmetic mean for the data; (2) use the geometric mean
for the data; (3) use the 90th percentile of the highest
value based on a distribution of the results; or (4) use the
maximum count.
In all cases the USEPA has proposed to count the limit of
detection when cysts or oocysts are not found (e.g., a
value of <1.0 cyst/L becomes a calculated value of 1.0
cyst/L).
Analysis of the combined data from the 1988-90 and
1991-93 studies allowed the four methods for tabulating
Giardia and Cryptosporidium data to be evaluated (Table
5).  In addition, a fifth method (termed maximum
detected level) was added which provides an alternative
calculation when the maximum count was based on a
nondetect value (e.g., limit of detection).  The logarith-
mic difference between these calculated values and the
estimated level for a 10-4 annual risk of infection for
Giardia and Cryptosporidium (0.0007 cysts/100 L and
0.003 oocysts/100 L respectively) permits a theoretical
evaluation of the level of treatment required for each
organism.
The average treatment requirement for Giardia based on
the geometric mean, the arithmetic average and maxi-
mum level was 5.38, 5.52, and 5.85 log
10
, respectively
(Figure 1).  The average treatment requirement for
Cryptosporidium based on the geometric mean, the
arithmetic average and maximum level was 4.49, 4.68,
and 5.05 log
10
, respectively (Figure 2).  All plants
required more than the minimum 3.0 log
10
 level of
treatment as outlined in the SWTR (25).   Overall, the
difference between treatment requirements based on the
geometric mean (the lowest value) and the maximum
level observed (the highest value) averaged 0.47 log
10
 f r
Giardia (range=0.1 - 1.2 log
10
) and 0.56 for
Cryptosporidium (range=0.01 - 1.59 log
10
).
The intent of establishing treatment goals based on the
monitoring data is to aid the plant supervisor and the
design engineer in the routine operations and design of
the treatment facility.  Once a database of results was
established, routine operations could be based on
achieving a particular level of treatment without the need
for constant parasite monitoring.  Using the geometric or
arithmetic mean for determining this routine level of
treatment is problematic because the parasite levels are
frequently higher than the mean.
The 90th percentile or the maximum level observed is a
more appropriate parameter for setting treatment goals.
The 90th percentile is an arbitrary standard, but does
account for unusual circumstances (e.g., flooding,
turbidity peaks, spills) when the utility would normally
perform additional treatment.  The 90th percentile would
encompass the normal variation in parasite levels during
routine operations.  The relationship between the samples
where cysts were not detected (nondetect values) and the
samples where cysts were observed is noticeable. This
consistency between actual counts and nondetect values
permits an estimation of the 90th percentile, even when
cysts or oocysts are infrequently detected.  Another
advantage of the 90th percentile approach is the possibil-
ity of estimating a confidence interval around the linear
fit of the data.  In the authors’ experience, as more data
are collected, the linear fit is improved, and the 95
percent confidence interval is reduced.  With this
analytical approach, there is an incentive for utilities to
perform increased raw water monitoring because the
highest values can be eliminated from consideration.
At least 10 samples are required to determine the 90th
percentile.  Within the database examined, only seven
systems were examined 10 or more times (Figure 3).
Figure 1
Figure 2
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Table 5
Tabulation of Giardia and Cryptosporidium Data for each surface water treatment plant
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Comparison of treatment goals for the geometric means,
arithmetic average, 90th percentile, and maximum count
showed that the difference between the different calcula-
tions averaged 0.71 log
10
 for Giardia (range 0.36 to 1.1
log
10
) and 0.78 log
10




When data are limited (e.g., <10 samples) the maximum
level observed would provide protection against possible
peak occurrences of pathogens.  One limitation with the
maximum level guideline occurs when the maximum
count is a nondetect value.  For the Giardia data pre-
sented in Table 5 the maximum count was a nondetect
value for 17 (23.6 percent) of the 72 systems.  For six of
these systems, all values were nondetect (i.e., Giardia
cysts were not found in any samples).  For nine of the
systems, the maximum nondetect value was <0.5 log
10
higher than a value where an actual cyst had been
detected.  For three systems, the maximum nondetected
value ranged between 1 and 2 log
10
 higher than an actual
observed value.  For Cryptosporidium, the maximum
count was a nondetect value in 10 of the 72 systems
(13.9 percent).  The difference between the maximum
count and the maximum detected level value (i.e., the
next highest value when the maximum level is a
nondetect) for Cryptosporidium averaged 0.24 log
10
(range 0.006 to 0.52).
An example of the impact of a nondetect value on the
calculated level of Giardia  is illustrated by the data from
site 72 (Table 6).  Giardia cysts were detected only once
among the five samples collected.  The sample collected
on June 27, 1989, was during flood stage of the river and
raw water turbidity levels were estimated at 3,000 NTU.
The large amount of debris in the sample clogged the
filter after 3 gal (11.3L) was collected and resulted in a
concentrated pellet of 55 mL.  Because the analytical
methodology limits the size of the pellet processed to 1
mL, the sample would have required processing 55 times
(approximately 3 months of work) to analyze all 3 gal.
Because the assay also requires a monolayer of material
to be placed on the filter, only a small fraction of the
processed sample was analyzed.  The net result was that
an equivalent volume of 0.004 L was analyzed.  No cysts
were detected in the sample, but two oocysts were. The
statistical reliability of a value based on no observed
organisms (or for Cryptosporidium, a count of two
oocysts)  is extremely large (greater than 10 fold).
Additional testing during 1991 to 1992 failed to produce
such high results.  The impact, however, of this nondetect
value results in a maximum observed count treatment
goal of 7.5 log
10
 for Giardia and 7.2 log
10
 for
Cryptosporidium removal, inactivation or both.  A more
realistic treatment goal would be the next highest value,
which in this case was 42 cysts/L, or a treatment goal of
6.8 log
10
.  Providing routine treatment at this level
ensures ample protection for the situation in which
Giardia was observed (11 cysts/L requires 6.2 log
10
treatment to achieve 10-4 annual risk of Giardia infection)
and is more comparable to the arithmetic or geometric




Treatment objectives can be optimized
Once the raw water monitoring has been completed and
the treatment goals for a particular plant established, the
utility can focus options to routinely achieve these goals
and balance them with other water quality objectives.
For most systems, this means optimizing particle remov-
als through coagulation, sedimentation and filtration, and
balancing disinfection so that adequate microbial
inactivation is achieved along with minimal DBP
formation.  Improving particulate removal obviously
lessens reliance on disinfection.
For this study, particle counting (total particles > 3 m)
was used to evaluate the removal of parasites through the
treatment process.  Previous studies have shown correla-
tions between removals of Giardia and Cryptosporidium
and particle counts (9,26).  In this study, the systems
achieved an average 2.7-log
10
 removal of particles >3 m
(range=0.94 - 3.8 log
10
).  The difference between the
average level of particle removal for each system and the
treatment goal (based on the geometric mean of raw
water parasite counts) estimates the level of disinfection
Table 6
Giardia and Cryptosporidium Data for Site 72
Date Giardia/L Cryptosporidium
oocysts/L
June 27, 1989 <242 484
July 8, 1991 11 39
 December 2, 1991 <12 24
May 11, 1992 <4 12
August 3, 1992 <42 42
Figure 3
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that will be required under the ESWTR.  For Giardia, the
average system would need to supplement sedimentation
and filtration treatment with and additional 2.7 log
10
 of
disinfection (Figure 4).   All  systems examined required
more than the minimum 0.5 log
10
 disinfection as outlined
in the SWTR (25).  However, when the level of Giardia
inactivation was estimated at each facility, the average
system applied sufficient CxT to achieve 5.1-log
10
disinfection.  This estimate was based on the average pH
(7.5), temperature (15oC), and free chlorine residual (1.4
mg/L) for the samples analyzed (contact times were
adjusted for short circuiting in the basins) (12), and will
obviously change for different seasonal conditions.
However, when this estimate was compared to the level
of disinfection necessary to achieve the 10-4 annual risk
of infection, 64.3 percent of the systems exceeded the
amount of disinfection necessary to control Giardia and
an additional 15.7 percent were within 1 log
10
 of the
treatment goal.  An estimated 20 percent of the systems
would need to increase disinfection levels (2 - 3 log
10
),
whereas another 20 percent could reduce the level of
disinfection used by 10 log
10
 or more.
The importance of these estimates is to show that many
systems are currently meeting or exceeding the required
level of treatment—even for the ESWTR guidelines for
Giardia—and that a substantial number of systems could
reduce disinfection practices without impacting micro-
bial protection.  This finding is similar to previous results
showing that 76 percent of the systems examined
exceeded the 10-4 risk level for Giardia (7).  Additionally,
approximately 80 percent of these systems currently
meet the stage 1 D/DBP levels of 80 g/L for THMs and
60 g/L for haloacetonitriles despite the wide use of
prechlorination (27).  In these studies, however, approxi-
mately 80 percent of the CxT credit for Giardia inactiva-
tion came from prechlorination, usually because of the
long contact times in the sedimentation basins.  Elimina-
tion of prechlorination CxT credit under the D/DBP Rule
would jeopardize the ability of utilities to provide
adequate Giardia disinfection.  Moreover, reliance on
only postfilter disinfection removes one of  the elements
of the multiple barrier protection by not providing
options for backup disinfection should postfiltration
disinfection fail.  Because most systems would probably
still apply some prechlorination (even if no disinfection
credit is applied) to control algal growths and to improve
filter performance and oxidation for iron, manganese,
and taste and odor compounds, DBP levels could actually
increase because the water would have to be
rechlorinated for postfiltration CxT credit.  It is important
that USEPA more carefully study the integration of the
ESWTR and D/DBP rules and cautiously approach the
issue of changing predisinfection practices before these
regulations are promulgated.
Plant optimization, chlorination have prevented
cryptosporidiosis recurrences
Comparing the difference between particle count
removals and treatment goals for Cryptosporidium
reveals that the average system will need to provide 2.0-
log
10
 disinfection (range=0.5 - 2.6 log
10
) to meet a 10-4
annual risk of infection.  Although there is not a large
database of disinfection data for C yptosporidium, recent
studies have shown that a combination of free chlorine (1
mg/L for 60 min) and chloramines (2 mg/L for 240 min)
resulted in 1.6-log
10
 of oocyst inactivation (28).  Other
studies have suggested that multiple stresses could
increase oocyst inactivation under field conditions (29-
31).  Although much more disinfection data are needed,
especially under field conditions, the reassuring message
is that the combination of effective turbidity and particle
count reductions with chlorination may already be
achieving risk assessment goals for Cryptosporidium.
Indeed, plant optimization and chlorine disinfection has
been sufficient to prevent reoccurrences of
cryptosporidiosis outbreaks in the Carrollton Ga., Talent
Ore., and Milwaukee Wis. systems.  Because multiple
application of disinfection may be important for
Cryptosporidium inactivation, again, it is critical that
USEPA move cautiously regarding the elimination of
predisinfection practices.
Plant effluent results examined
For the 1991-93 study, Giardia cysts were detected in
filtered plant effluent water on 12 occasions (4.6 percent
of 262 samples).  When detected, Giardia levels aver-
aged 2.6 cysts/100 L (range=0.98 - 9.0 cysts/100 L).
Microscopic examination of the cysts suggested that the
majority of the organisms were dead.  More than 86
percent of the 22 cysts found in the water samples lacked
observable internal morphological structures, while only
one isolate had a peritrophic space (a potential indicator
of viability).  Because microscopic indicators of viability
are very broad and probably greatly over estimate the
potential to cause illness, there is little reason to believe




Cryptosporidium oocysts were observed in 35 (13.4
percent) of 262 plant effluent samples. When
Cryptosporidium was detected, levels averaged 3.3
oocysts/100 L (range=0.29 - 57 oocysts/100 L).  Micro-
scopic examination of the oocysts showed that 27 (35
percent) of 77 isolates contained sporozoites.  It is
uncertain whether any of these sporozoites were viable.
Overall, 16.8 percent of the samples (44 of 262) con-
tained Giardia, Cryptosporidium, or both.  These levels
are lower than the 39 percent rate for finished water
reported in the previous study (7), but probably reflect
the lower cyst and oocyst occurrence in the raw water
and improved treatment plant performance.  The relation-
ship between the levels of parasites in raw water and
their detection frequency in filtered water has already
been discussed (7,9).  In the 1991 study, the average
plant effluent turbidity level was 0.19 ntu, and 80.5
percent of the systems had turbidity levels less than 0.5
ntu.  In the current study, the average plant effluent
turbidity level was 0.14 ntu and 98.9 percent of the
plants had turbidity values less than 0.5 ntu.  The data
suggest that implementation of the SWTR (25) has
resulted in improvements in water quality.
A summary of the occurrence data for Giardia and
Cryptosporidium in filtered effluent water for all samples
collected between 1988 and 1993 showed that almost 28
percent of the plants (20 of 71) were positive for Giardia
cysts on one or more sampling occasions.  A total of 14
systems (19.7 percent) were positive for cysts on only
one occasion, whereas six systems were cyst-positive
two or more times.  For Cryptosporidium, 32 of 71 plants
(45 percent) were consistently negative, while 24 plants
were positive once and 15 plants were oocyst-positive
two or more times.  Forty-four of 71 (62 percent) of the
plants were positive for Giardia, Cryptosporidium, or
both at one time or another.  The results suggest that if
sampled often enough, Giardia or Cryptosporidium will
eventually be detected at nearly every plant.  Because the
parasite assay does not indicate viability or virulence, the
results do not necessarily indicate that these systems are
at risk from waterborne pathogens.  However, the results
do suggest that controlling coagulation and filtration
procedures for removal of Cryptosporidium will be more
difficult than control of Giardia.
Because conventional filtration will remove 99 to 99.7
percent of cysts and oocysts (25), it is reasonable to
expect that detection of cysts and oocysts in the raw
water will result in detectable levels in filtered effluents.
Because microscopic detection of cysts and oocysts in
treated water is an inefficient method for determining
plant performance and the confidence interval of
individual results is large, the best use of limited analyti-
cal resources would be to concentrate on developing a
raw water database for Giardia and Cryptosporidium
occurrence and to use other means, such as particle
counts, to determine treatment plant performance (9,25).
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The Public Health Response to an Outbreak*
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Introduction
The words ‘epidemic’ and ‘outbreak’ are synomonous and can be defined as the occurrence of cases of disease that is in
excess of what would normally be expected (1).  The word ‘outbreak’ is often preferred because it less likely to be
misinterpreted or sensationalized.  In the United States, local and state health departments are the front line respondents
to outbreaks of disease within their jurisdiction.  Outbreaks often represent a crisis situation that concurrently necessi-
tates intense thought, coordinated action, and crisis management by the public health community.  The successful
management of an outbreak requires that public health officials be able to recognize the occurrence of an outbreak,
mobilize and coordinate resources, conduct a thorough investigation, and rapidly institute control measures.  An outline
of the basic steps to conducting an outbreak investigation are found in Table 1.  In this article we provide an overview to
the detection and investigation of outbreaks, institution of control measures, and administrative aspects of the public
health response.
Detection and Confirmation of an Outbreak
For public health agencies to respond to an outbreak
there first must be recognition that an outbreak has
occurred.  Outbreaks are frequently recognized by health
care providers or public health workers who observe an
increase in cases of disease or constellations of unusual
signs and symptoms.  For example, in 1989, physicians
who evaluated three patients with eosinophilia and
severe myalgia in New Mexico reported these cases to
the New Mexico Department of Health.  These reports
stimulated an investigation that led to the discovery of a
nationwide outbreak of the eosinophilia-myalgia
syndrome associated with consumption of L-tryptophan
produced by a single pharmaceutical company (2).
Outbreaks due to some enteropathogens, including
unusual Salmonella serotypes, are often noted first by
state public health laboratorians who recognize an
increase in the number of isolates (3).  Finally, public
health officials may recognize outbreaks of diseases
which are reported through routine notifiable disease
surveillance when there is an increase in reported cases
of a disease.
Once an outbreak is suspected, it is essential to deter-
mine if reported cases represent true cases of disease.
Misdiagnosis or laboratory error need to be ruled out by
examination of cases, review of charts, and repeating
laboratory tests when indicated.  For example, a pseudo-
outbreak of Mycobacterium xenopi in a Michigan
hospital was uncovered when case-patient charts were
reviewed and the majority of those with isolates did not
have disease consistent with M. xenopi infection (4).
Epidemiologic investigation then revealed that cases
were associated with undergoing bronchoscopy with a
bronchoscope that had been rinsed with contaminated tap
water after disinfection. The presence of an outbreak can
be confirmed only if there has been a true increase in
cases of the disease over a baseline number of expected
cases.
Institution of Control Measures
When the occurrence of an outbreak has been confirmed,
measures to control the outbreak should be instituted as
quickly as possible.  For some diseases (e.g., syphilis,
tuberculosis, hepatitis A) specific control measures, such
as treatment of cases, cohorting, contact investigation,
and prophylaxis, are well established and can be initiated
simultaneously with the investigation.  However, when
the source of the outbreak, agent, or both is unknown, an
epidemiologic investigation must be conducted before
specific control measures can be implemented. The
decision to take public health action involves weighing
the strength of the epidemiologic data, the likely cost of
inaction with regard to morbidity and mortality, the cost
of taking action in terms of inconvenience, financial loss,
and possible complications of the action (e.g., burn
injuries secondary to boil water orders).  Public health
officials must quickly assess these factors and promptly
communicate a balanced picture to decision makers.
When epidemiologic data implicates a source or mode of
transmission of illness, prompt consideration should be
given to immediate intervention. In general, public health
officials should not wait for laboratory confirmation of
their epidemiologic findings to take action because
waiting for requisite laboratory data may substantially
delay the institution of control measures.
*This article originally appeared in Current Issues in Public
Health, 1996; 2:1-4.
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Table 1
Basic steps to an outbreak
investigation
1. Verify the existence of an epidemic
2. Confirm the diagnosis
3. Take immediate control measures
(if indicated)
4. Develop a case definition
5. Institute case-finding and count cases
6. Collect and orient the data in terms of time, place
and person
7. Develop hypotheses explaining the specific
exposure that caused disease
8. Test hypotheses using appropriate
epidemiologic and statistical methods
9. Plan additional systematic studies




Adapted from Selected Bibliography references 1 and 2
Administrative Aspects
The public health response to an outbreak is complex and
substantially transcends the issues regarding the scien-
tific investigation of the outbreak.  Other important
considerations include the need to attend to establishing
relationships, logistical considerations, resource manage-
ment, planning, and coordinated communication and
action; failure to address these considerations likely will
hamper the response to the outbreak.
For example, an important first step is to establish the
outbreak investigation team, define its leadership, and
specify goals early in the investigation.  The leadership
must organize the team to assure the assignment of
specific roles and an appropriate division of labor.
Resources that are needed to conduct the investigation
should be assessed early and, if needed, additional
resources should be sought immediately.  When out-
breaks require the involvement of personnel from local,
state, and federal agencies, it is essential that collaborative
and consultative relationships between health officials be
established immediately.  Local and state officials
generally bear the final responsibility for the response to
an outbreak in a specific jurisdiction.  Each aspect of the
investigation should be prioritized to allow team mem-
bers to optimize their efficiency, and the team should
meet regularly to review the progress of each portion of
the investigation and redirect resources to complete the
essential tasks.  Collected data should be routinely
compiled, discussed daily by the investigative eam, and
used to further direct the investigation.
Because the collection, testing, and reporting of speci-
mens obtained from cases and the environment to the
outcome of an outbreak investigation, whenever pos-
sible, laboratory scientists should be included in the
planning and conducting of the outbreak investigation.
Consideration should be given to dedicating personnel to
assure proper collection, recording of laboratory data,
and transport of laboratory specimens.  In addition,
outbreak investigations often may require the expertise
and cooperation of persons in other disciplines (e.g.,
engineers, agriculture and industry officials, veterinar-
ians, and entomologists) to conduct the investigation; the
roles of these experts should be defined early in the
investigation.  This type of multi-disciplinary approach
adds to the complexity of the overall investigation, often
necessitating increased effort and time to communicate
findings and coordinate the investigation.
Because outbreaks often garner intense public interest,
the news media may seek to report large amounts
information about outbreaks in a timely manner, includ-
ing facts, controversies, and stories of human interest.
The needs of public health officials usually are specifi-
cally directed toward informing the public of measures to
control and prevent disease while avoiding the creation
of biases which might affect the scientific investigations.
The differing priorites of the news media and public
health may create a tension between these two groups.
To facilitate the provision of information a single public
health spokesperson should be designated as the main
communicator with the news media.  This person should
be in regular and direct contact with the investigation
team, should provide the media regularly scheduled
updates regarding the outbreak, act as a buffer to allow
the outbreak investigation team uninterrupted time to
conduct the investigation, and should interpret and
communicate important findings using messages that can
be readily understood and used by the general public.
Investigational Aspects
Following confirmation of the occurrence of an outbreak,
the investigator must enhance surveillance to identify
additional cases.  Many cases initially may not be
recognized because of inadequate testing of patient
specimens and underreporting of cases to local public
health departments.  To enhance surveillance and case-
finding, public health officials must inform the medical
community about the presence of an outbreak, clinical
manifestations, laboratory tests used to confirm the
23Cryptosporidium and Water
diagnosis, available treatment, prophylaxis of case
contacts, means of preventing secondary spread, and the
importance of promptly reporting all suspected cases to
the health department.  When appropriate, increased
laboratory testing should be encouraged and, if neces-
sary, supported logistically and financially.  The health
department may decide to conduct active surveillance for
cases by directly contacting health care providers and
laboratorians.
Case definitions have great importance in enhancing
case-finding, delineating the study population, and
describing criteria for the illness under investigation.
The three basic components of a case definition are
specification of 1) conditions (e.g., signs and symptoms
and laboratory results); 2) the time period of exposure or
onset of illness; and 3) relevant geographic factors (e.g.,
place of residence, employment, or recreational and
social activities).  For the purpose of reporting of cases
by health care providers, case definitions with both high
sensitivity and specificity are preferred.  However, in
some situations a relatively sensitive, but less specific
case definition, may be used to enhance case finding and
improve characterization of the spectrum of disease.
Information gathered about cases should be evaluated in
terms of on the characteristics of person, place, and time,
and used to construct epidemic curves, spot maps, and
other characteristic profiles shared by case-patients.  This
information can then be used to formulate hypotheses
about the source or spread of the problem.  This process
also entails extensive interview of case-patients (particu-
larly those who became ill early in the outbreak),
determining the order and timing of key events and
activities, and inspecting the site or sites suspected to be
involved in the outbreak.   In addition to formulating
hypotheses about the source and the mode of transmis-
sion, the investigation can also assess the pathogenic
mechanisms, presence of a dose response, risk factors for
illness, effectiveness of the control measures utilized,
sequelae of disease, and costs engendered.
The identification of hypotheses and other key questions
will quide the design of epidemiologic, laboratory, and
environmental studies.  Choice of study populations,
control groups, means of data collection (personal
interview, telephone interview, or self-administered
questionnaire) and the design of questionnaires must be
considered carefully to assure validity and precision of
studies.  Epidemiologists need to be creative and
resourceful when considering study designs to answer
specific questions.  For example, the use of multiple
different control groups during investigations of
hantavirus infections in the Southwest was critical in
permitting investigators to elucidate different factors
associated with exposure to infection (5).  During the
large cryptosporidiosis outbreak in Milwaukee due to
community-wide exposure to a contaminated public
water supply, the investigation of special populations
such as short-term visitors who had only brief exposure
to Milwaukee water was useful to determine the incuba-
tion period, duration of community exposure, and the
frequency secondary transmission (6).  In these ex-
amples, restriction of the investigations to single control
groups or community members, respectively, would
likely have precluded the determination of answers to
important questions.
Questionnaires should be designed to allow the testing of
identified hypotheses, evaluation for confounding and
effect modification, and classification of varying levels
of exposure and illness.   Collection of data extraneous to
testing the identified hypotheses should be avoided.
Maintaining a questionnaire as brief, clear, and easy to
use as possible results in higher response rates and more
timely data collection.  To accomplish this, question-
naires should undergo extensive critique by colleagues,
be revised as needed, and, when possible, be pre-tested
on people representative of those who will ultimately be
administered the questionnaire.  Designing question-
naires is often a time consuming and difficult process,
but is worth the effort since there is no analysis that can
overcome collection of poor data.  There is great truth in
the maxim, “garbage in, garbage out.”
Investigations should be carried to completion.  Data
collected during the initial investigation should be
evaluated promptly and used to direct on-going hypoth-
esis generation.  Surveillance should be maintained after
the outbreak appears to subside and the efficacy of the
control measures assessed.  A final report should be
written promptly to document the investigation, the
findings, and recommendations made. Consideration
should be given to the broader implications of the
investigation’s findings for public policy, industry, and
science.  For investigations that make substantial
contributions in these areas, the investigators should
communicate of their findings in a timely manner to
colleagues in public health bulletins, abstracts, presenta-
tions, and journal articles.
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Key Words and Phrases
Acid-fast stain: The nonspecific staining procedure used by most medical laboratories for
detection of Cryptosporidium oocysts in stool specimens.
Action level: A specified concentration of a contaminant in water; if this concentration is
reached or exceeded, certain actions (e.g., further treatment and monitoring) must be
taken to comply with a drinking-water regulation.
Available chlorine level : See “Free residual chlorine level.”
Backflow: A reversal of the normal flow of water or other liquid caused by a negative-
pressure gradient (e.g., within a water system).  Also known as “siphonage.”
Boil water advisory: A statement advising persons to boil tap water before use because of
suspected microbial contamination.
Case definition: A standard set of criteria for deciding whether an individual should be
classified as having a disease.
Coagulation: The process of adding chemicals to water to gather particles for removal by
sedimentation and/or filtration.
Coliforms: Bacteria used as a measure of potential fecal contamination.  Elevated coliform
levels indicate poor water quality.
Contact time: The length of time water is exposed to a disinfectant (e.g., chlorine contact
time).
Cross-connection: Any physical connection between the water pipe(s) delivering water to a
customer and a source of contamination (e.g., a wastewater line) that might allow that
contamination to enter the water pipe.
Cyst: The infectious stage of Giardia and some other protozoan parasites that has a
protective wall, which enables it to survive in water and other environments.
DFA test (direct fluorescent antibody test): A test for Cryptosporidium that uses
fluorescence-labeled antibodies to detect oocysts under a microscope, used by some
medical laboratories for the detection of Cryptosporidium in stool specimens.
Disinfection: The treatment of water to inactivate, destroy, or remove pathogenic (disease-
producing) bacteria, viruses, parasites, and other microorganisms for the purpose of
making the water microbiologically safe for human consumption.
Disinfection byproducts: Chemicals formed in water by reactions between organic matter
and disinfectants.
Distribution system: System of water pipes, storage reservoirs, tanks, and other means used
to deliver drinking water to consumers.
EIA (enzyme immunoassay): A specific antigen or antibody detection test used by some
medical laboratories for the detection of Cryptosporidium in stool specimens.
Endemic level: The expected or “background” level of a disease or infectious agent within a
given area.
Epidemiologically linked case: A case in which the patient has had the same exposure as
one or more persons who have/had the disease.
Excystation: The release of the internal contents of cysts or oocysts.  The mechanism by
which ingested Cryptosporidium oocysts cause human and animal infection.
Fecal coliforms: An easily measured subset of the coliform group of bacteria, primarily
Escherichia coli, that is found mainly in the gut of warm-blooded animals, including
humans.  Its presence in water indicates that fecal pathogens (e.g., Cryptosporidium,
Giardia) may also be present.
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Fecal-oral route: Transmission involving oral ingestion of Cryptosporidium or other
organisms that have been excreted through feces.
Filter backwash: Water that contains material obtained by reversing the flow of water
through a filter to dislodge particles.
Filtration : The process of removing suspended particles from water by passing it through
one or more permeable membranes or media of small diameter (e.g., sand, anthracite, or
diatomaceous earth).
Finished water: The fully treated water (i.e., drinking water) which leaves a treatment plant.
Flocculation: The water-treatment process after coagulation that uses gentle stirring to cause
suspended particles to form larger, aggregated masses (floc). The aggregates are removed
from the water by a separation process (e.g., sedimentation, flotation, or filtration).
Free, residual chlorine level: The concentration of chlorine in water that is not combined
with other constituents and thus serves as an effective disinfectant.  Also known as
“available chlorine level.”
Ground water: Water extracted from under the ground (i.e., from a well or spring).
Immunocompromised, immunosuppressed, immunodeficient, immune-suppressed:
Terms used to describe a person whose immune system has a reduced ability to protect
the body from infection.
Indicator organism: An easily measured microorganism, or group of related organisms, that
indicates by its presence or concentration that pathogens may be present.
Information Collection Rule: A U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation
that requires water systems using surface water that serve 100,000 or more people and
water systems using ground water that serve 50,000 or more people to conduct
monitoring and/or treatment studies.  It also requires these water systems to report data to
the EPA and to make their findings public if required by the state.  This data will be used
in developing future regulations for disinfectants/disinfection byproducts and enhanced
surface water treatment.
Laboratory-confirmed case: A case that is confirmed by analysis of a stool, blood, or tissue
sample in a reliable laboratory (as opposed to a case identified only by a person’s
symptoms or reported symptoms).
Maximum-contaminant level: The maximum permissible concentration (level) of a
contaminant in water supplied to any water consumer.
Multiple barrier  system: The use of more than one barrier or protection and treatment in
series to ensure the safety of drinking water.  Multiple barriers may include wastewater
collection and treatment, protection of water sources, disinfection, protection of water
quality during storage and distribution, aggressive management, and adequate training.
Nephelometric turbidity units (NTU) : Measurement of turbidity (lack of clarity) of a
sample of water.
Oocyst: The infectious stage of Cryptosporidium parvum and some other coccidian parasites.
An oocyst has a protective shell-like wall that facilitates its survival in water and other
environments.
Point-of-use filter : Water filter installed at point just before water is drunk.  A faucet, for
example, is a “point-of-use.”
Protozoan: One-celled microscopic organism.
Raw water: Untreated, unfiltered water.
Reverse osmosis: A process that removes dissolved salts, metallic ions, and microbes from
water by forcing it through a semipermeable membrane.
27Cryptosporidium and Water
Sedimentation: The process of settling out suspended solid particles to the bottom of water.
Shedding: Releasing infective particles; excreting contagious germs.
Siphonage: See “backflow.”
Source water: Untreated, unfiltered water (e.g., water in lakes, rivers, and reservoirs) used to
produce drinking water.  Also known as “raw water.”
Spiking: A laboratory research method of adding oocysts to water to determine if filtration
systems are functioning properly; intentionally contaminating water with oocysts or other
microorganisms.
Stool specimen: A small sample of feces to be tested for the presence of oocysts or other
microorganisms.
Submicron: Less than 1 micron (1 millionth of a meter).
Supportive laboratory results: Laboratory results that support a diagnosis but do not prove it.
Surface water: The water in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, ponds, and oceans.
Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR): EPA regulation that requires water systems using
surface water, and ground water under the direct influence of surface water, to disinfect
their waters. It also requires all such systems to filter their water, unless the system can
meet certain EPA-specified criteria.
Suspected case: An instance of disease (e.g., cryptosporidiosis) that is suspected but is not
laboratory confirmed.
Total chlorine: Free and bound atoms of chlorine in water calculated together.
Total Coliform Rule:  EPA  regulation that sets a maximum limit and monitoring
requirements for total coliforms in drinking water. Total coliforms, which are not
generally pathogenic, are a group of closely related bacteria used to indicate
contamination problems in the distribution system, and thus the potential presence of
waterborne pathogens.
Total coliforms: Nonfecal and fecal coliforms calculated together to measure contamination
of a water sample.
Total coliform test: A measure that detects the presence or number of living coliform
bacteria in a water sample.
Transmission: Passing of infection from one person or animal to another.
Turbidity : The level of suspended matter (e.g., clay, silt, or plankton) in water, which causes
a loss of clarity or transparency.
Watershed: An area from which water drains to a particular body of water.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Information About Self-reported Or
Physician-reported Cases
Name of person who is ill Today’s date |__|__|-|__|__|-|__|__|
(Last, First) ______________________ MM DD YY
Address__________________________ Telephone No.____________________(home)
  __________________________ ____________________(work)
Sex_____ Age_____ Symptoms onset date  |__|__|-|__|__|-|__|__|
MM   DD   YY
Still having symptoms now? Y    N Total duration of symptoms ________________
Seen a physician?    Y    N If yes, name and number___________________
    ___________________
 If yes, diagnosis ________________________
Any laboratory work done?    Y    N If yes, what type (probe for blood and stool)
_______________________________________
If yes, results (probe for Cryptosporidium,
Giardia, Cyclospora) ______________________
Any of the following symptoms? Comments
Diarrhea Y N __________________________________
Nausea Y N __________________________________
Vomiting Y N __________________________________
Fever Y N __________________________________
Weight loss Y N __________________________________
Cramping Y N __________________________________
Immune compromised in any way (HIV, cancer chemotherapy, organ transplant recipient)?
Y N If yes, specify ___________________________
Are other family members ill with similar symptoms?    Y    N If yes, how many?______
If yes, specify
__________________________________________________________




Caller believes potential vehicle or source of the infection is__________________________
Report completed by _________________
34
Figure E
Note: Text in regular type is to be read to the respondent.
Text in CAPITALS is an instruction for the interviewer and should not be read to the respondent.
Text in italic is a suggestion for modification of the questionnaire to tailor the document to the ongoing investi-
gation.
CASE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CASE-CONTROL STUDY
ID: |__|__|__|__| Interviewer: _____________________________
Date of Interview: |__|__|-|__|__|-|__|__|
  MM    DD   YY
Interview Outcome Code: |__|__|
TITLE OF YOUR SURVEY/CASE-CONTROL STUDY
WHEN YOU MEET THE SUBJECT:
Hello, my name is (YOUR NAME).  I am from (STATE YOUR AFFILIATION).  We are conducting a study
designed to examine factors associated with the development of state the disease you are studying.  I am here to
speak with you about this study.
ARRANGE PRIVATE SETTING FOR INTERVIEW IF NOT DONE BY PHONE.
As I just mentioned, the purpose of this study is to tate specifically what the primary goal of the interview is,
i.e., to collect information on exposure factors for acquiring Cryptosporidium.  Your help in this study is very
important.  Your participation is voluntary and all information you give will be kept confidential to the extent
legally possible. Some of the questions may be sensitive.  You may refuse to answer any question at any time.
Neither your name nor any identifying information will appear on any report of the study.
ADMINISTER CONSENT FORM.
BEGIN INTERVIEW.
SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
CIRCLE CODE FOR PARTICIPANTS GENDER
MALE.......................................... 1
FEMALE..................................... 2
I would like to begin by asking you some basic questions about yourself.
A1. What is your full name? (LAST, FIRST, MI)__________________________________
A2. What is your home address?  (IF RESPONDENT REFUSES, ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN HIS/HER ZIP
CODE, EXPLAINING THAT INFORMATION ON THE GENERAL AREA WHERE HE/SHE LIVES IS
VERY IMPORTANT FOR EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT.)
______________________________________________________________________
A3. What is your work address?  (IF RESPONDENT REFUSES, ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN HIS/HER ZIP
CODE, EXPLAINING THAT INFORMATION ON THE GENERAL AREA WHERE HE/SHE WORKS
IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT.)
______________________________________________________________________
35
A4. What are your home and work phone numbers? (IF SUBJECT REFUSES FILL IN 8s IN THE BOXES.  IF
NONE, FILL IN 9s.)
|__|__|__|-|__|__|__|-|__|__|__|__| |__|__|__|-|__|__|__|-|__|__|__|__|
HOME WORK
A5. What is your date of birth? |___|___|-|___|___|
MONTH   YEAR










A7. What type of residence are you living in now? (List the appropriate possibilities with codes for your
population such as a private home, apartment, condominium, a group residence, a homeless shelter etc....
Codes should include 7 for other, 8 for refused, and 9 for unknown or blank responses.)
A8. How many individuals currently live in your household? |__|__|
SECTION B: CLINICAL INFORMATION
(The questions in this section relate to symptoms experienced by the case patient.  Modify and/or delete as
appropriate if the questionnaire is being used to interview a control patient.)
Now I would like to ask you some questions about your illness.
B1. What was the approximate date your symptoms began? |__|__|-|__|__|-|__|__|
 MM   DD   YY





B3. How long have you had these symptoms? (RECORD AS NUMBER OF DAYS.  CROSS CHECK THE
RESPONSE BY SUBTRACTING THE DATE OF THE INTERVIEW FROM THE DATE OF ONSET OF
SYMPTOMS.) |__|__|__|
B4. Have you had any of the following symptoms? (READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.  CLARIFY















NO SYMPTOMS......................... 00 (GO TO B12)
B5. Have you consulted a health care provider for your symptoms?
YES............................................ 1
NO.............................................. 2 (GO TO B8)
REFUSED................................... 8 (GO TO B8)
UNKNOWN................................ 9 (GO TO B8)
B6. What was his or her name, address, and telephone number?
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
B7. What was the diagnosis? (RECORD THE RESPONDENT’S ANSWER VERBATIM AND CODE
LATER.)____________________________
_________________________________________________________ |__|__|
B8. Has any laboratory work been done,  such as a blood test and/or a stool examination?
YES............................................ 1
NO.............................................. 2 (GO TO B10)
REFUSED................................... 8 (GO TO B10)
UNKNOWN................................ 9 (GO TO B10)
B9. What were the results of the test(s)? (RECORD THE RESPONDENT’S ANSWER VERBATIM, AND
VERIFY WITH THE LAB AND CODE LATER.)
BLOOD__________________________________________ |__|__|
STOOL__________________________________________ |__|__|
B10. Were you hospitalized as a result of your symptoms?
YES............................................ 1
NO.............................................. 2 (GO TO B12)
REFUSED................................... 8 (GO TO B12)
UNKNOWN................................ 9 (GO TO B12)
B11. How many days were you hospitalized? |__|__|
B12. Do you have a weakened immune system ?  In other words, are you HIV positive, receiving cancer





B13. Had you regularly been taking any medication before your symptoms began?
YES............................................ 1
NO.............................................. 2 (GO TO LINE BEFORE B15)
REFUSED................................... 8 (GO TO LINE BEFORE B15)
UNKNOWN................................ 9 (GO TO LINE BEFORE B15)
B14. Tell me the name of this (these) medications.  (RECORD THE RESPONDENT’S ANSWER





IF RESPONDENT LIVES ALONE, GO TO SECTION C.
B15. Are other members of your household ill with similar symptoms?
YES............................................ 1
NO.............................................. 2 (GO TO SECTION C)
REFUSED................................... 8 (GO TO SECTION C)
UNKNOWN................................ 9 (GO TO SECTION C)
B16. How many members are ill? (CODE 88 FOR REFUSAL, 99 FOR UNKNOWN.) |__|__|
B17. What is his (her, their) relationship to you, and his (her, their) age and gender?
RELATION_____________|__|__|    AGE |__|__|       GENDER (M=1, F=2) |__|
RELATION_____________|__|__|    AGE |__|__|       GENDER (M=1, F=2) |__|
RELATION_____________|__|__|    AGE |__|__|       GENDER (M=1, F=2) |__|
SECTION C: EXPOSURE INFORMATION
(Questions in this section should be added, deleted, and/or tailored to the specific situation being investigated,
and to whether the respondent is a case or control patient.  The time of reference should be between 2 and 4
weeks before the onset of the illness.)
I would like to move on to some questions about how you might have acquired your illness.  First, I would like
to concentrate on your exposure to water during the 2 weeks before you became ill.  (EMPHASIZE THE TIME
FRAME OF INTEREST.)
C1. What were your sources of drinking water at home?  (READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
Municipal water from the tap.............................. 1 (GO TO C4)
Municipal water processed with a home filter..... 2
Well water.......................................................... 3 (GO TO C4)
Commercially bottled water................................ 4 (GO TO C4)
(SPECIFY NAME)_____________________
Other (SPECIFY)_________________________ 7 (GO TO C4)
REFUSED........................................................... 8 (GO TO C4)
UNKNOWN........................................................ 9 (GO TO C4)




C3. When was the last time you changed the filter element?  (CODE 8 FOR REFUSED AND 9 FOR
UNKNOWN, E.G. 99-99.) |__|__|-|__|__|
 MM YY
C4. What were your sources of drinking water at school or at work?  (READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT
APPLY.)
Municipal water from the tap............................................ 01
Municipal tap water with more filtration at work............. 02
Municipal tap water filtered at home and taken to work... 03
Well water......................................................................... 04







DOES NOT GO TO SCHOOL OR WORK..................... 00
C5. Before you became ill, on average, how many glasses of water did you drink in a day?  (RECORD THE
NUMBER FOR HOME AND SCHOOL/WORK CONSUMPTION SEPARATELY.  FILL IN 8s FOR
REFUSED, 9s FOR UNKNOWN, AND 0s FOR NOT APPLICABLE.)
|__|__| |__|__|
HOME      SCHOOL/WORK
C6. What was your usual source of ice during the 2 weeks before you became ill?  (READ AND CIRCLE
ALL THAT APPLY.)
Tap water from your home.................................. 1
Tap water from your school/work....................... 2
Commercially bought ice..................................... 3
(SPECIFY BRAND AND LOCATION)
_________________________________
_________________________________




C7. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you drink any beverage made with water, such as ice-tea
or lemonade, at a restaurant, picnic, fair, or other social event?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO C9)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO C9)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO C9)




  MM    DD   YY
(Duplicate this information for each restaurant and/or event.)
C9. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you swim in a pool, lake or river?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO C15)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO C15)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO C15)
C10. Where did you swim?
BODY OF WATER_____________________________ |__|
LOCATION___________________________________ |__|
C11. Do you remember if you put your face in the water?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO C15)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO C15)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO C15)
ID:
39
C12. Did you get any of the water in your mouth?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO C15)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO C15)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO C15)
C13. Do you remember accidentally swallowing any of the water?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO C15)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO C15)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO C15)
C14. Please estimate how much water you swallowed.  (READ.)
A mouthful................................... 1
Several mouthfuls......................... 2
The equivalent of a glass............... 3
REFUSED................................... 8
UNKNOWN................................ 9
C15. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you bathe in a hot tub or jacuzzi?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C17)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C17)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C17)
C16. Where did you bathe in this hot tub or jacuzzi?
LOCATION_________________ |__|
Now I would like to concentrate on your exposure to food during the 2 weeks b fore you became ill.
(EMPHASIZE THE TIME FRAME OF INTEREST AGAIN.)
C17. During an average week, how many meals did you eat outside your home, including breakfast, lunch, and
dinner, and any take out food ordered and brought home? (CODE 00 FOR NONE, 88 FOR REFUSED,
AND 99 FOR UNKNOWN.  IF NONE, THEN GO TO C19.)
NUMBER OF MEALS |__|__|
C18. How is food served at these restaurants?  (READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
Take-out or Drive-thru..................... 01





C19. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, how many times did you eat the following food items?
(CODE 0 FOR NONE, 8 FOR REFUSED, AND 9 FOR UNKNOWN.)
Lettuce or garden salad................................................................ |__|
Other cold salads such as coleslaw, potato salad, or pasta salad... |__|
Cold cuts, chicken salad, egg salad, or tuna salad......................... |__|
Raw vegetables such as carrots, tomatoes, and cucumbers............. |__|
Raw fruits such as strawberries and raspberries.......................... |__|
ID:
40
C20. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you drink unpasteurized milk, unpasteurized apple juice,
and/or eat any unpasteurized products?
YES............................................ 1
NO.............................................. 2 (GO TO C22)
REFUSED................................... 8 (GO TO C22)
UNKNOWN................................ 9 (GO TO C22)
C21. What unpasteurized product(s) did you eat?
___________________________ |__|







C22. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you begin eating any new health foods or begin using any
new dietary supplements?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO C24)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO C24)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO C24)
C23. What were these new products?
___________________________ |__|







C24. During the two weeks before you became ill, did you use any nontraditional or
alternative treatments or therapies?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO C26)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO C26)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO C26)
C25. What product(s) did you use?
___________________________ |__|







C26. Before you became ill, where did you do most of your grocery shopping? (READ AND CIRCLE ALL
THAT APPLY.)
(List and code groceries found in the location being investigated.  If there are specialty markets or stores,
make sure to collect information on what products were bought at each store.)
ID:
41
C27. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you go to any of the following bars, clubs, and/or discos?
(READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
(List clubs, bars etc...found in the location being investigated and code.)
C28. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you attend any parties, weddings, receptions, banquets, or
other events?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C30)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C30)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C30)




  MM     DD      YY
(Duplicate this information for each event.)
I would now like to ask you a few questions about your travel history.
C30. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you travel within the state?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO C32)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO C32)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO C32)
C31. Please give me the locations and the number of days you spent at each location.
___________________________ |__|__| |__|__|







C32. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you travel to another state within the United States?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO C34)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO C34)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO C34)
C33. Please give me the name of the cities and states, and the number of days you spent in each state.
___________________________ |__|__| |__|__|









C34. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you travel to another country?
YES............................................ 1
NO..............................................2 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C36)
REFUSED...................................8 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C36)
UNKNOWN................................9 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C36)
C35. Please tell me which country (ies) and the number of days you spent in each country.
___________________________ |__|__| |__|__|







Next, I would like to ask you some questions about person to person and person to animal exposures.





C37. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, were you involved in any of the following types of activities?
(READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
Food handling.............................. 1 (GO TO C38)
Child care..................................... 2 (GO TO C39)
Animal care outside of household 3 (GO TO C40)
Patient care.................................. 4 (GO TO C41)
Other (SPECIFY)_____________ 7 (GO TO C42)
REFUSED.................................... 8 (GO TO C42)
UNKNOWN................................. 9 (GO TO C42)
C38. What type of food handling or preparation were you involved with?  (READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT
APPLY.)
Hot food preparation.................................. 1
Cold food preparation................................ 2
As server or waiter..................................... 3
As bartender............................................... 4




C39. What type of child care work were you involved in?  (READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
Out of home child care center.................... 1
(SPECIFY NAME)_______________
In-home child care center.......................... 2







C40. What type of animal care were you involved in?  (READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
Work in a pet store.................................... 1
Work on a farm.......................................... 2















C42. Do you have children in out of home child care?
YES............................................ 1
NO.............................................. 2 (GO TO LINE BEFORE C44)
REFUSED................................... 8 (GO TO LINE BEFORE C44)
UNKNOWN................................ 9 (GO TO LINE BEFORE C44)
C43. Where is the out of home child care located?
NAME/ADDRESS__________________  |__|
IF THE CASE PATIENT IS 5 YEARS OLD OR LESS, ASK QUESTION C44.  OTHERWISE GO TO
QUESTION C46.
C44. Does the child who is ill attend a child care center?
YES................................................ 1
NO.................................................. 2 (GO TO C46)
REFUSED...................................... 8 (GO TO C46)
UNKNOWN................................... 9 (GO TO C46)
C45. Where is the child care center located?
NAME/ADDRESS__________________ |__|
C46. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you come in contact with anyone who had diarrhea,
including (READ AND CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)










C47. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you visit a person who was ill with an intestinal problem,
e.g., diarrhea, nausea, or vomiting?
YES.............................................. 1
NO.............................................. 2 (GO TO C49)
REFUSED................................... 8 (GO TO C49)
UNKNOWN................................ 9 (GO TO C49)
C48. Where did you visit this person? (READ.)
In a hospital.................................. 1
In a nursing home......................... 2
In a hospice.................................. 3





C49. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you visit anyone in a hospital, nursing home, and/or
hospice?
YES............................................. 1
NO............................................... 2 (GO TO C52)
REFUSED.................................... 8 (GO TO C52)
UNKNOWN................................. 9 (GO TO C52)
C50. What is this person’s relationship to you, and his or her age and gender?
RELATION_____________|__|__|           AGE |__|__|       GENDER (M=1, F=2) |__|
C51. Where was this person located?
LOCATION__________________ |__|






C53. During the 2 weeks before you became ill, did you come in contact with young animals, that is animals
who are less than 6 months of age?
YES............................................. 1
NO............................................... 2 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C56)
REFUSED................................... 8 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C56)
UNKNOWN................................ 9 (GO TO INTRO BEFORE C56)
C54. How did you come in contact with these young animals?  For example, were they (READ AND CIRCLE
ALL THAT APPLY.)
Pets in a house........................................... 1
Animals on a farm...................................... 2






C55. What types of young animals did you come in contact with?  (List appropriate animals for this
investigation or leave open ended as needed.)
Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about possible sexual exposures.  Some of these ques-
tions may be very personal.  I would like to remind you that you may refuse to answer any question at
any time.
(Design questions C56 and on to collect information on sexual practices that could involve oral exposure
to fecal matter.)



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Definitions of many of the following terms can be found in “Key Words and Phrases,” on pages 25
through 27 of the Appendix.
acid-fast stain ............................................................ 3-3, 3-4
AIDS ......................................................................... 1-2, 2-2, 4-11, 5-9, 5-10, 5-11, 6-3, 6-8
animals ...................................................................... 3-1, 5-5, 5-7, 5-8, 5-10, 5-11, 6-3, 6-4, 6-9, 6-10
assay ......................................................................... 3-3, 4-12, 4-13
assay kit .................................................................... 3-4, 3-5
boil water advisory ................................................... 1-6, 4-2, 4-14, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14,
.................................................................................. 5-15, 5-16, 5-18, 5-19, 5-20, 5-21
bottled water ............................................................. 1-4, 5-8, 5-3, 6-5, 6-11, 6-12
case definition ........................................................... 5-1, 5-2
CDC .......................................................................... 1-9, 3-8, 4-17, 5-9, 7-3
chain of command .................................................... 1-3
chlorine ..................................................................... 4-1, 5-10, 5-14, 5-17, 7-1
clinic ......................................................................... 4-11, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-13
clinical laboratory ..................................................... 1-2, 3-1, 3-8
coagulation ............................................................... 4-1, 4-2, 4-15
coliform .................................................................... 1-4, 4-2, 5-4
coliform bacteria test ................................................ 4-2
contact time............................................................... 4-15
cross-connection ....................................................... 4-15, 4-16
cyst ............................................................................ 5-8, 5-13, 5-14, 5-19
day care ..................................................................... 1-2, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-5, 5-6
dental office .............................................................. 1-6, 5-18
dishwashing .............................................................. 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17, 5-18, 5-20
disinfection ............................................................... 4-1, 4-15, 5-4, 5-17, 7-1, 7-2
distilled water ........................................................... 5-8
distribution system.................................................... 2-2, 4-2, 4-15, 4-16, 5-4
drinking water quality ............................................... 1-2, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 4-1, 4-2
EIA (enzyme immunoassay)..................................... 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 4-12
endemic level ............................................................  3-1
enteric pathogen........................................................ 3-2
environmental sampling ........................................... 2-3, 4-3
EPA ........................................................................... 1-1, 1-3, 4-2, 4-3, 4-15, 4-17, 5-4, 6-5, 6-6
Escherichia coli (E. Coli)......................................... 3-3, 4-2
fact sheets ................................................................. (see Chapter 6)
fecal accident ............................................................  7-1, 7-2
fecal coliform............................................................ 4-2
filter .......................................................................... 1-4, 2-1, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-5, 4-14, 5-4, 5-5, 5-8,
.................................................................................. 5-10, 5-11, 5-19, 5-21, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12,
.................................................................................. 6-13, 6-14
filtration .................................................................... 1-4, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-15, 5-4, 7-2
finished water ........................................................... 1-4, 1-9, 2-3, 4-2, 4-3, 4-14, 4-15, 4-16
flocculation ............................................................... 4-1, 4-2, 4-15
Giardia ......................................................................4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-6, 4-7, 4-10, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13,
.................................................................................. 4-15
ground water ............................................................. 4-1
guides ........................................................................ (see Chapter 6)
health department ..................................................... 1-1, 1-4, 1-6, 1-7, 2-2, 2-3, 5-1, 5-2, 5-4, 5-5,
.................................................................................. 5-7, 5-13, 5-14, 5-15, 5-18, 5-19, 6-5, 6-8
HIV ........................................................................... 1-8, 5-18, 6-1, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-9
hospitals .................................................................... 1-2, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 2-2, 3-1, 5-13
hotel .......................................................................... 1-4
hot tubs ..................................................................... 6-4, 6-10, 6-11
ice ............................................................................. 1-4, 6-5, 6-10
ice makers ................................................................. 5-20, 5-21
ICR (Information Collection Rule)................................2-1
immunocompromised ............................................... 5-17, 5-18
immunosuppressed ................................................... 1-2, 1-5, 5-11, 7-2
infection control ........................................................ 5-1
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